The Office of Police Oversight (OPO) developed final recommendations to revise the Austin Police Department’s (APD) use-of-force policies. The policy areas covered in this report include restricting shooting at moving vehicles, exhausting all alternatives before using deadly force, de-escalation, duty to intervene, banning chokeholds and strangleholds, and warning before shooting. OPO’s final recommendations incorporated community feedback and compared APD’s current use-of-force policies to national best practices in policing.
APD, with support from the City Manager's Office, will review OPO's final recommendations before incorporating them into the General Orders. APD will bring the changes to the General Orders to City Council for feedback before they are implemented, as instructed by City Council.
In June 2020, City Council passed a series of resolutions aimed at restricting the use of force by law enforcement. As part of those resolutions, the City Manager directed the OPO to facilitate a rewrite of the Austin Police Department (APD) policy manual, known as the General Orders. The rewrite will cover all policies, including those surrounding issues like search and seizure, body-worn cameras, dashboard cameras, mental health response, discipline, bias, language, and courtesy.
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Community Feedback and
Final Recommendations for
8 Can't Wait Policy Initiatives
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
BACKGROUND
COMMUNITY FEEDBACK ON
USE-OF-FORCE POLICIES
OVERARCHING THEMES
GENERAL IMPRESSIONS FROM
COMMUNITY FEEDBACK
CONCLUSION & NEXT STEPS
APPENDICES
ENDNOTES
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47
60
6
8
61
86
BAN CHOKEHOLDS AND
STRANGLEHOLDS
WARN BEFORE SHOOTING
Analysis of community
feedback
Recommendations from
community feedback
RESTRICT SHOOTING AT
MOVING VEHICLES
DE-ESCALATION
EXHAUST ALL
ALTERNATIVES BEFORE
USING DEADLY FORCE
DUTY TO INTERVENE IN
CASES OF IMPROPER OR
EXCESSIVE FORCE
Analysis of community
feedback
Recommendations from
community feedback
Analysis of community
feedback
Recommendations from
community feedback
Analysis of community
feedback
Recommendations from
community feedback
Analysis of community
feedback
Recommendations from
community feedback
Analysis of community
feedback
Recommendations from
community feedback
Data collection
Synthesis Process
Community feedback on use-of-force policies
Narrative Insights
General Impressions from Community
Feedback
APPENDIX A - METHODOLOGY
APPENDIX B - COMPARING OPO’S PROPOSED
RECOMMENDATIONS WITH BEST PRACTICES
APPENDIX C - DATA VISUALIZATIONS OF
QUANTITATIVE COMMUNITY FEEDBACK
Table of Contents
47% of respondents agreed that officers should be prohibited from the
act of shooting while driving or riding in a moving vehicle, while another
47% disagreed
While those who supported allowing shooting at moving vehicles were
concerned about limiting officers’ tactical options, some community
members incorrectly believed that officers are trained on this tactic.
Community members who supported limiting shooting at a moving
vehicle responded that it could put bystanders at risk.
Restrict shooting at moving vehicles
Office of Police Oversight
Executive Summary
52% of respondents said police should use all available alternatives
before using deadly force.
Community members in favor of changing APD policy expressed a need
for more predictability in interactions with the police, particularly for
people with mental health conditions who are at risk for unnecessary
deadly force.
Those who supported the existing policy were concerned that the
proposed change in policy would limit officer discretion.
Exhausting all alternatives before using deadly force
61% of respondents said that policies should acknowledge or address
factors that could affect someone’s ability to follow an officer’s orders,
such as a disability, a mental health condition, or fear.
Community members were split on whether violence is integral to
policing or is not integral and should be de-emphasized.
Community members who supported change reasoned that de-
escalation is significant for people living with a mental health condition.
De-escalation
In January 2021, the Office of Police Oversight (OPO) published a review of six use-of-force policies
within the Austin Police Department (APD) policy manual, known as the General Orders. At the
direction of the Austin City Council and the City Manager, OPO compared APD’s use-of-force policies
to national best practices in policing and made recommendations. In May 2021, OPO engaged
community members through a series of virtual events and a survey. The purpose of the events and
survey was to gather feedback on APD’s current use-of-force policies and OPO’s recommended
changes. Community members submitted more than 1,400 surveys with more than 2,200 comments.
This report summarizes the community’s feedback on APD’s use-of-force policies and OPO’s
proposed changes. Below are the highlights of community sentiment on APD use-of-force policies.
Community feedback on specific APD use-of-force policies
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Office of Police Oversight
Executive Summary
6
80% of respondents said that any officers who witness improper or
excessive use of force by any other officer and do not interfere should be
required to report the full circumstances of the incident.
Feedback related to this topic showed overwhelming support for a policy
that would require officers to intervene for professional and ethical
integrity reasons.
Some community members in support of a duty-to-intervene policy
expressed concern about protecting officers who do the reporting or
intervene.
Duty to Intervene
6
53% of respondents agreed that chokeholds and strangleholds should be
banned outright.
Community members who supported such a ban reported that chokeholds
involve too much risk of becoming unintentionally lethal, that this tactic
instills fear in the community, and that there should be more training on
alternative procedures.
Many responses in support of allowing the use of chokeholds were based
on the assumption that APD officers are trained on this tactic when, in
fact, they are not. A minority of community members also believed that
chokeholds and strangleholds are not actually deadly.
Ban Chokeholds and strangleholds
55% of respondents believed that policy must specify how an officer
should give a warning before shooting.
Community members who supported changing APD policy said that the
current policy doesn’t account for situations where a person may not hear
or understand an officer’s warning, including those who do not
understand English or are living with a mental health condition.
Community members who did not support changes to APD policy were
concerned that officers might not have enough time to provide a warning
in every situation, so this policy change could put them in danger.
Warn before shooting
4
Office of Police Oversight
Executive Summary
Lethal force tactics may undermine efforts to build community trust in police. To begin to build
community trust, APD should focus on reducing its use of lethal force tactics and eliminating
unnecessary instances of lethal force.
APD policy should be revised to categorically prohibit the use of maneuvers that could
negatively impact air intake or blood flow.
APD should revise policy to prioritize community and officer safety by prohibiting force tactics
that are ineffective and on which officers are not trained. Failure to do so may lead to an
increased risk of uncontrollable consequences.
Policies and training should be examined and revised to ensure that all community-police
interactions reflect a service-minded and situationally-aware approach.
Changes to APD policy should be based on best practices, including evidence-based practices,
that prioritize community and officer safety.
APD should revise policy and training to focus on equity and accountability, particularly by
providing clearer guidelines to officers. Consistent equitable treatment of community members
and consistent accountability for officers who engage in misconduct can help increase
predictability in community-officer interactions, which can help improve trust within the
community and combat issues of disproportionate or disparate treatment.
APD policy should include more defined terms and procedures to ensure officers are better
informed of department expectations and prepared for their work in the field. Policies inform
training, so policies that include defined terms and procedures can help ensure that officers are
well prepared for the field. This can help improve officer and community safety.
Additional community feedback on APD use of force
APD, with support from the City Manager's Office, will review OPO's final recommendations
before incorporating them into the General Orders.
APD will bring changes to the General Orders to City Council for feedback before they are
implemented, as instructed by City Council.
Next Steps
5
Background
Office of Police Oversight
This report concludes a three-phase process led by the Office of Police Oversight (OPO). The
process was initiated after several resolutions were passed by the Austin City Council in June 2020.
City Council Resolutions to Reimagine Public Safety
In June 2020, City Council passed a series of resolutions aimed at restricting the use of force by law
enforcement and reimagining public safety in Austin. As part of those resolutions, the City Manager
directed the OPO to facilitate a rewrite of the Austin Police Department (APD) policy manual, known
as the General Orders. The rewrite that OPO has been tasked with facilitating will cover all policies,
including those related to search and seizure, body-worn cameras, dashboard cameras, mental
health response, discipline, bias, language, and courtesy.
The City Manager also directed OPO to issue recommendations on use-of-force policies. Policies
regarding the use of force cover a wide range of topics, including de-escalation, exhausting all
alternatives before using deadly force, impact munitions, TASER devices, chokeholds, and
comprehensive reporting.
Three-Phase Approach
OPO developed a three-phase approach to conduct the rewrite of APD’s General Orders related to 8
Can’t Wait.
In Phase I, OPO examined relevant APD policies and researched best practices related to those
policies. OPO published a report in January 2021 highlighting the main concerns with existing policy
language and recommended policy changes. The report examined whether APD’s current policies
aligned with best practices and the City of Austin’s official position on these topics. Additionally,
OPO examined whether APD’s policies aligned with the model policies at the center of 8 Can’t Wait,
an initiative by Campaign Zero that advocates for policies that reduce the use of deadly force by
police.
In Phase II, OPO conducted a community engagement campaign to gather feedback on APD’s current
policies and OPO’s proposed policy changes. The campaign included outreach through events and
surveys. This community engagement effort aligned with OPO’s community-centered approach to
oversight and City Council’s directive that OPO conduct the General Orders rewrite through an open
process, seeking feedback and input from the community.
Finally, in Phase III, OPO compiled and analyzed the community feedback collected in Phase II. This
report discusses that analysis and proposes final policy recommendations to APD. APD, in
consultation with the City Manager’s Office, will review the recommendations before incorporating
them into the General Orders. APD will subsequently bring the proposed modified General Orders
to City Council for feedback before implementing them.
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Background
Office of Police Oversight
Community feedback on use-of-force policies are conclusions drawn from the quantitative and
qualitative data directly related to the six use-of-force policy topics.
Overarching themes reflect the sentiments expressed by community members through answers
to open-ended survey questions. These insights are not necessarily specific to use-of-force
policies, but rather reflect community feedback on APD's policies overall.
General impressions from community feedback are topics that OPO saw repeatedly across data,
but that are not necessarily related to policy. Many of these sentiments reflect community
concerns about policing and reform more broadly. Unlike the previous two sections, this section
does not include recommendations.
Analysis of Community Feedback
OPO analyzed more than 1,400 survey responses, including 2,200 qualitative responses, to produce
three categories of information in this report:
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Community Feedback on Use-of-Force Policies
Office of Police Oversight
OPO based its preliminary recommendations on a comparative analysis between APD’s current
policies and those of 100 other U.S. police departments. Recommendations were also based on
research into best practices from police organizations like the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)
and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). These are both organizations from which
APD and other police departments draw their policies and training.
Next, this section will discuss community feedback collected during Phase II: OPO’s community
engagement campaign to gather input from the public about proposed changes to policies. This
outreach effort included four virtual forums hosted on Zoom, digital surveys collected via SpeakUp,
Austin! and Zoom, and other forms of community engagement.
OPO analyzed more than 1,400 survey responses to produce community feedback on use-of-force
policies. Community feedback on use-of-force policies are conclusions drawn from the quantitative
and qualitative data related to the six use-of-force policy topics. Quantitative data consisted of
answers to sixteen multiple-choice questions collected in the survey. Qualitative data consisted of
answers to two open-ended questions in the survey and comments recorded during four virtual
community events.
Both sets of data were analyzed to understand whether community members felt policy changes were
needed, whether community members were amenable to changes proposed by the Office of Police
Oversight, and whether community members’ responses highlighted any other related considerations.
This section will include high-level summaries of the qualitative and quantitative data, with direct
quotations from community members. The quotations in this report are unedited and were selected to
highlight the diversity of opinions across the community.
Finally, this analysis recommends ways for APD to change its use-of-force policies in a manner that
aligns with community perspectives. All recommendations within this section also align with current
best practices for safeguarding the safety of community members and police officers.
This section discusses community feedback on use-of-force policies. The feedback is categorized
by policy topic and is drawn from both quantitative and qualitative data.
The first part of this analysis will revisit the findings and recommendations published in OPO’s
Phase I report: 8 Can’t Wait Policy Review and Recommendations. OPO’s Phase I report covered the
following six policy areas related to use of force:
1. Restrict shooting at moving vehicles
2. Exhaust all alternatives before using deadly force
3. De-escalation
4. Duty to intervene in cases of improper or excessive use of force
5. Ban chokeholds and strangleholds
6. Warn before shooting
15
8
Restrict Shooting at Moving Vehicles
Office of Police Oversight
Research shows that shooting at moving vehicles is a dangerous and ineffective tactic with a high
risk of injuring bystanders. Campaign Zero's 8 Can't Wait initiative recommends that police
departments restrict the circumstances under which officers may shoot at moving vehicles.
In Resolution 95, the Austin City Council said it was the official policy of the City that “[u]se of
deadly force against individuals, including persons fleeing (in vehicle or on foot), shall be limited to
situations where necessary for self-defense or defense of others against an imminent deadly threat
or threat of serious bodily injury, and either there were no other reasonable alternatives to prevent
serious injury, or death or all reasonable alternatives have been exhausted.”
APD's current policy is silent on the issue of shooting from moving vehicles and does not sufficiently
restrict shooting at moving vehicles. Increasing restrictions on shooting at moving vehicles has
been shown to contribute to a reduction in officer-involved shootings.
Click here for OPO's Phase I analysis of this policy topic.
Analysis of community feedback on restricting shooting at moving vehicles
51% of respondents reported that they felt safe with the current policy on shooting at moving
vehicles
56% of respondents disagreed that, under all circumstances, shooting at moving vehicles should
be prohibited
47% of respondents agreed that officers should be prohibited from the act of shooting while
driving or riding in a moving vehicle, while another 47% disagreed
Quantitative Data
Qualitative Data
Over half of respondents supported the current policy for shooting at moving vehicles, and believe it
should be allowed when necessary. Some respondents support shooting at moving vehicles because
they believe an officer is adequately trained on this action; however, APD officers are not trained in
this area.
Those who expressed support for restricting shooting at moving vehicles reasoned that it can be
inaccurate and unsafe due to the additional variables created by a vehicle in motion. Additionally,
community members expressed concern that a moving vehicle could be perceived as a threat when,
in fact, there was no threat. For example, an officer may perceive a vehicle in motion as a threat,
even if it is driving away from officers and bystanders. Further, those who supported OPO's policy
changes responded that there should be more guidelines within this policy, and that shooting at
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Restrict Shooting at Moving Vehicles
moving vehicles should be restricted except for instances when a vehicle poses immediate, life-
threatening danger.
Those who responded that no change was needed reasoned that a car could be used as a weapon
and that situations happen too quickly to restrict officers. Additionally, those not in support of OPO's
proposed changes responded that the policy change was too restrictive and that a vehicle used as a
weapon could directly impact an officer's safety.
Below are selected comments from community feedback:
Office of Police Oversight
“Re: shooting at moving vehicles, Lexipol policy manual states shots fired at
and from a moving vehicle are rarely effective. Behavioral change must be
more effective.”
“The only reason to shoot at a vehicle is if the vehicle is moving towards the
officer and they should only be able to shoot at the tires to stop the vehicle
from moving. If the officer feels someone’s life is in danger inside the vehicle
and the vehicle is moving away from the officer they should be able to shoot
the tires. If my child was in a car with a kidnapper and an officer was there I
would want them to stop the car. If the car is moving away from the officer,
shoot the tires, if the car is moving towards the officer they should be able to
shoot the tires. Shooting at tires is the best thing.”
“I suggest that officers can only shoot at a moving vehicle only to disable the
vehicle and not to shoot at occupants of the vehicle.”
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Restrict Shooting at Moving Vehicles
Shooting at moving vehicles was not sufficiently restricted
The policy was silent on the topic of shooting from moving vehicles
Adopt OPO's amended recommendations
OPO’s preliminary review of APD’s policy on shooting at moving vehicles highlighted two concerns:
While the majority of community members supported APD’s existing policies, many community
members’ responses demonstrated misunderstandings as to the effectiveness of the tactics and the
current training offered to APD officers.
In its Phase I report, OPO made a series of recommendations to improve APD’s policies, particularly
considering the fact that APD does not train officers to shoot at or from moving vehicles.
The table below compares APD’s current policies and OPO’s proposed recommendations with Austin
City Council Resolution 95, 8 Can’t Wait, and best practices from leading police organizations.
Office of Police Oversight
Recommendations from community feedback
Table 1. Comparing OPO’s Proposed Recommendations and APD’s Current Policy on Shooting at
Moving Vehicles
OPO's Proposed Recommendations
APD's Current Policy
Aligns with information from:
Aligns with information from:
*Model policies for Campaign Zero’s 8 Can’t Wait initiative do not address mass casualty incidents.
YES Police Executive Research Forum
YES International Association of Chiefs
of Police
YES Austin City Council Resolution 95
8 Can’t Wait*
NO Police Executive Research Forum
NO International Association of Chiefs
of Police
NO 8 Can’t Wait
NO Austin City Council
Resolution 95
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Restrict Shooting at Moving Vehicles
Office of Police Oversight
Since OPO made preliminary recommendations in January 2021, there have not been any updated
best practices contradicting this information. In fact, in June 2021, the Police Executive Research
Forum published a statement doubling down on its position, which aligns with OPO’s
recommendations. The Police Executive Research Forum is a non-profit police research and policy
organization that informs policy and training at law enforcement agencies nationwide, including
APD. In particular, the Police Executive Research Forum recommends that “[a]gencies should
adopt a prohibition against shooting at or from a moving vehicle unless someone in the vehicle is
using or threatening deadly force by means other than the vehicle itself.”
OPO has analyzed the community’s feedback. OPO has also considered current best practices,
including the consensus among experts that shooting at or from moving vehicles is dangerous and
rarely effective even when officers are trained. After examining all of this information, OPO
recommends that APD adopt OPO’s preliminary recommendations with the following amendment:
Table 2. OPO’s Preliminary and Amended Recommendation to APD’s Policy on Shooting at Moving Vehicles
OPO’s Preliminary Recommendation
GO 202.1.3(a)(1)
OPO’s Amended Recommendation
GO 200.1.2 and GO 202.1.3(a)(1)
202.1.3 MOVING VEHICLES
200.1.2 DEFINITIONS
Totality of the Circumstances- The facts and
information known to the officer at the time
of the incident, which serve as the basis for
the officer’s decision to use force.
202.1.3 MOVING VEHICLES
NOTE: New OPO recommendations are shown in bold, underlined text.
Click here for more information about OPO’s preliminary recommendation.
(a) Officers shall only discharge their
firearms at a moving vehicle if, based on
the totality of the circumstances, they
have exhausted all possible alternatives
and:
1. an occupant of the vehicle is using
deadly force by means other than the
vehicle itself
(a) Officers shall only discharge their
firearms at a moving vehicle if, based on
the totality of the circumstances, they
have exhausted all possible alternatives
and:
1. an occupant of the vehicle is using or
immediately threatening deadly force by
means other than the vehicle itself
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Restrict Shooting at Moving Vehicles
Office of Police Oversight
Not categorically prohibiting an officer from shooting at a moving vehicle
Restricting the circumstances under which shooting at a moving vehicle would be permissible,
including by:
Requiring officers to exhaust all alternatives before shooting
Requiring that the driver, or an occupant, of the vehicle be using the use of deadly force, or
immediately threatening deadly force, by means other than the vehicle itself
Adding more guidelines
Not categorically prohibiting an officer from shooting at a moving vehicle
Restricting the circumstances under which it would be permissible by:
Requiring that the driver, or an occupant, of the vehicle be using deadly force, or
immediately threatening deadly force, by means other than the vehicle itself
Accounting for situations in which the vehicle itself is being used as a weapon that will more
likely than not result in mass casualties (e.g., ramming a car into a crowd of protesters)
Creating a duty for officers to move out of the way of a moving vehicle
Eliminating vague terms
Prohibiting shooting from moving vehicles based on the increased likelihood of risk to innocent
bystanders and the lack of training of APD officers
OPO’s recommendations incorporate community feedback and/or the City of Austin’s official
position by:
OPO’s recommendations incorporate guidance from law enforcement research and policy
organizations by:
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Exhaust All Alternatives Before
Using Deadly Force
Office of Police Oversight
This policy recommendation is intended to help eliminate the unnecessary use of deadly force.
Alternatives to deadly force include tactics and tools like conflict avoidance, empty-hand
techniques, and less-lethal force options (e.g., TASER devices). Campaign Zero’s 8 Can’t Wait
initiative recommends that police departments require officers to exhaust all other alternatives
before using deadly force.
In Resolution 95, the Austin City Council said it was the official policy of the City that “[u]se of
deadly force against individuals, including persons fleeing (in vehicle or on foot), shall be limited to
situations where necessary for self-defense or defense of others against an imminent deadly threat
or threat of serious bodily injury, and either there were no other reasonable alternatives to prevent
serious injury, or death or all reasonable alternatives have been exhausted.”
APD’s current deadly force policy does not require officers to exhaust all alternatives before using
deadly force.
Click here for OPO’s Phase I analysis of this policy topic.
48% of respondents reported that APD's current policy on exhausting all alternatives before
using deadly force does not make them feel safe
52% of respondents said police should use all available alternatives before using deadly force
Quantitative Data
Qualitative Data
Roughly half of all respondents expressed concerns about whether this policy would allow for any
exceptions in extreme circumstances. Respondents also voiced support for more clarity about which
techniques should be considered alternatives.
Those who responded that change was needed reasoned that a change would result in more
predictability and accountability, which would create a safer city more in line with community
values. Further, more predictability and accountability in the use of force would create a safer
environment for people living with a mental health condition who are especially at risk for
unnecessary deadly force. Moreover, respondents expressed support for officers having
supplemental training on alternatives to deadly force, explaining that it could save lives.
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Analysis of community feedback on exhausting all alternatives before using deadly force
14
Exhaust All Alternatives Before
Using Deadly Force
Office of Police Oversight
Those who responded that no change was needed were concerned that this proposed policy would
limit officer discretion and create an unsafe environment favorable to civilians who might commit a
crime.
They also said that situations in the field happen too quickly to limit officers' use of deadly force.
Further, respondents not in support of OPO's proposed changes said that officers should be able to
wield deadly force to protect themselves.
Below are selected comments from community feedback:
“Police have to make split second decisions. If someone points a gun at an
officer, the officer is justified in shooting. If you don’t commit crimes, you are
not going to get yourself in a bad situation. If you fight an officer while being
arrested, you are responsible for the possibility of being shot!”
”Police should have every possible tool to STOP a suspect from endangering the
public. Disarming or mandating a set of procedures will lead to injury or death
of police or innocent bystanders.”
“‘Exhaust all alternatives’ is not possible when someone puts a gun in your face.
The dynamic response model is the current standard for good reason.”
Recommendations from community feedback
There is no requirement to exhaust all alternatives before using deadly force.
Adopt OPO’s amended recommendations.
OPO's preliminary review of APD's deadly force policy highlighted one concern:
In its Phase I report, OPO made a series of recommendations to improve APD’s policies. The table
below compares APD’s current policies and OPO’s proposed recommendations with Austin City
Council Resolution 95, 8 Can’t Wait, and best practices from leading police organizations.
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Exhaust All Alternatives Before
Using Deadly Force
Table 3. Comparing OPO’s Proposed Recommendations and APD’s Current Policy on Exhausting All Alternatives
Before Using Deadly Force
NO 8 Can’t Wait
NO Austin City Council
Resolution 95
Office of Police Oversight
OPO's Proposed Recommendations
APD's Current Policy
Aligns with information from:
Aligns with information from:
*The Police Executive Research Forum has not publicly taken a clear position on this topic, but the
concept of exhausting all alternatives appears to align with its broader de-escalation recommendations.
Additionally, in an assessment of an Arizona police department, the Police Executive Research Forum
recommended use-of-force policy language that “prohibits the use of lethal force against individuals
who pose a danger only to themselves and not to other members of the public or to officers. Officers
should also be required to consider the use of many available less-lethal options in these situations.
Officers should be prepared to exercise considerable discretion to wait as long as necessary so that
the situation can be resolved peacefully.” This recommendation aligns with the concept of
exhausting all alternatives before using deadly force.
Police Executive Research Forum
YES International Association of
Chiefs of Police
YES Austin City Council
Resolution 95
YES 8 Can’t Wait
Police Executive Research Forum*
NO International Association of Chiefs
of Police
Since OPO made preliminary recommendations in January 2021, there have not been any updated
best practices contradicting this information.
OPO has analyzed the community’s feedback. OPO has also considered current best practices. After
examining this information, OPO recommends that APD adopt OPO's preliminary recommendations
with the following amendment:
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Exhaust All Alternatives Before
Using Deadly Force
Office of Police Oversight
Table 4. OPO’s Preliminary and Amended Recommendation to APD’s Policy on Exhausting
All Alternatives
OPO’s Preliminary Recommendation
GO 200.1.2, 200.4, and 202.1.1
OPO’s Amended Recommendation
GO 200.1.2, 200.4, and 202.1.1
200.1.2 DEFINITIONS
Unreasonable – Conduct which, given the
totality of the circumstances, is irrational, not
warranted, or not in accordance with practical
realities.
200.4 DEADLY FORCE APPLICATIONS
&
202.1.1 POLICY
200.1.2 DEFINITIONS
Unreasonable – Conduct which, given the
totality of the circumstances, is irrational,
unwarranted, or not in accordance with
practical realities. Assessments will be based
on an objective examination of real-time facts
and information, avoiding hypothetical
scenarios.
200.4 DEADLY FORCE APPLICATIONS
&
202.1.1 POLICY
(b) Deadly force shall only be used as a last resort
after all alternatives have been exhausted or when,
after analyzing the situation, alternatives have
been rendered impossible by the totality of the
circumstances.
Officers shall utilize appropriate tactical
communication and decision-making as
outlined in General Order 200.2 to ensure
that they have the time, distance, and
resources to properly respond to
situations they encounter.
1.
(b) Deadly force shall only be used as a last
resort after all alternatives have been exhausted
or when, after analyzing the situation,
alternatives are found to be unreasonable
based on the totality of the circumstances.
Officers shall utilize appropriate tactical
communication and decision-making as
outlined in General Order 200.2 to ensure
that they have the time, distance, and
resources to properly respond to
situations they encounter. Examples of
alternatives to deadly force include,
but are not limited to, the following:
Creating physical barriers or
utilizing existing barriers to create
separation;
Moving to a safer position;
Verbal communication, including
advisements and warnings;
Not engaging in physical
confrontation unless immediately
necessary (e.g., self-defense,
defense of others);
Requesting additional resources.
1.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
NOTE: New OPO recommendations are shown in bold, underlined text.
Click here for more information about OPO’s preliminary recommendation.
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Exhaust All Alternatives Before
Using Deadly Force
Office of Police Oversight
Requiring officers to exhaust all alternatives before using deadly force while providing an
exception in cases when alternatives are unreasonable
Adding more guidelines and examples, including:
Examples of alternatives to deadly force
A thorough definition of "unreasonable" requiring that:
Officers only be permitted to determine that alternatives to deadly force were
unreasonable after assessing the totality of the circumstances and determining that
alternatives are "irrational, unwarranted, or not in accordance with practical realities"
Assessments be based on real-time facts and information and avoid hypothetical
scenarios
Requiring officers to exhaust all alternatives before using deadly force while providing an
exception in cases when no reasonable alternatives are available
OPO’s recommendations incorporate community feedback and/or the City of Austin’s official
position by:
OPO’s recommendations incorporate guidance from law enforcement research and policy
organizations by:
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De-escalation
Office of Police Oversight
Defuse tense situations or conflicts
Obtain voluntary compliance
Prevent unnecessary use of force
Use the least amount of force if force is required
De-escalation uses techniques designed to safely stabilize a situation, reduce the immediacy of a
threat, and resolve an incident with the least amount of force necessary. The main goals of de-
escalation are to:
Campaign Zero's 8 Can't Wait initiative recommends that, before using force, officers be required to
"use proper de-escalation techniques to decrease the likelihood that law enforcement officers will
resort to force and to increase the likelihood of cooperation between law enforcement officers and
members of the public." Campaign Zero also recommends that officers determine whether an
individual's lack of compliance results from factors like a medical condition, physical limitation,
language barrier, etc.
In Resolution 95, the Austin City Council said it was the City's official policy that "[u]se of force shall
incorporate de-escalation tactics in all circumstances, and the response shall be proportionate to
the seriousness of the offense and the threat of harm presented."
APD's current policy lacks specificity and does not adequately address real-world situations that may
lead to someone's inability to comply with officer instructions.
Click here for OPO's Phase I analysis of this policy topic.
Analysis of community feedback on de-escalation
49% of respondents said that APD’s current de-escalation policy did not make them feel
safe
66% of respondents said they believed that APD should add to the list of de-escalation
techniques that officers can use
61% of respondents said that policies should acknowledge or address factors that affect
someone’s ability to follow an officer’s orders, such as disability, a mental health
condition, or fear
Quantitative Data
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De-escalation
Office of Police Oversight
Qualitative Data
In this policy area, there was a split between respondents who felt that violence is integral to
policing and those who thought it is not integral and should be de-emphasized. Despite this divide,
the majority of respondents did express a desire for a robust list of techniques, and consideration of
community members.
Those in favor of a change in APD policy reasoned that de-escalation could significantly benefit
people living with mental health conditions, could improve community relations, and could increase
safety for community members and officers. These respondents expressed support for de-
emphasizing violence in policing and reducing the likelihood of an overreaction by an officer, which
they believed would be furthered with a change in APD policy. Additionally, they expressed an
interest in seeing more clarity and definition in policy regarding the tools and resources available to
officers to allow de-escalation of a situation.
Those who responded that no change to APD policy was needed reasoned that situations in the field
happen too quickly to follow rigid guidelines, that all tools and uses of force should be available to
officers, and that people outside the police force should not set guidelines for officers. Further,
respondents not in support of OPO’s proposed policies expressed that officers’ current training is
adequate, that de-escalation creates an unsafe environment for police, and that officers need all
options available to them.
Below are selected comments from community feedback:
“No, APD's current policies on use of force do not align with my ideas of a
safe community. Our Austin community deserves more respect and
consideration of preserving life at all costs. APD should not be using
displaying such reckless behavior, especially when it comes to those in our
community who battle mental health and drug problems. I would vote to
completely reallocate all funds to APD to other community groups and
practices that focus more on de-escalation, counseling, and refraining from
shooting first if at all. I would also, if fund reallocation were not an
available option, vote for APD to drastically change their current policies,
as I have marked here today. There are too many police-involved shootings
in our Austin community. Let's stop the violence.”
“APD’s currently policies do not align with my idea of community safety.
They leave officers under trained in de-escalation, mental health and
alternatives to force tactics. Officers who are not trained in de-escalation
techniques are at risk of escalating circumstances to the point of using
deadly force on the citizens their apprehending. This puts the officers at
risk as well as the citizens they are meant to be protecting.”
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De-escalation
Office of Police Oversight
“No, it does not. While it is not possible to lay out how officers
should act in every possible interaction, more explicit guidance
with clear examples would certainly provide more options for them,
especially de-escalation techniques.”
“No. There are many factors that go into why a person may be
acting a certain way. De-escalation techniques should always be
used is the primary way of handling situations. Plenty of people use
them successfully on a regular basis. Nurses use them, social
workers use them, I use them. More training in this area could go a
long way.”
Under current policy, definitions for "de-escalation" and "de-escalation techniques" provide little
detail and no examples.
The term "potential force encounters" is not defined
Current policy does not adequately acknowledge or address factors outside of deliberate
noncompliance that may affect someone's ability to comply with officer commands
The policy presents the potential for de-escalation efforts to fail but does not explain the
reasons that may happen
The current policy makes treating people with dignity optional
Recommendations from community feedback
Adopt OPO's amended recommendations.
OPO's preliminary review of APD's de-escalation policy highlighted five concerns:
In its Phase I report, OPO made a series of recommendations to improve APD’s policies. The table
below compares APD’s current policies and OPO’s proposed recommendations with Austin City
Council Resolution 95, 8 Can’t Wait, and best practices from leading police organizations.
21
De-escalation
Office of Police Oversight
Table 5. Comparing OPO’s Proposed Recommendations and APD’s Current Policy on De-Escalation
NO 8 Can’t Wait
NO Austin City Council
Resolution 95
OPO's Proposed Recommendations
APD's Current Policy
Aligns with information from:
Aligns with information from:
* Some parts of APD’s current de-escalation policy align with information from the Police Executive
Research Forum and the International Association of Chiefs of Police while others do not. Particular
issues include the following: (1) the tone of the policy does not adequately reinforce a commitment to de-
escalation; (2) the policy does not follow a linear structure, which negatively impacts readability; (3) the
policy needs to be updated to reflect current de-escalation training and model policies from THE
International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Police Executive Research Forum (e.g.,
acknowledging that noncompliance may not be deliberate, but rather based on inability to comprehend,
fear, etc).
YES International Association of Chiefs
of Police
YES Austin City Council
Resolution 95
YES 8 Can’t Wait
Police Executive Research Forum*
International Association of Chiefs of
Police
YES Police Executive Research
Forum
Since OPO made preliminary recommendations in January 2021, there have not been any
updated best practices contradicting this information. Rather, in April 2021, the Police Executive
Research Forum announced that it would be updating its de-escalation training program to
incorporate the "Step Up and Step In" concept. This concept challenges traditional policing by
acknowledging and training for the reality that "[i]t's not just the culture of policing that
sometimes gets in the way of good decision-making. It can also be the structure of police
agencies themselves."
Importantly, there is a broad range of de-escalation tactics and techniques, none of which
eliminate an officer's ability to use physical force when necessary. Additionally, in 2020, the
International Association of Chiefs of Police partnered with the University of Cincinnati Center
for Police Research and Policy to conduct a study on the impact of de-escalation training
developed by the Police Executive Research Forum. The study revealed that the
implementation of this training led to a decrease in citizen and officer injuries.
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De-escalation
Office of Police Oversight
OPO has analyzed the community’s feedback. OPO has also considered current best practices,
including the consensus among experts that incorporating de-escalation tactics into police-
community encounters is safe and effective. After examining all of this information, OPO
recommends that APD adopt OPO's preliminary recommendations with the following
amendments:
Table 6. OPO’s Preliminary and Amended Recommendation to APD’s Policy on De-Escalation
OPO’s Preliminary Recommendation
GO 200.1.2 and GO 200.2
OPO’s Amended Recommendation
GO 200.1.2 and GO 200.2
200.1.2 DEFINITIONS
De-escalation – (1) The use of a range of techniques
(e.g. communication, time, distance, cover,
concealment, etc.) designed to create conditions
that safely stabilize a situation and reduce the
immediacy of a threat so that more time, options,
and resources are available to resolve the situation
using the least amount of force necessary. (2)
Reducing or ending the use of force once a threat
has diminished.
De-escalation Techniques – Tactics used by officers
that are designed to increase the likelihood of
gaining voluntary compliance and reduce the
likelihood of using force during an encounter.
Tactics may include, but are not limited to, the
following: maintaining safe distance, active
listening, clear communication, explaining what
actions need to be taken and any alternatives,
explaining the consequences of taking particular
actions, and securing additional resources.
200.1.2 DEFINITIONS
De-escalation – (1) The use of a range of techniques
(e.g. communication, time, distance, cover,
concealment, etc.) designed to create conditions
that safely stabilize a situation and reduce the
immediacy of a threat so that more time, options,
and resources are available to resolve the situation
using the least amount of force necessary. (2)
Reducing or ending the use of force once a threat
has diminished.
De-escalation Techniques – Tactics used by officers
that are designed to increase the likelihood of
gaining voluntary compliance and reduce the
likelihood of using force during an encounter.
Tactics may include, but are not limited to, the
following: maintaining safe distance, active
listening, clear communication, explaining what
actions need to be taken and any alternatives,
explaining the consequences of taking particular
actions, and securing additional resources.
Critical Decision-Making Model (CDM) - The CDM is
a five-step critical thinking process. The five steps
are built around the core values of the department
and the policing profession. The CDM guides
officers through a process of collecting
information; assessing the situation, threats, and
risks; considering police powers and agency policy;
identify options and determining the best course of
action; and acting, reviewing and reassessing the
situation.
Office of Police Oversight
23
De-escalation
Office of Police Oversight
Table 6. OPO’s Preliminary and Amended Recommendation to APD’s Policy on De-Escalation (Continued)
OPO’s Preliminary Recommendation
GO 200.1.2 and GO 200.2
OPO’s Amended Recommendation
GO 200.1.2 and GO 200.2
200.2 DE-ESCALATION
Officers shall safely incorporate appropriate de-
escalation techniques in all circumstances,
particularly those that are part of the Critical
Decision-Making Model, and shall approach all
encounters with the goal of preventing or
minimizing uses of force and, in situations where
compliance is needed, gaining voluntary
compliance
200.2 DE-ESCALATION
Officers shall safely incorporate appropriate de-
escalation techniques in all circumstances, and
shall approach all encounters with the goal of
preventing or minimizing uses of force and, in
situations where compliance is needed, gaining
voluntary compliance.
NOTE: New OPO recommendations are shown in bold, underlined text.
Click here for more information about OPO’s preliminary recommendation.
Acknowledging that noncompliance may not be deliberate or a threat, but instead related to the
inability to hear, the inability to comprehend, fear, etc.
Providing additional guidance on de-escalation tactics to be employed by officers
Acknowledging the need for de-escalation tactics to be used in all encounters while still accounting
for officer safety
Acknowledging that noncompliance may not be deliberate or a threat, instead related to the
inability to hear, the inability to comprehend, fear, etc.
Providing clear guidance on de-escalation tactics to be employed by officers
Clearly communicating that de-escalation is a priority while acknowledging the need for officer
safety
OPO’s recommendations incorporate community feedback and/or the City of Austin’s official position
by:
OPO’s recommendations incorporate guidance from law enforcement research and policy organizations
by:
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Duty to Intervene in Cases of Improper
or Excessive Use of Force
Office of Police Oversight
47% of respondents said current policy on the duty to intervene in cases of improper or
excessive use of force does not make them feel safe
66% of respondents said that they believed that policy should list the different ways an officer
can intervene
80% of respondents said that any officers who witness improper or excessive use of force by any
other officer and do not interfere should be required to report the full circumstances of the
incident
A duty-to-intervene policy creates an affirmative obligation for police officers to stop fellow officers
from engaging in certain conduct prohibited by law or department policy. Campaign Zero's 8 Can't
Wait initiative recommends that police departments require officers to intervene and report
unnecessary or excessive force used by other officers. The murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis
Police Department Officer Derek Chauvin brought this issue to the forefront of public discourse in
2020. It reinforced the dire need for police departments to require that officers hold each other
accountable and intervene in cases of excessive force and other misconduct.
In Resolution 95, the Austin City Council said it was the official policy of the City that APD policies
"…requiring officers to intervene to stop improper or excessive uses of force by their fellow officers
should be appropriately enforced."
APD's current policy in this area lacks the specificity necessary to make it enforceable in many cases
when it should apply.
Click here for OPO's Phase I analysis of this policy topic.
Analysis of community feedback on the duty to intervene in cases of improper or
excessive use of force
Quantitative Data
Qualitative Data
The majority of respondents who mentioned this policy were supportive of OPO’s proposed changes,
with support expressed for more clarity and specificity as to how the reporting should be done.
Respondents favored giving officers a way to hold those in their ranks accountable, with realistic
considerations for protecting officers who do the reporting.
Feedback on this policy showed overwhelming support for officers having a duty to intervene for
professional and ethical integrity reasons. Some respondents expressed concern for officers who
intervene and recommended that protections be put in place to prevent their careers from being
negatively impacted due to intervening or reporting excessive force.
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Duty to Intervene in Cases of Improper
or Excessive Use of Force
Office of Police Oversight
Below are selected comments from community feedback:
“We frequently hear the argument that police brutality is caused by a
few bad apples. If good officers don’t protect us from the bad ones,
who will?”
“I agree intervention should be defined. And, I believe there should be
a whistleblower protection so that people calling out these issues do
not become targets themselves of a culture of not reporting this. So, I
think reporting requirements should be defined, intervention should
be defined, and I think it should be outside the chain of command to
protect those that do come forward.”
“Should follow the chain of command or ranking officer should be the
final word. Any issues that come up should be reported.”
Under current policy, terms used are vague or undefined
The policy does not specify the means for intervening
The policy's scope is too narrow
Department hierarchical issues are not addressed
Reporting requirements are not defined
Recommendations from community feedback
Adopt OPO’s amended recommendations.
OPO's preliminary review of APD's duty-to-intervene policy highlighted five concerns:
In its Phase I report, OPO made a series of recommendations to improve APD’s policies. The
table below compares APD’s current policies and OPO’s proposed recommendations with
Austin City Council Resolution 95, 8 Can’t Wait, and best practices from leading police
organizations.
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Duty to Intervene in Cases of Improper
or Excessive Use of Force
Office of Police Oversight
Table 7. Comparing OPO’s Proposed Recommendations and APD’s Current Policy
on the Duty to Intervene
NO 8 Can’t Wait
NO Austin City Council
Resolution 95*
OPO's Proposed Recommendations
APD's Current Policy
Aligns with information from:
Aligns with information from:
*APD’s current policy does not align with Resolution 95 because it lacks the specificity necessary to be
enforceable in many cases when it should apply.
YES International Association of Chiefs
of Police
YES Austin City Council
Resolution 95
YES 8 Can’t Wait
NO Police Executive Research
Forum
NO International Association of Chiefs
of Police
YES Police Executive Research
Forum
Since OPO made preliminary recommendations in January 2021, there have not been any updated
best practices contradicting this information.
OPO has analyzed the community’s feedback. OPO has also considered current best practices and
research into the role of peer intervention in enhancing safety for community members and
officers. After examining this information, OPO recommends that APD adopt OPO’s preliminary
recommendations with the following amendments:
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Duty to Intervene in Cases of Improper
or Excessive Use of Force
Office of Police Oversight
Table 8. OPO’s Preliminary and Amended Recommendation to APD’s Policy on the Duty to Intervene
OPO’s Preliminary Recommendation
GO 200.1.3
OPO’s Amended Recommendation
GO 200.1.3
GO 200.1.3 DUTY TO INTERVENE
(b) Intervening officers shall make every effort
to safely intervene by verbal and physical
means as the situation requires; if verbal
intervention is not enough to stop the act(s),
intervening officers shall make every effort to
safely intervene through physical means.
Examples of physical intervention methods
include, but are not limited to, the following:
Physically positioning oneself in
between the officer(s) whose
conduct is in question and the other
involved individual(s);
Using physical force to remove an
officer from a particular area; or
Using physical force to stop an
officer’s physical contact with an
involved individual.
1.
2.
3.
(b) Intervening officers shall make every
effort to safely intervene by verbal and
physical means as the situation requires; if
verbal intervention is not enough to stop
the act(s), intervening officers shall make
every effort to safely intervene through
physical means.
Examples of verbal intervention methods
include, but are not limited to, the
following:
GO 200.1.3 DUTY TO INTERVENE
Redirecting the officer’s attention to
something else;
Direct confrontation or direct orders,
as applicable.
Physically positioning oneself in
between the officer(s) whose
conduct is in question and the other
involved individual(s);
Using physical force to remove an
officer from a particular area; or
Using physical force to stop an
officer’s physical contact with an
involved individual.
1.
2.
Examples of physical intervention
methods include, but are not limited to,
the following:
1.
2.
3.
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Duty to Intervene in Cases of Improper
or Excessive Use of Force
Office of Police Oversight
Table 8. OPO’s Preliminary and Amended Recommendation to APD’s Policy on the Duty to Intervene (continued)
OPO’s Preliminary Recommendation
GO 200.1.3
OPO’s Amended Recommendation
GO 200.1.3
(g) Regardless of their role during a call or
original purpose for being in the vicinity, it
is the duty of every on-scene witness
officer to intervene unless and until the
conduct in question has been stopped. In
those situations that trigger a duty to
intervene, officers shall accept, without
question, the intervention of another
officer.
NOTE: New OPO recommendations are shown in bold, underlined text.
Click here for more information about OPO’s preliminary recommendation.
(g) Regardless of their role during a call or
original purpose for being in the vicinity, it is
the duty of every on-scene witness officer to
intervene unless and until the conduct in
question has been stopped.
(f) Notwithstanding General Orders 110.4.3
and 110.4.4, this policy creates an
affirmative duty to intervene regardless of
rank or whether the intervening officer is of
higher or lower rank than the officer(s)
whose conduct is in question. Employees
will not, in any way, cause or conspire to
cause retaliatory action against an
employee who intervenes or attempts to
intervene.
(f) Notwithstanding General Orders 110.4.3
and 110.4.4, this policy creates an affirmative
duty to intervene regardless of rank or
whether the intervening officer is of higher or
lower rank than the officer(s) whose conduct
is in question.
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Duty to Intervene in Cases of Improper
or Excessive Use of Force
Office of Police Oversight
Implementing additional guidelines, which will support enforceability
Explicitly prohibiting retaliation against intervening officers
Describing the ways that an officer should intervene
Providing clear reporting guidelines
Addressing hierarchical issues in police culture
Causing the duty to be triggered when officers believe another officer is preparing to engage in
misconduct and when they witness the officer engage in misconduct
Creating a standalone policy that covers misconduct outside of the use-of-force
Describing the ways that an officer should intervene
Explicitly prohibiting retaliation against intervening officers
Requiring officers to accept, without question, the intervention of another officer
OPO’s recommendations incorporate community feedback and/or the City of Austin’s official position
by:
OPO’s recommendations incorporate guidance from law enforcement research and policy
organizations by:
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96
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Ban Chokeholds and Strangleholds
Office of Police Oversight
Vascular neck restraints
These maneuvers affect blood flow and are often referred to as "strangleholds."
Respiratory neck restraints
These maneuvers affect air intake and are often referred to as "chokeholds."
Neck restraints generally fall into two categories:
Campaign Zero's 8 Can't Wait initiative recommends that police departments restrict officers from
using chokeholds or strangleholds on individuals in all cases to avoid unnecessary deaths or serious
injuries.
In Resolution 95, the Austin City Council said it was the official policy of the City that "the use of
chokeholds and stranglehold– broadly defined to include all maneuvers that involve choking,
holding the neck, or cutting off blood flow in the neck– is strictly prohibited as a policing tactic."
APD policy does not explicitly ban these techniques; rather, it limits the use of chokeholds and
strangleholds to situations in which deadly force would be authorized.
Click here for OPO's Phase I analysis of this policy topic.
51% of respondents said that the current policy on banning chokeholds and strangleholds does
not make them feel safe
53% of respondents agreed that chokeholds and strangleholds should be banned outright
Involve too much risk for becoming unintentionally lethal
Instill fear in the community
Should not be used and officers should be given more training on alternative maneuvers
Analysis of community feedback on banning chokeholds and stranglehold
Quantitative Data
Qualitative Data
Many responses in support of the use of chokeholds were based on the assumption that they are part
of APD training when, in fact, they are not.
Those who responded that change in this policy is needed reasoned that chokeholds and
strangleholds:
Respondents also said that the current policy is too vague, that other cities have already banned
chokeholds, and that it is often used as a disproportionate response.
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Ban Chokeholds and Strangleholds
Office of Police Oversight
Those who responded that no change is needed reasoned that the procedure is safe when performed
correctly, and should be permissible when deadly force is needed. Those not in support of OPO’s
proposed policy changes said that chokeholds are not a common practice, that banning them would
be detrimental to officer safety, and that they are a necessary component of officer self-defense.
Below are selected comments from community feedback:
.
“Sounds like current policy could have been used to justify either Eric
Garner or George Floyd’s murder. The nuance of “to protect human life”
would have to become a huge part of APD culture for a policy based on
that to work. Because the person being strangled is a human life, too”
“These should be explicitly defined, explicitly banned. I don’t think we
should be improvising techniques to kill people on the spot and people
should be trained how to adequately de-escalate and try to avoid as
much as possible killing people no matter what they’ve done. I’m not
living in a utopia and know that is not always possible, but we should
be able to define, ban, and be able to provide disciplinary actions for
officers that do not adhere to that.”
“All APD needs is a lot more officers. Then, you would finally be able to
rotate them out for more training. Ex: choke holds are highly affective.
The problem is officers do not have enough time to train on proper
techniques. 1/3 of each officer's time should be spent on training,
under current policies, each year.”
Chokeholds and strangleholds are not categorically banned
Under current policy, the terms used are not defined
The policy's scope is too narrow
Directives are inconsistent
Recommendations from community feedback
Adopt OPO’s preliminary recommendations.
OPO's preliminary review of APD's policy on chokeholds and strangleholds highlighted four
concerns:
32
Ban Chokeholds and Strangleholds
Office of Police Oversight
In its Phase I report, OPO made a series of recommendations to improve APD’s policies. The table
below compares APD’s current policies and OPO’s proposed recommendations with Austin City
Council Resolution 95, 8 Can’t Wait, and best practices from leading police organizations.
Table 9. Comparing OPO’s Proposed Recommendations and APD’s Current Policy on Banning Chokeholds and
Strangleholds
NO 8 Can’t Wait
NO Austin City Council
Resolution 95
OPO's Proposed Recommendations
APD's Current Policy
Aligns with information from:
Aligns with information from:
* In 2020, the International Association of Chiefs of Police recommended that chokeholds and vascular
neck restraints only be allowed in deadly force situations and stated that "[t]raining should also be
provided on all approved force options and techniques permitted by agency policy, along with a regular
refresher training that includes a review of the policy and hands-on, practical training." APD does not
provide training on the use of chokeholds and strangleholds. As a result, APD policies permitting the use
of techniques for which officers are not trained does not align with the recommendation from the
International Association of Chiefs of Police.
YES International Association of Chiefs
of Police*
YES Austin City Council
Resolution 95
YES 8 Can’t Wait
NO Police Executive Research
Forum
NO International Association of Chiefs
of Police*
YES Police Executive Research
Forum
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109
110
111
112
113
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Ban Chokeholds and Strangleholds
Office of Police Oversight
Categorically banning the use of chokeholds and strangleholds as a policing tactic
Categorically banning the use of any action that could, or is intended to, prevent, reduce, hinder
or otherwise negatively impact an individual’s blood flow to the brain or intake of air
Implementing additional guidelines to improve clarity and accountability
Defining maneuvers and terminology referenced in policy
Banning both chokeholds and strangleholds
Since OPO made preliminary recommendations in January 2021, there have not been any updated
best practices contradicting this information. Rather, as recently as September 2021, the U.S.
Department of Justice directed all federal law enforcement agencies to update their policies to
restrict the use of chokeholds and strangleholds, explaining that these techniques are “inherently
dangerous” and have “too often led to tragedy.” Indeed, across the board, experts agree that both
chokeholds and strangleholds are inherently dangerous. Experts that recommend allowing
chokeholds and strangleholds in deadly force situations also discuss the need for frequent training
on any use-of-force tactics permitted by policy.
OPO has analyzed the community’s feedback. OPO has also reviewed current best practices,
including the consensus among experts that chokeholds and strangleholds are inherently
dangerous. Finally, OPO has considered the fact that APD does not provide officers with training
on chokeholds and strangleholds. After examining all of this information, OPO recommends that
APD adopt OPO’s preliminary recommendations.
OPO’s recommendations incorporate community feedback and/or the City of Austin’s official position
by:
OPO’s recommendations incorporate guidance from law enforcement research and policy
organizations by:
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34
Warn Before Shooting
Office of Police Oversight
Warning before shooting is a tactic that can help to slow down tense interactions and provide
community members with another opportunity to comply before officers use deadly force.
Campaign Zero’s 8 Can’t Wait initiative recommends that police departments “[r]equire officers to
give a verbal warning in all situations before using deadly force.”
In Resolution 95, Council directed that “[u]se of force shall incorporate de-escalation tactics in all
Circumstances.” Warning before shooting is considered a de-escalation tactic.
APD’s current policy on this topic is unclear and lacks specificity. Additionally, as it relates to
warnings, APD’s current policies on less-lethal force are more detailed than its policies on lethal
force.
Click here for OPO’s Phase I analysis of this policy topic.
49% of individuals responded that APD’s current policy on warning before shooting makes
them feel safe, while 47% stated they do not feel safe
55% of respondents believe that policy must specify how an officer should warn before
shooting
Analysis of community feedback on warn before shooting
Quantitative data
Qualitative Data
Overall, respondents expressed diverging concerns about this policy area. Many responded
that disabilities and language barriers should be considered, while others believed that some
people who interact with the police don't merit a warning if a potential crime has been
committed.
Those who support changing APD’s policies reasoned that the current policy doesn’t account
for situations where a person may not hear or understand an officer’s warning, including
those who don’t understand English and people living with a mental health condition.
Community members responded that the potential for officers to kill someone by discharging
their firearm is great, and there should be more clearly defined steps taken to ensure that a
person understands that they are facing this risk.
Those who responded that a change wasn’t needed reasoned that there may not be enough
time for an officer to provide a warning in every situation and that it may put them in danger.
Further, community members not in support of OPO’s proposed changes repeated concerns
that warning before shooting could place an officer at a tactical disadvantage.
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Warn Before Shooting
Office of Police Oversight
Below are selected comments from community feedback:
“Much more warning must be given before using force. My daughter for
example has a diagnosed listening comprehension disorder related to
her ASD which has a documented effect on her ability to accurately
follow directions in a timely manner. She doesn’t look disabled but I am
not confident that given certain scenarios people like her (especially men
and people of color) would be safe from getting shot at by the police.”
“I think that a warning should be mandatory and I think we should think
broadly about people with different abilities as to how we give a warning
so a verbal warning won’t work for everybody. I think how a warning is
given should have a standard of consistency across officers training,
consistent with comprehensive training around different abilities so that
there is a range of ways you warn people before you end their life.”
Without further detail in policy, feasibility language is ambiguous
The policy is more robust for less-lethal force warnings
The policy does not specify how a warning should be given
Recommendations from community feedback
Adopt OPO’s preliminary recommendations.
OPO’s preliminary review of APD’s policy on warning before shooting highlighted three concerns:
In its Phase I report, OPO made a series of recommendations to improve APD’s policies. The table
below compares APD’s current policies and OPO’s proposed recommendations with Austin City
Council Resolution 95, 8 Can’t Wait, and best practices from leading police organizations.
36
Warn Before Shooting
Office of Police Oversight
In its Phase I report, OPO made a series of recommendations to improve APD’s policies. The table
below compares APD’s current policies and OPO’s proposed recommendations with Austin City
Council Resolution 95, 8 Can’t Wait, and best practices from leading police organizations.
Table 10. Comparing OPO’s Proposed Recommendations and APD’s Current Policy on Warn Before Shooting
NO 8 Can’t Wait
NO Austin City Council
Resolution 95
OPO's Proposed Recommendations
APD's Current Policy
Aligns with information from:
Aligns with information from:
*The Police Executive Research Forum has not publicly taken a clear position on this topic, but the
concept of warning before shooting appears to align with broader de-escalation recommendations from
the Police Executive Research Forum; providing warnings is considered a key de-escalation tactic.
YES International Association of
Chiefs of Police
YES Austin City Council
Resolution 95
YES 8 Can’t Wait
Police Executive Research Forum*
NO International Association of Chiefs
of Police
Police Executive Research Forum*
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
37
Warn Before Shooting
Office of Police Oversight
Requiring that officers provide a warning before shooting except in limited circumstances
Permitting officers to shoot without first issuing a warning when the use of deadly force is
immediately necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily injury to officers or
bystanders on scene and giving a warning will create additional risk.
Requiring officers to include specific information in a warning
Requiring that officers provide a warning before shooting except in limited circumstances
Permitting officers to shoot without first issuing a warning when providing a warning would
negatively impact officer or community safety
Requiring officers to include specific information in a warning
Since OPO made preliminary recommendations in January 2021, there have not been any updated
best practices contradicting this information.
OPO has analyzed the community’s feedback. OPO has also considered current best practices. After
examining this information, OPO recommends that APD adopt OPO’s preliminary recommendations.
OPO’s recommendations incorporate community feedback and/or the City of Austin’s official position
by:
OPO’s recommendations incorporate guidance from law enforcement research and policy
organizations by:
138
139
140
38
Overarching Themes
Office of Police Oversight
Overarching themes reflect the sentiments expressed by community members through answers to
open-ended survey questions. These insights are not necessarily specific to use-of-force policies,
but rather reflect community feedback on APD's policies overall.
Recommendation: APD policy should include more defined terms and procedures to ensure
officers are better informed of department expectations and prepared for their work in the
field. Policy informs training, so policies that include defined terms and procedures can help
ensure that officers are well prepared for the field. This can help improve officer and
community safety.
Insight: Among participants, there was a general desire for more clearly defined
procedures, as well as better training and guidelines to help officers be more prepared for
situations in the field. Putting specifics about officer expectations into policy ensures that
officers will be trained on them, which means they will be more prepared to meet APD’s
expectations (their employer) and the community they are serving once they are in the
field.
OPO analyzed more than 1,400 survey responses, including 2,200 qualitative responses, to
develop these overarching themes. Overarching themes are based only on the open-ended
qualitative responses collected via the SpeakUp, Austin! survey and virtual community meetings.
OPO utilized a human-centered, iterative process to review the answers from community members
and identify patterns.
This section will feature a statement that summarizes community sentiment, as well as direct
quotations from community members for context. The quotations are unedited and represent the
nuance in the community's concerns about APD policies.
“Not at all. There is a lack of specifications for officers in
each section. Leaves room for officers to hurt/kill people
and not be held accountable. And of course officers should
exhaust all alternatives before using lethal force. In my
opinion, they shouldn’t have guns.”
“The policies should be defined more clearly. Clearer
directives and more nuanced training will force
performance improvements. More accountability when the
guidelines and standards are less ambiguous.”
“No. Not having specifics outlined for use of deadly force or
policies in place to intervene or report use of excessive
force must change.”
39
Overarching Themes
Office of Police Oversight
Recommendation: Policies should be built on a foundation of accountability, which is achieved
by providing clearer guidelines. This foundation may also help combat issues of
disproportionate or disparate treatment. Officers who violate policy should be consistently held
accountable, and disposition and discipline decisions should be equitable. Additionally,
deterrence and accountability measures should incentivize equitable treatment of community
members and disincentivize inequitable treatment. Taken together, these measures can help
increase predictability in community-officer interactions, which can help improve trust within
the community.
Insight: Some community members supported current policies because they believe that the
policies protect law-abiding citizens and “good” officers. Further, they said that negative
consequences only affect criminals or “bad” officers.
““They do not make me feel safe because the terms and boundaries are not clearly
defined. Giving concrete examples to officers, requiring reporting, and requiring the use
of de-escalation techniques before deadly force are things that seem like common sense
but aren't happening. A police officer's duty is to serve & protect. These guidelines and
accountability measures will help officers serve and protect ALL community members,
not just those that do not appear threatening (real or perceived) to them. Community
safety means REDUCING harm, not perpetuating it. I think police officers play an integral
role in our community, but they must be held accountable and trained on life-affirming
and life-supporting techniques. Death and harm should NEVER be the default, and it is in
communities of color and for Black people in the US. We need change & accountability.”
“The policies do not, and the reality of APD’s use of force also does not align. The
community includes people who are disabled, Black, brown, deaf, or just agitated. The
role of a police department should be to serve and protect *everyone,* not resort to
gunfire.”
40
Overarching Themes
Office of Police Oversight
“Not at all. They are too loosely defined and thus up for complete interpretation based on
the officer. This is extremely dangerous for communities of color as the lack of specific
rules and boundaries protects the officer rather than those who are affected by police
brutality in the case of trials and other legal action pursued by civilians. APD must be
utilizing mental health professionals to receive training and even to learn when to step out
of a situation that they should absolutely not be present for. It is extremely scary that
officers are allowed to use force without explanation in Austin.”
“Yes. I have had many interactions with police. The APD is ahead of the game in policing. I
believe our citizen’s mindset needs to change. A lot of the recommendations I read are
unrealistic and can’t be blanket instructions. If you ban chokeholds and the cop is in a
deadly encounter, all available options should be available. If citizens want to not have a
violent encounter during an arrest or interaction, then it is up to us to allow ourselves to
understand the process and not be confrontational. De-escalation is a two way street. If
only one side is attempting to use it, it has little chance of being successful. Also, since
when does “un-armed” mean “not dangerous”?”
“Most force used by police is in response to force used by citizens against police”
Recommendation: Efforts to build community trust in police may be undermined by lethal force
tactics. To begin to build community trust, APD should focus on reducing its use of lethal force
tactics and eliminating unnecessary instances of lethal force.
Insight: Some respondents reported that deadly force tactics instill fear in the community
because they can cause serious harm or death in ways that are considered unnecessary or
unreasonable.
41
Overarching Themes
Office of Police Oversight
“No. It is not safe for some people (APD) to be able to commit violence against the rest of
us with no accountability or consequences. I am a disabled person and part of my
disability is hearing loss. I also get very frightened when I perceive someone as being
angry or hostile which causes me to freeze up. I am terrified of being hurt or killed by
police because of not being able to hear/understand or comply quickly enough, even if I
pose no real threat. I'm a gentle person and would not do anyone any harm. APD has
proven, particularly over the past year, that they have many officers who are willing to
hurt, maim, and even kill people who pose no immediate threat to the safety of others in
the eyes of a reasonable person. Furthermore many APD officers proved that they were
not willing or able to use "less lethal" weapons as designed- two examples are beanbag
rounds being fired at too close of a range and rubber bullets being aimed directly at
people instead of at the ground over a distance, but I suspect there are others. The fact
that chokeholds and strangleholds aren't categorically banned for APD is ABSOLUTELY
HORRIFYING. APD training should focus more on de-escalation and non-violent means of
handling the situations the officers encounter in their work.”
"Although I am a law-abiding citizen, I don’t feel safe with APD. When there are police
officers present, I fear they will try to find a reason to get me in trouble, even though I
don’t break laws or cause trouble. This is exacerbated by the fact that I am visibly
transgender and a mixed race Mexican Indigenous person; I feel that when a police
officer identifies me as LGBTQ+ and nonwhite, they expect that I am a criminal. I have
witnessed APD officers harm peaceful protestors and homeless people who committed
no crime. I fear that without serious efforts to reform the department and retrain
officers, there will be no solution. I would feel safer if officers were not permitted to
carry lethal weapons to calls where the suspect is not carrying lethal weapons. I feel the
current culture of policing makes officers feel that all civilians are potentially dangerous
to them, and that instead of helping them do their jobs, this causes officers to react in a
traumatized flight-or-fight manner that harms civilians and officers alike. To bring about
safe policing, that culture would need to change, so that officers feel they are a part of
their community and they can trust civilians.
42
Overarching Themes
Office of Police Oversight
Recommendation: APD policy should be revised to categorically prohibit the use of maneuvers
that could negatively impact air intake or blood flow.
Insight: Many respondents reported that they felt unsafe with APD’s current policy on
chokeholds. Many respondents shared concerns that current policy does not align with
community values because maneuvers like chokeholds and strangleholds are too likely to
cause injury or death even if that is not the intended consequence. Some community
members also referenced the murder of George Floyd in discussing their concerns with these
maneuvers.
“How many times do we need to hear the words “I can’t breathe” before things
change.”
”Police should not only be barred from using deadly force including chokeholds and
strangleholds but also should be extremely limited in how they can even touch people
accused or suspected of a crime. Police are frequently shown throwing people - even
children - to the ground, punching, kicking, maiming and shoving civilians who are
involved in petty crimes like theft or traffic violations. How is this legal? How do police
have so much unchecked power?”
“These should be explicitly defined, explicitly banned. I don’t think we should be
improvising techniques to kill people on the spot and people should be trained how to
adequately de-escalate and try to avoid as much as possible killing people no matter
what they’ve done. I’m not living in a utopia and know that is not always possible, but
we should be able to define, ban, and be able to provide disciplinary actions for
officers that do not adhere to that.”
43
Overarching Themes
Office of Police Oversight
Recommendation: APD policy should be revised to prioritize community and officer safety by
prohibiting force tactics that are ineffective or on which officers are not trained. Failure to do so
may lead to an increased risk of uncontrollable consequences.
Insight: Community members expressed concern that policies allowing officers to utilize
tactics on which they are not trained create an unacceptable safety risk to community
members and officers beyond the inherent risk presented, leading to the potential for
uncontrollable consequences.
“Trainings should be provided consistently. From Judo or other
techniques. No chokeholds.”
“No. They do not align with my idea of community safety. After
reading this survey, I thought it was laughable that any of the
untrained police officers were allowed to shoot at moving objects or
while moving. They are not marksmen and are completely unqualified
to handle deadly force in those situations. They only make certain
people feel safe. They clearly need new training and rules.”
“No. Without definitions and examples for officers to use, they are left
to their own devices. This will lead to unequal treatment of members
of the public and dangerous or deadly interactions. Too often, police
are asked to intervene during mental health crises for which they are
not trained. Interactions with untrained officers will lead to unequal
treatment and dangerous or deadly outcomes.”
Recommendation: Changes to APD policy should be based on best practices, including evidence-
based practices, that prioritize community and officer safety.
Insight: Community members who feel safe with current APD policy perceive changes that
de-center officer discretion as a danger to public safety.
44
Overarching Themes
Office of Police Oversight
“I strongly believe that a level of officer's discretion in life or death situations should exist
but along with that discretion a great level of responsibility should be there also. An
example, if an officer is involved in a any use of force incident and no body cam is
provided by a department issued cam, a strict policy of grounds for termination should
exist. As a former state certified EMT, if I failed to adhere to establised procedure, I could
lose my certification and as a stipulation of employment, I would lose my job.”
“Current policies prioritize de-escalation and require extensive reporting of all uses of
force. Policies that ignore the fact that officers often have to improvise and make split
second decisions in rapidly evolving situations are dangerous.”
“Yes. Officers are sometimes faced with violent encounters which necessitate use of force.
I do not believe that policy changes restricting their ability to utilize use of force where
appropriate would enhance the safety of the community. I feel it would have the opposite
effect. Officers will no longer be proactive in their work to deter crime if too many policy
changes are made; the fear of losing their job would outweigh their desire to help. It’s not
feasible for example to always require de-escalation or warnings prior to firing a weapon.
Things can go bad on calls very quickly and I wouldn’t support punishing an officer for
having to use deadly force and not being able to use a warning first. These proposed
policies just couldn’t be applied to 100% of calls so I can’t support it.”
Recommendation: Policies and training should be examined and revised to ensure that all
community-police interactions reflect a service-minded and situationally-aware approach.
Insight: Any situation can potentially involve people living with disabilities, mental health
conditions, or invisible illnesses. A service-minded and situationally-aware approach best
achieves positive resolutions in such situations.
45
Overarching Themes
Office of Police Oversight
“APD’s currently policies do not align with my idea of community safety. They leave
officers under trained in de-escalation, mental health and alternatives to force tactics.
Officers who are not trained in de-escalation techniques are at risk of escalating
circumstances to the point of using deadly force on the citizens their apprehending. This
puts the officers at risk as well as the citizens they are meant to be protecting.”
“I believe that most community safety needs do not require an armed officer to respond.
For example, someone experiencing a mental health episode needs a trained mental
health responder. Someone driving recklessly does not need to be pulled over by
someone with a gun, but could be pulled over by an unarmed traffic safety officer. People
suffering domestic violence need a safe place to go and a trained counselor, and
perpetrators also need a trained counselor. I hope APD disarms officers responding to
most situations.”
“No. Deescelation should be the first priority. There also should be training for mental
health interventions. Deadly force should be a last resort.”
“Training on de escalation of incidents is so important. Perhaps including mental health
professionals in DV incidents or with the mentally ill or disabled would change betokened
the potential for unnecessary violence.”
46
General Impressions from Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
General impressions from community feedback are topics that OPO saw repeatedly across data but
are not necessarily related to policy. Many of these sentiments reflect community concerns about
policing and reform more broadly. Unlike the previous two sections, this section does not include
recommendations.
OPO analyzed more than 2,200 qualitative responses to develop these general impressions from
community feedback. General impressions from community feedback are based only on community
members’ responses to the open-ended questions collected via the SpeakUp, Austin! survey and
virtual community meetings. OPO compiled these findings through a group synthesis process that
categorized responses by content, sentiment, and theme.
This section will feature a statement that summarizes the patterns in the feedback, as well as direct
quotes from community members for context. The quotations are unedited and were selected to
represent the nuance in the community’s concerns about public safety.
“They don't include nearly enough accountability for officers as would be
reasonable, in my opinion. I would like to see mandatory trials of any officers
that are involved in a incident that escalates to lethal force. The fact that for
much of the policies surrounding lethal force there aren't given examples of
descalation or the warnings that should be given is unacceptable. It should be
noted however that some of the policies mentioned in this form are
sometimes needed. It doesn't make sense to outright ban firing from their
own moving vehicle, because there is the possibility of extreme situations
that require that. To note chokeholds shouldn't be a problem in police use,
any Jujitsu student of six months would never have somebody die in a
chokehold.”
Expertise and training
In general, community members who expressed support for APD’s current policies also expressed a
belief in the expertise of police officers and faith in their training. Many comments expressing
support for existing policies revealed misunderstandings or incorrect assumptions about current APD
training and policies. For example, some community members assumed that APD officers are trained
to perform chokeholds or strangleholds. This is inaccurate.
Below are examples of community responses:
141
47
General Impressions from Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
“All APD needs is a lot more officers. Then you would finally be able to rotate them out for
more training. Ex: choke holds are highly affective. The problem is officers do not have
enough time to train on proper techniques. 1/3 of each officers time should be spend on
training, under current policies, each year.”
“I think it shouldn’t be mandatory to offer a warning, but I think, once again, it’s a split second
decision an officer has to make and sometimes a half a second is not long enough to issue a
warning. Once again, I think it’s best judgment through extensive training because if they are
not passing the academy and passing everything else then why are they an officer to begin
with, but, yes, I think, in best practice a warning should be given but it is not always feasible.”
“Yes. We had the best police force in the United States. Our officers got all sorts of training in
dealing with dogs, de-esculation, mental health issues that if the Austin City Council bothered
to find out, like Ora Houston did when she was a council person, they would know that.”
48
General Impressions from Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
“All situations are different and rapidly evolving. An exact layout of what an officer should say or
do in a deadly force encounter prior to being able to use deadly force is just not safe and or
feasible. Also Officers are already currently not allowed to use chokeholds.”
“Yes because having a hard line does not work in reality. People should try and do most of these
things if the situation allows for it but if the safety of the public and the officer does not allow for
it forcing officers to go through a litany of tasks before force can be used is dangerous in and of
itself.”
“Yes. If someone is actively shooting at someone an Officer without warning or trying lesser
means should be able to use their firearm if allowed by law to defend their life or the life of
another. Requiring a warning and the Officer to try and use lesser means to stop the incident will
get more people killed. There should not be an outright ban on shooting at moving vehicles. If
someone is trapped and can not escape while someone is intentionally attempting to run
someone else over the Officer should be able to use lethal means to include a firearm to preserve
the life of the victim.”
Rigidity versus flexibility
Many respondents, particularly those who expressed support for APD’s current policies, stated that
it is impossible for an officer to follow rigid policies to the letter in the heat of the moment when
situations are dynamic in the field.
Below are examples of community responses:
49
General Impressions from Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
Who is qualified to make recommendations
Among those who supported APD’s current policies, there was a repeating sentiment that people without
law enforcement experience are not qualified to make policy recommendations that affect police officers.
Similarly, some individuals who supported APD’s current policies asserted that the City of Austin, including
OPO, has already negatively impacted APD policies. In contrast, among those who did not support APD’s
current policies, there was a repeating sentiment that community members should be involved and have a
say in developing police policies and practices.
Below are examples of community responses:
“APD's current policies on use of force (not including OPO's recommendations), do not align
with my ideas of community safety because standard police officers should not carry guns.
When people get stopped for traffic violations or for questioning and the officer stopping them
has a gun, the interaction produces fear, dread, and vulnerability in residents. Guns prevent
trust from building between people with guns and people without guns, and where there are
more guns, there are more gun deaths. There would be less gun violence in communities if
standard police stopped carrying guns. Police officers should not put people into choke-holds.
Police officers should come from the communities they oversee. Community input and
engagement is necessary as communities set standards for public safety. These are my ideas of
community safety, and APD's current policies on use of force do not align with them.”
“Yes. Cops have a to make split second decisions and do not need to be racking their brain on
what policy “specifically” says they can do. It is impossible to predict every single situation that
may arise and we would be holding them to impossible terms. No one could do that job with
restrictions like that. Furthermore, it’s laughable that a person with zero experience as an
officer or someone show has never had to make decisions like this is allowed to critique, much
less provide recommendations to officers.”
50
General Impressions from Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
“Yes. I think all of the policy in place right now is fine. In the job of policing it’s not black
and white. There are situations that may arise where you might not have the ability to
think it straight through. You may only have .01 seconds to react and we have to depend
on our training. The training APD receivers is by far way better than other departments
and I have seen this first hand. You could walk up to a vehicle and someone points a gun
at you. You have to react accordingly and your not going to have time to say hey stop
drop the gun. There is a lot of gray policing and I don’t think anyone should be making
policy recommendations when you have been in the shoes of a officer or have seen what
it’s like being a police officer first hand.”
51
General Impressions from Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
Trust and safety
There is a positive correlation between people who feel safe with current policies and people who trust the
police. High levels of trust lead to people feeling safe. People who supported no policy changes generally
expressed faith in APD officers, believed that APD has the best training available, and deferred to officers’
judgment and discretion. People who supported policy changes expressed distrust in the predictability of
police actions and a lack of faith in APD’s training. Those who responded with a lack of trust often requested
more definitions and specifics in policy to help clarify what actions are acceptable.
Below are examples of community responses:
“Austin has been one of the safest cities in the country thanks to the work and policy of the
APD.”
“Absolutely not. Especially with Austin Police Association’s post that said “can you imagine
the reduction in officer involved shootings if people would comply and complain later?” I do
not trust these human beings to keep ANYONE safe. It is clear that most of them prefer
violence over protecting, and truly do not understand what it means to serve the public. I
would like to see APD removed from all non-violent areas of crime, and I would like to see
their use of force policies heavily amended. We shouldn’t have police responding to any
nonviolent offense. And APD should do everything in their power to deescalate any violent
scenarios.”
“They do not. My idea of community safety would be to use force as an absolute last resort if
at all used. It was extremely disturbing watching them use rubber bullets and tear gas last
summer to get community members hospitalized. There needs to be major change in APD.
Someone tried to break into my apartment a few week ago and I did not call the police
because I just don’t believe they would do anything.”
52
General Impressions from Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
“The Austin Police Department and its officers are top notch. APD reports/documents
everything. Our officers should be held up on a pedestal for an example to the rest of the
country. Most of these recommendations are things APD already does. Warnings before
deadly force? This is a joke. Strangle holds should be banned except when deadly force
would be authorized. Stop making our officers out to be your enemy.”
“Yes, I trust our police department. They work this job everyday and know how to be safe.
We have the safest department in the country. Stop trying to ruin that. Give a warning when
using deadly force? You think in a split second you’re gonna have the mental ability to give
a warning? Wow”
53
General Impressions from Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
Safety and minority communities
People who reported being members of a minority community (e.g., those who identify as BIPOC (Black,
Indigenous and People of Color), LGBTQ+, or people living with disabilities) or knowing people who are part of
those communities also generally reported feeling unsafe with APD’s current policies.
Below are examples of community responses:
“No. It is not safe for some people (APD) to be able to commit violence against the rest of us
with no accountability or consequences. I am a disabled person and part of my disability is
hearing loss. I also get very frightened when I perceive someone as being angry or hostile which
causes me to freeze up. I am terrified of being hurt or killed by police because of not being able
to hear/understand or comply quickly enough, even if I pose no real threat. I'm a gentle person
and would not do anyone any harm. APD has proven, particularly over the past year, that they
have many officers who are willing to hurt, maim, and even kill people who pose no immediate
threat to the safety of others in the eyes of a reasonable person. Furthermore many APD officers
proved that they were not willing or able to use "less lethal" weapons as designed- two
examples are beanbag rounds being fired at too close of a range and rubber bullets being aimed
directly at people instead of at the ground over a distance, but I suspect there are others. The
fact that chokeholds and strangleholds aren't categorically banned for APD is ABSOLUTELY
HORRIFYING. APD training should focus more on de-escalation and non-violent means of
handling the situations the officers encounter in their work.”
54
General Impressions from Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
“They do not align with my ideas of community safety. Police officers should be trained to
avoid force at all costs, and trained to automatically de-escalate situations. I don't believe
officers should be shooting at any moving or non-moving vehicles - they could end up
crashing into other cars or people after being shot. The people being shot at would also be
much more at risk of being killed. For Policy #5, I would like for APD to make it VERY clear
that warnings MUST be given, and also how to make sure people actually hear and
understand the warnings. I'm deaf, and I know I probably wouldn't hear police officers
shouting commands behind me if I am not looking at them. Additionally, so many people
walk around listening to music through headphones these days. Police officers can't just
assume that people heard them and are ignoring them. They MUST get people's attention
in a safe manner - don't touch or yell unexpectedly. Above all, police shouldn't
automatically assume every person has committed a crime and treat them as such. It seems
like a lot of police training has a "police" vs. "perp" mentality that isn't good.”
"Although I am a law-abiding citizen, I don’t feel safe with APD. When there are police
officers present, I fear they will try to find a reason to get me in trouble, even though I don’t
break laws or cause trouble. This is exacerbated by the fact that I am visibly transgender and
a mixed race Mexican Indigenous person; I feel that when a police officer identifies me as
LGBTQ+ and nonwhite, they expect that I am a criminal. I have witnessed APD officers harm
peaceful protestors and homeless people who committed no crime. I fear that without
serious efforts to reform the department and retrain officers, there will be no solution. I
would feel safer if officers were not permitted to carry lethal weapons to calls where the
suspect is not carrying lethal weapons. I feel the current culture of policing makes officers
feel that all civilians are
potentially dangerous to them, and that instead of helping them do their jobs, this causes
officers to react in a traumatized flight-or-fight manner that harms civilians and officers
alike. To bring about safe policing, that culture would need to change, so that officers feel
they are a part of their community and they can trust civilians.”
55
General Impressions from Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
Police and community dynamics
Among those who do not feel safe with APD’s current policies, there was also a sentiment that broader
change is necessary for police culture, training, and community policing practices. These respondents
viewed the current climate of policing in Austin as an oppositional power imbalance and expressed
support for an approach in which police officers view themselves as members of the community they are
policing and perform their role in line with community values. Tactics that have the potential for extreme
violence and unintended lethal force, such as chokeholds, were characterized as not conforming to
community standards and values and reinforcing the separation of the police from the community.
Below are examples of community responses:
“Sounds like current policy could have been used to justify either Eric Garner or George
Floyd’s murder. The nuance of “to protect human life” would have to become a huge part of
APD culture for a policy based on that to work. Because the person being strangled is a
human life, too”
“We need so much more than this. We need to stop sending armed, militarized units to deal
with petty crimes and misdemeanors, not to mention mental health crises. We need to end
police raids that unnecessarily endanger civilians over alleged drug offenses. We need
radically different police recruitment and training processes that reimagine APD as an
institution whose goal is to protect Austinites - not intimidate and incarcerate them. We
need much stronger accountability measures - for instance, a cop turning off their body
camera before murdering someone should be considered admitting guilt to premeditated
murder. Why should a cop bring a gun to a traffic stop? Any chance of the cop being injured
in that interaction becomes much higher when the targeted person is looking down the
barrel of a gun. A gun doesn't protect, it kills. Rank-and-file cops should not be going to
work every day ready to kill civilians. They should be disarmed completely.”
56
General Impressions from Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
“Not only do these policies need to change, but there also needs to be a complete
overhaul in of police training that focus on peaceful de-escalation techniques. Moreover,
officers need to be held accountable for their actions rather than being protected behind
the thin blue line.”
“Officers who respond with violence and fear do not deserve to serve our city. The people
in this city deserve safety - APD has proven to be incapable of providing this to the
people. Trained social workers and professionals with knowledge on deescalation is what
the city needs. 18 weeks of police training where crisis intervention is only one of over 30
areas of training is not significant enough. Police officers in training need more
significant and consistent mental health screenings throughout their careers.”
57
General Impressions from Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
Safety during police interactions
Both those who supported current APD policies and those who supported policy change cited
concern for the safety of the public and police officers during an encounter. Those who supported
current APD policies generally emphasized officer safety, whereas those who supported policy
change talked about the safety of all involved, including those suspected of criminal activity.
Below are examples of community responses:
“Use of force should be considered as last resort. I understand how quickly a situation can
escalate but the first priority should be maintaining the safety of the suspect and the officer,
even if the suspect is able to leave the scene. How does use of a taser fit into this
discussion?”
“The policies do not, and the reality of APD’s use of force also does not align. The
community includes people who are disabled, Black, brown, deaf, or just agitated. The role
of a police department should be to serve and protect *everyone,* not resort to gunfire.”
“No, anyone who is supposed to be helping keep a community safe, should be using
violence as the last resort only. People who are breaking the law are also part of the
community, and they should be de-escalated, more violence does not decrease violence. A
safe community is one that is supported, not injured, murdered, or brutalized. Use of force
should be very specific, and highly trained. Mental health training and de-escalation should
be priority- for the safety of officers as well as to the safety of others.”
58
General Impressions from Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
“Yes. Officers are sometimes faced with violent encounters which necessitate use of force. I
do not believe that policy changes restricting their ability to utilize use of force where
appropriate would enhance the safety of the community. I feel it would have the opposite
effect. Officers will no longer be proactive in their work to deter crime if too many policy
changes are made; the fear of losing their job would outweigh their desire to help. It’s not
feasible for example to always require de-escalation or warnings prior to firing a weapon.
Things can go bad on calls very quickly and I wouldn’t support punishing an officer for
having to use deadly force and not being able to use a warning first. These proposed policies
just couldn’t be applied to 100% of calls so I can’t support it.”
“No. These policies are vague and give the police far too broad of discretion when using
lethal force. The police discretion should be minimized. It does not make me, nor others in
my household, feel safe when the police can use force willy-nilly. Community safety isn't
just about the police keeping us safe from others but about the police themselves being
inherently safe to encounter.”
“Officers must make very fast life-and-death decisions. In most situations, where an officer’s
life is at risk, giving warnings it’s going to get them killed. You also cannot “Deescalate”
when somebody has already determined to harm you.”
59
Conclusions and Next Steps
Office of Police Oversight
In Resolution 95, Council directed that "[a]ll changes to the General Orders made pursuant to
[Resolution 95] must be reported back to the Council and relevant Council committees for feedback
before they are implemented."
As a result, the next steps in this process will be for APD, in consultation with the City Manager's
Office, to review OPO's final recommendations before incorporating them into the General Orders.
APD will subsequently bring the proposed modified General Orders to Council for feedback per
Resolution 95.
142
60
Appendix A: Methodology
Office of Police Oversight
OPO analyzed more than 1,400 survey responses, including 2,200 qualitative responses, to distill and
summarize the community’s feedback on APD use-of-force policies. Qualitative data consisted of
answers to two open-ended questions in the survey and comments recorded during four virtual
community events. Quantitative data consisted of sixteen closed-ended questions collected in the
survey.
Respondents to the survey self-selected. Additionally, to make the survey more accessible to Austin
residents, demographics were not tracked. As a result, it is not possible to determine statistical
significance in this analysis.
To understand the large volume of data in the community feedback on OPO's proposed policy
recommendations, the OPO team held multi-day synthesis workshops to organize the data and discuss
insights. During the synthesis process, OPO and supporting staff selected and arranged quotes
according to content and sentiment. Team members then reviewed repeated themes and patterns
throughout the community feedback and identified quotes supporting the themes.
Data Collection
Research Goals
In Resolutions 95 and 96, City Council instructed that OPO conduct this rewrite through an open
process, seeking feedback and input from the community. In Phase II, OPO's overarching goal was to
facilitate community engagement opportunities to create space for authentic, inclusive conversations
and feedback on APD's current use-of-force policies and OPO's proposed changes. To this end, OPO
hosted a series of four community engagement events and developed a digital survey to collect
community feedback.
Digital Survey
To develop questions for the digital survey, OPO's Communications Division first consulted with a user
research designer. Then, the Communications Division worked with OPO’s Policy & Research Division
to narrow down goals for the questions. Next, the questions were reviewed again by a user research
designer and a content strategist. During this stage of review, questions were revised to ensure that
they were worded as clearly as possible while providing necessary information and context. After
finalizing the questions, the survey was translated into English and Spanish and published on the City
of Austin's community engagement website: SpeakUp, Austin!.
OPO also conducted various outreach efforts, including Spanish-language outreach. Spanish-language
responses to SpeakUp, Austin! surveys have historically been low. Outreach to the Spanish-speaking
community was critical given these low participation rates and the fact that the Latinx community in
Austin has experienced a high concentration of officer-involved shooting incidents in recent years.
143
61
Appendix A: Methodology
Office of Police Oversight
OPO's primary goals in creating and distributing the survey were to make it as accessible as
possible and to reach community members who are generally not brought in to be part of
conversations around policing. To reach these community members—including people of color,
unhoused individuals, and those in the disability or mental health community—OPO focused on
removing barriers to participation. As a result, the digital survey did not require participants to
log in or register, and it did not ask for demographic data. While helpful data points, these
things can decrease someone's willingness to participate in the survey and, as a result, the
potential for their voice to be heard.
The survey consisted of both closed-ended and open-ended questions. The closed-ended
questions, which had predefined answer choices, were necessary to collect data that could be
measured in quantities. The open-ended questions were essential to provide a means for
participants to express their thoughts and opinions. Open-ended questions also allowed OPO
to review individual responses to learn more about the participants and develop insights. In
the end, the survey consisted of sixteen closed-ended questions and two open-ended
questions.
The digital survey was open on SpeakUp, Austin! from April 23 through May 31, 2021. During
that time, OPO received more than 1,400 survey responses in both English and Spanish.
Virtual Meetings
OPO also engaged with community members by hosting four virtual events. As with the digital
survey, OPO focused on ensuring that the events were accessible and inclusive. To that end,
OPO offered interpretation by request for any language and every event offered interpretation
in Spanish and American Sign Language. Approximately 60 community members attended the
virtual presentations.
During the events, OPO's community engagement staff guided participants through a
presentation covering APD's current policies and OPO's recommended policy changes. After
presenting each policy, staff facilitated a discussion and collected feedback from individual
participants. Community members were asked to provide their input on the existing policy and
recommended changes by answering the question, "Does this policy make you feel safe?”
Community members could respond aloud or reply through the Zoom application's chat
function.
Additionally, participants were encouraged to answer closed-ended questions through the
Zoom application's poll function. Each policy area's poll questions were broken up, but utilized
the same language as those in the SpeakUp, Austin! survey.
Community feedback was documented by recording all four meetings and collecting transcripts
of the meeting chat. Staff utilized this information to create data points used in this analysis.
Synthesis Process
To understand the qualitative data collected, a team of six Office of Police Oversight staff used
a human-centered design approach to synthesize the findings. This approach to problem-
solving places the people who are being designed for at the center of the process. The data
was first organized and coded by sentiment, lived experience and actionable recommendations
expressed. Then the information was reviewed in a quality control process to confirm it was
categorized correctly. The group then analyzed to reveal patterns, insights, and themes.
62
Appendix A: Methodology
Office of Police Oversight
Does the community think policy change is needed?
Is the community amenable to OPO's proposed changes?
Are there any other considerations?
Community feedback on use-of-force policies
Community feedback on use-of-force policies are conclusions drawn from the quantitative
and qualitative data directly related to the six use-of-force policy topics. For community
feedback on use-of-force policies, the responses were filtered for specific mention of the
policies in question. These groupings were separated based on whether they reflected a
positive or negative sentiment, and clustered to reveal patterns in the responses.
These patterns were then evaluated through the lens of three questions to be answered:
1.
2.
3.
Overarching Themes
Overarching themes are based on patterns observed across the cumulative qualitative data.
The team identified the responses relevant to the six policy areas to reveal overarching
themes during the data synthesis process. The team identified and developed more
prominent themes across the data through group discussion and summarized these themes in
concise statements. Then, the overarching themes were cross-referenced with the community
feedback to ensure that they accurately represented community sentiment.
General Impressions from Community Feedback
General impressions from community feedback are topics that OPO saw repeatedly across
data but are not necessarily related to policy. Many of these sentiments reflect community
concerns about policing and reform more broadly. Unlike the previous two sections, this
section does not include recommendations.
63
Appendix B: Comparing OPO's Proposed
Recommendations with Best Practices
Office of Police Oversight
Restrict Shooting at Moving Vehicles
Police Executive
Research Forum
144
International
Association
of Chiefs of Police
145
Office of Police
Oversight
146
Deadly force:
Vehicle or means
other than vehicle?
Officers should be
prohibited from
shooting at moving
vehicles unless
someone in the
vehicle is using or
threatening deadly
force by means other
than the vehicle itself.
Offices should only
consider this tactic if
“a person in the
vehicle is immediately
threatening the officer
or another person
with deadly force by
means other than the
vehicle,” or when the
vehicle is intentionally
being used as a deadly
weapon and “all other
reasonable means of
defense have been
exhausted (or are not
present or practical).”
Officers should be
prohibited from
shooting at moving
vehicles unless they
have, based on the
totality of the
circumstances,
exhausted all possible
alternatives and an
occupant of the
vehicle is using deadly
force by means other
than the vehicle itself.
Exceptions?
There should be an
exception permitting
officers to shoot at a
vehicle when it is
being used in a mass
ramming incident with
the intent of running
down a crowd of
people.
There should be an
exception when the
vehicle itself is “used
as a deliberate means
to kill others, such as
a truck being driven
through a crowd of
innocent bystanders.”
There should be an
exception allowing
officers to shoot at a
moving vehicle used
in mass casualty
incidents, providing
the example of using
a vehicle to drive into
a crowd of people.
Officers’ duty to
move out of the
way?
Policies should
require officers to get
out of the way of a
moving vehicle.
“In cases where officers
believe that the driver is
intentionally attempting
to run them down,
primary consideration
must be given to
moving out of the path
of the vehicle. The
Consensus Policy
recognizes that there
are times when getting
out of the way of the
vehicle is not possible
and the use of a firearm
by the officer may be
warranted.”
Policies should
require an officer to
move out of the path
of any approaching
vehicle unless it is
impossible to do so.
64
Appendix B: Comparing OPO's Proposed
Recommendations with Best Practices
Restrict Shooting at Moving Vehicles (continued)
Police Executive
Research Forum
147
International
Association
of Chiefs of Police
148
Office of Police
Oversight
149
Terms and
guidelines?
Policies prohibiting
shooting at moving
vehicles should
eliminate vague terms
that may undercut the
concrete elements of
the policy, such as the
officer holding a
“reasonable belief” the
vehicle poses a threat.
Such language,
creates a loophole
leading to bad tactics
that compromises
officers’ and
community members’
safety.
Recommended policy
language limits vague
terms and instead
uses phrases like
“immediately.”
Policies related to
shooting at moving
vehicles should
eliminate language
like “reasonably
perceives,” and
undefined terms like
“extraordinary
circumstances.”
Other factors?
Shooting from a
moving vehicle?
Agencies should adopt
a prohibition against
shooting at or from a
moving vehicle unless
someone in the
vehicle is using or
threatening deadly
force by means other
than the vehicle itself.
When permitted, “such
actions should be taken
only if the action does
not present an
unreasonable risk to
officers or others, when
reasonable alternatives
are not practical, when
failure to take such
action would probably
result in death or
serious bodily injury,
and then only when due
consideration has been
given to the safety of
others in the vicinity.”
Policy should prohibit
discharge of a firearm
at a moving vehicle in
any situation when
the totality of the
circumstances
indicates that it is
more likely than not
that an innocent
passenger or
bystander could be
injured.
Proportionality-is the
response proportional
to the threat officers
faced? Is a “win at all
costs” mentality
coming into play?
“You can arrest the
suspect another day,
but you can never get
that life back. This
needs to be the new
way of thinking about
these types of
encounters.”
Not permitted unless
exigent circumstances
exist. Same arguments
can be made as with
shooting at a moving
vehicle. “Most notably,
accuracy of shot
placement is significantly
and negatively affected
in such situations,
thereby substantially
increasing the risk to
innocent bystanders from
errant shots.”
Policy should prohibit
shooting from moving
vehicles.
Office of Police Oversight
65
Appendix B: Comparing OPO's Proposed
Recommendations with Best Practices
Office of Police Oversight
Exhaust All Alternatives Using Deadly Force
Police Executive
Research Forum
150
International
Association
of Chiefs of Police
151
Office of Police
Oversight
152
Should officers be
required exhaust all
alternatives before
using deadly force?
In a 2017 assessment
of the Winslow,
Arizona Police
Department, the
Police Executive
Research Forum
stated that the
department should
add language to its
use-of-force policy
“...that prohibits the
use of lethal force
against individuals
who pose a danger
only to themselves
and not to other
members of the public
or to officers. Officers
should also be
required to consider
the use of many
available less-lethal
options in these
situations. Officers
should be prepared to
exercise considerable
discretion to wait as
long as necessary so
that the situation can
be resolved
peacefully.”
In 2020 published a
revised version of its
model use-of-force
policies stating,
“Officers shall use
force only when no
reasonably effective
alternative appears to
exist and shall use
only the level of force
which a reasonably
prudent officer would
use under the same or
similar
circumstances.”
In its policy on
shooting at moving
vehicles, the
International
Association of Chiefs
of Police states that
the tactic is only
permitted when “...all
other reasonable
means of defense
have been exhausted
(or are not present or
practical)...”
Only permits the use
of deadly force as a
last resort after all
alternatives have been
exhausted or when,
after analyzing the
situation, alternatives
have been rendered
unreasonable by the
totality of the
circumstances.”
“Unreasonable” is
defined as conduct
which, given the
totality of the
circumstances, is
irrational,
unwarranted, or not in
accordance with
practical realities.
Assessments will be
based on an objective
examination of real-
time facts and
information, avoiding
hypothetical
scenarios.
66
Appendix B: Comparing OPO's Proposed
Recommendations with Best Practices
Office of Police Oversight
De-Escalation
Police Executive
Research Forum
153
International
Association
of Chiefs of Police
154
Office of Police
Oversight
155
Addresses potential
reasons for
noncompliance?
In it’s de-escalation
training program,
which is used by APD,
the Police Executive
Research Forum
states, “Don’t
automatically view
non-compliance as a
threat. There are many
reasons the subject
may not be following
your directions (can’t
hear, can’t process
information). Stay
focused on the
subject’s behavior and
communication back
to you.
Remember....everythin
g you do impacts all
future contacts the
individual in crisis
(and maybe family and
friends) have with the
police. Don’t make it
harder for the next
officer by taking
shortcuts or treating
someone poorly.
Finally...manage your
own reactions.”
Stated in its model
policy titled
Interactions with
Individuals with
Intellectual and
Developmental
Disabilities, “Some
people with I/DD
might become easily
upset and can engage
in self-harming
behaviors or act in
aggressive ways. Fear,
including fear of law
enforcement,
frustration, and
changes in their daily
routines and
surroundings can
trigger such behavior.
The mere presence of
an officer can also be
a source of stress.
People with I/DD
often have
impairments that
make it difficult for
them to process
incoming sensory
information.”
Requires officers to
gather information as
they arrive on scene,
including factors that
could impact
someone’s ability to
interact with officers,
understand the nature
of the situation,
and/or voluntarily
comply with
instructions. Provides
a non-exhaustive list
of examples,
including: (1) medical
conditions; (2) mental
health diagnoses, (3)
intellectual or
developmental
disabilities (IDD), or
cognitive disorders; (4)
mental health crises;
(5) physical
capabilities (taking
into account factors
like age, injury, or
size); (6) hearing or
vision capabilities; (7)
language barriers; (8)
effects of drugs (street
or prescribed) or
alcohol; and (9)
conflicting noise or
other distractions in
the vicinity (e.g.
multiple officers
giving commands at
the same time, traffic
noise, lights and
sirens, etc.).
67
Appendix B: Comparing OPO's Proposed
Recommendations with Best Practices
Office of Police Oversight
De-Escalation (continued)
The policy goes on to
list 14 things that
officers should do
when interacting with
individuals with I/DD,
including, but not
limited to, the
following: (1) speak
calmly; (2) repeat
short, direct phrases in
a calm voice, avoiding
slang or euphemisms;
(3) use nonthreatening
body language, soft
gestures, and avoid
abrupt movements or
actions, keeping
hands at sides and
visible when possible;
(4) whenever
reasonable and
practical, avoid
touching the person
unless there is an
emergency situation;
(5) maintain a safe
distance, providing
the person with a
zone of comfort that
will also serve as a
buffer for officer
safety; (6) eliminate,
to the degree
possible, loud sounds,
bright lights, and
other sources of
overstimulation by
turning off lights and
sirens; (7) avoid taking
mobility devices away;
(8) be prepared for a
potentially long
encounter; (9) do not
interpret odd behavior
as belligerent or
aggressive.
Police Executive
Research Forum
International
Association
of Chiefs of Police
Office of Police
Oversight
Addresses potential
reasons for
noncompliance?
(continued)
68
Appendix B: Comparing OPO's Proposed
Recommendations with Best Practices
Office of Police Oversight
De-Escalation (continued)
Police Executive
Research Forum
156
International
Association
of Chiefs of Police
157
Office of Police
Oversight
158
Addresses the safety
of all involved in an
incident?
Acknowledges that
“...the goal of de-
escalation is to slow
down the situation so
that the subject can
be guided toward a
course of action that
will not necessitate
the use of force,
reduce the level of
force necessary, allow
time for additional
personnel or resources
to arrive, or all three.”
States in its de-
escalation training
guide, “Reinforce with
patrol officers the core
ideal of sanctity of
human life--the need
to protect themselves,
members of the public
and, whenever
possible, criminal
suspects and subjects
in crisis from danger
and harm.”
“Officers shall safely
incorporate
appropriate de-
escalation techniques
in all circumstances,
and shall approach all
encounters with the
goal of preventing or
minimizing uses of
force and, in
situations where
compliance is needed,
gaining voluntary
compliance.”
Addresses an
officer’s role in
impacting the
direction of an
interaction?
Training reminds
officers to manage
their own reactions,
citing the impact that
one incident can have
on the community’s
view of police in the
future.
Training directs
officers to not
automatically view
non-compliance as a
threat.
Adding a new module
to its de-escalation
training program to
introduce the concept
of “Step Up and Step
In” to address the
importance of peer
intervention.
Discusses the
importance of volume
and tone of speech
during interactions, as
well as the
importance of body
language, stating that
“...standing too close
to an angry or
agitated person might
cause them to feel
threatened.”
“While de-escalation
efforts may fail in
some instances,
officers are expected
to recognize their
ability to impact the
direction and outcome
of many situations
through their own
conduct and decision-
making. Officers shall
not engage in
unnecessary conduct
that could be
expected to escalate a
situation.”
69
Appendix B: Comparing OPO's Proposed
Recommendations with Best Practices
Office of Police Oversight
Duty to Intervene in Cases of Improper or Excessive Use of Force
Police Executive
Research Forum
159
International
Association
of Chiefs of Police
160
Office of Police
Oversight
161
Should the duty to
intervene be
triggered when an
officer believes
another officer is
preparing to use
unnecessary or
excessive force and
when officers
observe unnecessary
or excessive force?
An officer has a duty
to intervene to
prevent or
stop the use of
excessive force by
another
officer when it is safe
and reasonable to do
so.
Officers should be
obligated to intervene
when they believe
another officer is
about to use excessive
or unnecessary force,
or when they witness
colleagues using
excessive or
unnecessary force, or
engaging in other
misconduct.
Any officer who
observes another
officer use or prepare
to use force that is not
objectively reasonable
or engage in any
conduct that would
constitute a violation
of state law, federal
law, or APD policy
shall make every
effort to safely
intervene and stop the
other officer.
Should the duty to
intervene apply to
misconduct aside
from force?
Officers should be
obligated to intervene
when they believe
another officer is
about to use excessive
or unnecessary force,
or when they witness
colleagues using
excessive or
unnecessary force, or
engaging in other
misconduct.
“Implementing a
standalone ‘Duty to
Intervene’ policy
separate from an
agency’s use-of-force
policy communicates
that this is a priority
for an agency’s
leadership. An
effective policy states
that officers must
intervene if
witnessing a fellow
officer engaging in
any act that is
unethical, violates law
or policy, or when
force is being
inappropriately
applied or applied
when it is no longer
required.
Any officer who
observes another
officer use or prepare
to use force that is not
objectively reasonable
or engage in any
conduct that would
constitute a violation
of state law, federal
law, or APD policy
shall make every
effort to safely
intervene and stop the
other officer.
70
Appendix B: Comparing OPO's Proposed
Recommendations with Best Practices
Office of Police Oversight
Duty to Intervene in Cases of Improper or Excessive Use of Force (continued)
Acknowledges that
the means of
intervention depends
on the situation, but
recommends that
officers intervene by
using one or more of
the “3 D’s”: Distract,
Direct (“address the
misconduct directly
and step in to
intervene”), and
Delegate
The policy must “be
clear that an
intervention must go
beyond a verbal
comment if the officer
using force ignores
the attempted
intervention.”
Requires intervening
officers to make every
effort to safely
intervene by verbal
and physical means as
the situation requires.
Requires that, if verbal
intervention is not
enough to stop the
act(s), intervening
officers must make
every effort to safely
intervene through
physical means. Also
provides examples of
verbal and physical
intervention.
Police Executive
Research Forum
International
Association
of Chiefs of Police
Office of Police
Oversight
Should officers be
provided guidance
on how they should
intervene?
71
Appendix B: Comparing OPO's Proposed
Recommendations with Best Practices
Office of Police Oversight
Duty to Intervene in Cases of Improper or Excessive Use of Force (continued)
Police Executive
Research Forum
International
Association
of Chiefs of Police
Office of Police
Oversight
162
163
164
Issues of police
culture addressed?
Cites the difficulty
that police officers
may have in
challenging one
another, especially if
someone of lower
rank or tenure is
challenging someone
of higher rank or
tenure.
Acknowledges that
officers may not
intervene because of a
“...belief that loyalty
means supporting a
colleague’s actions
regardless of whether
they are right or
wrong, a fear of
retaliation and
backlash from peers,
detriment to one’s
career, or the desire to
not get involved. Peer
bystander intervention
encourages officers to
recognize that
stepping into a
situation when a peer
is about to make a
mistake benefits them
and everyone
involved.”
Accounts for
hierarchical issues and
retaliation in police
culture. Cross-
references APD
policies related to
insubordination and
obedience, stating
that the policy creates
an affirmative duty to
intervene regardless
of rank or whether the
intervening officer is
of higher or lower
rank than the officer(s)
whose conduct is in
question. Also
explicitly prohibits
retaliation against
intervening officers.
72
Appendix B: Comparing OPO's Proposed
Recommendations with Best Practices
Office of Police Oversight
Ban Chokeholds and Strangleholds
Police Executive
Research Forum
165
International
Association
of Chiefs of Police
166
Office of Police
Oversight
167
Addresses
respiratory and
vascular neck
restraints?
References both
“choke holds”
(respiratory neck
restraints) and
“Vascular Neck
Restraints” and
describes them as
“extremely dangerous
maneuvers that could
easily result in death.”
“PERF recommends
the prohibition of any
type of neck restraint,
such as [the] Carotid
Control Hold, due to
the limited occasions
in which it is
necessary, and the
extensive training and
skill required to
perform it safely and
effectively.”
Officers should be
prohibited from
shooting at moving
vehicles unless they
have, based on the
totality of the
circumstances,
exhausted all possible
alternatives and an
occupant of the
vehicle is using deadly
force by means other
than the vehicle itself.
Prohibits or
restricts?
“PERF has generally
recommended the
prohibition of any
type of neck
restraint…”
Restricts in all cases
except where deadly
force would be
authorized.
Prohibits officers from
performing any action
that could, or is
intended to, prevent,
reduce, hinder or
otherwise negatively
impact an individual’s
blood flow to the
brain or intake of air.
73
Appendix B: Comparing OPO's Proposed
Recommendations with Best Practices
Office of Police Oversight
Ban Chokeholds and Strangleholds (continued)
Addresses training?
Explains that
“...officers should
receive training on
their agency's use-of-
force policy and any
accompanying legal
updates on at least an
annual basis. Training
should also be
provided on all
approved force
options and
techniques permitted
by agency policy,
along with
regular refresher
training that includes
a review of the policy
and hands-on,
practical training.”
Explained in a 2020
assessment of the
Vancouver, WA Police
Department that
extensive training and
skill are required to
perform these
maneuvers safely and
effectively.
Stated in a 2018
assessment of the
Volusia County
Sheriff's Office that
departments allowing
neck restraints must
ensure officers “...are
trained and tested
yearly on the proper
techniques, and that
policy and training are
revised so that it is
authorized only in
situations in which
lethal force is
authorized.”
In its 2015 report, Re-
engineering Training
on Police Use of
Force, published an
interview with the
NYPD Chief discussing
neck restraints. “The
training team put on
an exhibition of what
they do in the Police
Academy, and it was
very impressive. But
the problem was that
these folks who do the
training are all very
practiced in martial
arts.
Categorically bans the
use of maneuvers like
chokeholds and
strangleholds in part
because APD does not
train on these
maneuvers.
Police Executive
Research Forum
International
Association
of Chiefs of Police
Office of Police
Oversight
74
Appendix B: Comparing OPO's Proposed
Recommendations with Best Practices
Office of Police Oversight
Ban Chokeholds and Strangleholds (continued)
They have done this
training all day, every
day, for many years, so
they’ve developed an
expertise with it, and
they demonstrated all
these restraint
techniques that they
were able to employ
very effectively. But
that does not translate
when you try to train a
police officer in it
during one brief
session in their career,
maybe two if they’re
lucky.”
Police Executive
Research Forum
International
Association
of Chiefs of Police
Office of Police
Oversight
Addresses training?
(Continued)
75
Appendix B: Comparing OPO's Proposed
Recommendations with Best Practices
Office of Police Oversight
Warn Before Shooting
Police Executive
Research Forum
168
International
Association
of Chiefs of Police
169
Office of Police
Oversight
Warnings required?
If an officer decides to
use deadly force, they
must, “whenever
feasible...warn the
subject of his or her
intent to use deadly
force…”
PERF de-escalation
curriculum, including
its Critical Decision-
Making Model, focus
heavily on “slowing
down” encounters and
effective
communication.
In a 2018 assessment
of the Volusia County
Sheriff's Office, PERF
assessed the “degree
of communication
between the subject
and deputy prior to
the shooting.
Determinations that a
deputy did
communicate were
made conservatively
by reviewers, based on
qualitative assessment
of whether the
shooting occurred
quickly, or whether
the deputy had had an
opportunity to
attempt to resolve the
incident without the
use of force prior to
the shooting.”
Requires that a verbal
warning be given prior
to the deployment of
a firearm except in
limited circumstances.
170
76
Appendix B: Comparing OPO's Proposed
Recommendations with Best Practices
Office of Police Oversight
Warn Before Shooting (continued)
Exceptions when
warnings are not
required?
“If issuing a verbal
warning presents a
heightened risk to the
safety of the officer or
another person, the
officer may employ
deadly force without
delay.”
Distinguishes
warnings from giving
ultimatums, noting
that individuals “...may
not understand or be
able to comprehend
what you are saying,
so ultimatums are
counter-productive.”
Warnings not required
if 2 conditions met:
1. Use of deadly force
is immediately
necessary to prevent
imminent death or
serious bodily injury
to officers or
bystanders on scene
2. Giving a warning
will place the officer
or bystanders in
additional danger.
Warnings required
to include specific
language?
States to avoid
ultimatums.
Officers must“identify
himself or herself,
warn the subject of his
or her intent to use
deadly force, and
demand that the
subject stop. This
requirement was
made clear in the
Garner decision.”
Warnings must
identify officers as
police officers and
include a clear,
specific command (e.g.
"Austin Police! Drop
the weapon or I’ll
shoot!").
Police Executive
Research Forum
International
Association
of Chiefs of Police
Office of Police
Oversight
77
Appendix C: Data Visualizations of Quantitative
Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
1. "Does APD's current policy on 'shooting at moving vehicles' (not including OPO’s
recommendations) make you feel safe?"
"¿Las políticas actuales de APD sobre 'disparos a vehículos en movimiento' (no incluyendo las
recomendaciones de OPO) le hacen sentir seguro?"
2. "Under all circumstances, shooting at moving vehicles should be prohibited."
"Debería estar prohibido disparar a vehículos en movimiento bajo cualquier circunstancia."
The following charts visualize the quantitative data analyzed in this report, including the more than
1,400 survey responses collected from SpeakUp, Austin! English and Spanish surveys and virtual
community meetings polls. The cumulative responses to the sixteen multiple-choice questions are
visualized in this section.
78
Appendix C: Data Visualizations of Quantitative
Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
3. "Officers should be prohibited from the act of shooting while driving or riding in a moving
vehicle."
"Los oficiales deberían tener prohibido disparar mientras conducen o viajan en un vehículo en
movimiento."
4 "Does APD’s current policy on 'exhausting all alternatives before using deadly force' (not
including OPO’s recommendations) make you feel safe?"
"¿Las políticas actuales de APD sobre 'agotar todas las alternativas antes de usar la fuerza
letal' (no incluyendo las recomendaciones de OPO) le hacen sentir seguro?"
Prefer not to answer
0.5%
Prefer not to answer
0.8%
79
Appendix C: Data Visualizations of Quantitative
Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
5. "Should officers be required to use all available alternatives before using deadly force?"
"¿Deben usar los oficiales todas las alternativas disponibles antes de usar la fuerza letal?"
6. "Does APD’s current policy on 'de-escalation' (not including OPO’s recommendations)
make you feel safe?"
"¿Las políticas actuales de APD sobre 'desescalada' (no incluyendo las recomendaciones de
OPO) le hacen sentir seguro?"
Prefer not to answer
0.5%
80
Appendix C: Data Visualizations of Quantitative
Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
7. "APD should add a list of de-escalation techniques that officers can use."
"APD debe agregar una lista de técnicas para desescalar situaciones que pueden usar los
oficiales."
Q8. "Should APD policy acknowledge or address factors that affect someone’s ability to
follow an officer’s orders, such as disability, mental health, or fear?"
"¿Deben las políticas de APD reconocer o abordar los factores que afectan la habilidad de
una persona de seguir las órdenes de un oficial, como discapacidad, salud mental o miedo?"
Prefer not to answer
0.5%
81
Appendix C: Data Visualizations of Quantitative
Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
Q9. "Does APD’s current policy on the 'duty to intervene in cases of improper or excessive
use of force" (not including OPO’s recommendations) make you feel safe?"
"¿Las políticas actuales de APD sobre el 'deber de intervenir en casos de uso de fuerza
inapropiado o excesivo' (no incluyendo las recomendaciones de OPO) le hacen sentir seguro?"
Q10. "APD policy on the duty to intervene should list the different ways an officer can
intervene."
"Las políticas de APD sobre el deber de intervenir deben enumerar las distintas formas en las
que un oficial puede intervenir."
Prefer not to answer
0.4%
82
Appendix C: Data Visualizations of Quantitative
Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
Q11. "Any officers who witness improper or excessive use of force by any other officer and do
not interfere should be required to report the full circumstances of the incident."
"Cualquier oficial que sea testigo del uso de fuerza inapropiado o excesivo por parte de
cualquier otro oficial y que no interfiera debe estar obligado a reportar todas las circunstancias
del incident."
Q12. "Does APD’s current policy on 'warning before shooting' (not including OPO’s
recommendations) make you feel safe?"
"¿Las políticas actuales de APD sobre 'advertir antes de disparar' (no incluyendo las
recomendaciones de OPO) le hacen sentir seguro?"
Prefer not to answer
0.6%
83
Appendix C: Data Visualizations of Quantitative
Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
Q13. "APD policy must specify how an officer should give a warning before shooting."
"Las políticas de APD deben especificar cómo es que un oficial debe advertir antes de disparar."
Q14. "Does APD’s current policy on 'banning chokeholds and strangleholds' (not including
OPO’s recommendations) make you feel safe?"
"¿Las políticas actuales de APD sobre 'prohibición de las llaves al cuello y las llaves estranguladoras'
(no incluyendo las recomendaciones de OPO) le hacen sentir seguro?"
Prefer not to answer
0.6%
Prefer not to answer
1.0%
84
Appendix C: Data Visualizations of Quantitative
Community Feedback
Office of Police Oversight
Q15. "Chokeholds and strangleholds should be banned."
"Las llaves al cuello y las llaves estranguladoras deberían estar prohibidas."
Q16. "Do the six OPO suggested policy changes to APD policy (click this link to review the
recommendations) provide enough direction to guide officer behavior?"
"¿Están alineadas las políticas existentes con sus ideas de seguridad comunitaria? ¿Por qué sí o
por qué no?"
85
Endnotes
Office of Police Oversight
1. See City of Austin Office of Police Oversight, 8 Can’t Wait Policy Review and Recommendations, Jan.
2021, https://alpha.austin.gov/policeoversight/policy-review-and-recommendations-8-cant-wait/.
2. See City of Austin Office of Police Oversight, 8 Can’t Wait Policy Review and Recommendations.
3. See City of Austin Office of Police Oversight, 8 Can’t Wait Policy Review and Recommendations.
4. Resolution 20200611-050, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020), accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=342178; Resolution 20200611-095, Austin
City Council (June 11, 2020), accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=342177; Resolution 20200611-096, Austin
City Council (June 11, 2020), accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=342179.
5. Resolution 20200611-050; Resolution 20200611-095; Resolution 20200611-096.
6. Resolution 20200611-095; Resolution 20200611-096.
7. Resolution 20200611-095.
8. Resolution 20200611-095.
9. See City of Austin Office of Police Oversight, 8 Can’t Wait Policy Review and Recommendations.
10. See City of Austin Office of Police Oversight, 8 Can’t Wait Policy Review and Recommendations.
11. See City of Austin Office of Police Oversight, 8 Can’t Wait Policy Review and Recommendations; 8
Can’t Wait, Campaign Zero, 2020, accessed Oct. 1, 2021, https://8cantwait.org.
12. See “Office of Police Oversight,” City of Austin, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://alpha.austin.gov/police-oversight/; Resolution 20200611-095; Resolution 20200611-096.
13. Resolution 20200611-095.
14. Resolution 20200611-095.
15. See City of Austin Office of Police Oversight, 8 Can’t Wait Policy Review and Recommendations.
16. See "Review of the Vancouver, WA Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research
Forum, June 2020, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.cityofvancouver.us/sites/default/files/fileattachments/police_vpd/page/42481/vancouv
er_pd_final_report_june_2020.pdf; “Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final
Report,” Police Executive Research Forum, Sept. 2018, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.volusiasheriff.org/_/documents/VSO-PERF-Use-of-Force-Review-Final.pdf; “How Can
We Get Cops to Stop Shooting at Vehicles?,” Police Executive Research Forum, June 5, 2021;
accessed Oct. 1, 2021, https://www.policeforum.org/trending5jun21; “Guiding Principles on Use of
Force,” Police Executive Research Forum, 2016, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.policeforum.org/assets/guidingprinciples1.pdf.
86
Endnotes
Office of Police Oversight
17. “Police Use of Force Policy Analysis,” Campaign Zero, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56996151cbced68b170389f4/t/57e1b5cc2994ca4ac1d97700
/1474409936835/Police+Use+of+Force+Report.pdf; “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,”
Campaign Zero, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56996151cbced68b170389f4/t/5defffb38594a9745b936b64/
1576009651688/Campaign+Zero+Model+Use+of+Force+Policy.pdf
18. Resolution 20200611-095.
19. See Austin Police Department, “202.1.3 Moving Vehicles,” Austin Police Department General
Orders, Jul. 6, 2021, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
20. .See “How Can We Get Cops to Stop Shooting at Vehicles?,” Police Executive Research Forum.
21. APD Executive Staff has confirmed that officers are not trained to shoot at or from moving
vehicles.
22. See City of Austin Office of Police Oversight, 8 Can’t Wait Policy Review and Recommendations.
23. See "Review of the Vancouver, WA Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research
Forum; “Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive
Research Forum; “How Can We Get Cops to Stop Shooting at Vehicles?,” Police Executive Research
Forum; “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum.
24. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International Association
of Chiefs of Police, et al., July 2020, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2020-
07/National_Consensus_Policy_On_Use_Of_Force%2007102020%20v3.pdf.
25. See “Police Use of Force Policy Analysis,” Campaign Zero; “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force
Policy,” Campaign Zero.
26. See Resolution 20200611-095.
27. See "Review of the Vancouver, WA Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research
Forum; “Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive
Research Forum; “How Can We Get Cops to Stop Shooting at Vehicles?,” Police Executive Research
Forum; “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum.
28. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International Association
of Chiefs of Police, et al.
29. See “Police Use of Force Policy Analysis,” Campaign Zero; “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force
Policy,” Campaign Zero.
87
Endnotes
Office of Police Oversight
30. See Resolution 20200611-095.
31. “About PERF,” Police Executive Research Forum, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.policeforum.org/.
32. “How Can We Get Cops to Stop Shooting at Vehicles?,” Police Executive Research Forum;
“Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum.
33. See "Review of the Vancouver, WA Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research
Forum; “Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive
Research Forum; “How Can We Get Cops to Stop Shooting at Vehicles?,” Police Executive Research
Forum; “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum; "National Consensus
Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International Association of Chiefs of Police, et al.
34. See Resolution 20200611-095.
35. See Resolution 20200611-095.
36. See Resolution 20200611-095.
37. See "Review of the Vancouver, WA Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research
Forum; “Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive
Research Forum; “How Can We Get Cops to Stop Shooting at Vehicles?,” Police Executive Research
Forum; “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum; "National Consensus
Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International Association of Chiefs of Police, et al.
38. See "Review of the Vancouver, WA Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research
Forum; “Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive
Research Forum; “How Can We Get Cops to Stop Shooting at Vehicles?,” Police Executive Research
Forum; “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum; "National Consensus
Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International Association of Chiefs of Police, et al.
39. See "Review of the Vancouver, WA Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research
Forum; “Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive
Research Forum; “How Can We Get Cops to Stop Shooting at Vehicles?,” Police Executive Research
Forum; “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum; "National Consensus
Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International Association of Chiefs of Police, et al.
40. See "Review of the Vancouver, WA Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research
Forum; “Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive
Research Forum; “How Can We Get Cops to Stop Shooting at Vehicles?,” Police Executive Research
Forum; “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum; "National Consensus
Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International Association of Chiefs of Police, et al.
88
Endnotes
Office of Police Oversight
41. See "Review of the Vancouver, WA Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research
Forum; “Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive
Research Forum; “How Can We Get Cops to Stop Shooting at Vehicles?,” Police Executive Research
Forum; “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum.
42. See "Review of the Vancouver, WA Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research
Forum; “Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive
Research Forum; “How Can We Get Cops to Stop Shooting at Vehicles?,” Police Executive Research
Forum; “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum; "National Consensus
Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International Association of Chiefs of Police, et al.
43. 8 Can’t Wait, Campaign Zero.
44. See Stoughton, Seth W., et al. Evaluating Police Uses of Force. New York, New York University
Press, 2020.
45. 8 Can’t Wait, Campaign Zero; Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,” Campaign Zero.
46. Resolution 20200611-095.
47. See Austin Police Department General Orders.
48. See “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum; “Winslow, AZ Police
Department Review and Assessment Final Report,” Police Executive Research Forum, April 2017,
accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.winslowaz.gov/PERF%20Winslow%20Police%20Department_Final%20Report%20to%2
0WPD%204-3-17.pdf.
49. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International Association
of Chiefs of Police, et al. See City of Austin Office of Police Oversight, 8 Can’t Wait, Campaign Zero;
Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,” Campaign Zero.
50. See 8 Can’t Wait, Campaign Zero; “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,” Campaign Zero.
51. Resolution 20200611-095.
52. See “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum; “Winslow, AZ Police
Department Review and Assessment Final Report,” Police Executive Research Forum.
53. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International Association
of Chiefs of Police, et al.; 8 Can’t Wait, Campaign Zero; “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,”
Campaign Zero.
54. See 8 Can’t Wait, Campaign Zero; “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,” Campaign Zero.
55. See Resolution 20200611-095.
56. See “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum.
89
Endnotes
Office of Police Oversight
57. “Winslow, AZ Police Department Review and Assessment Final Report,” Police Executive
Research Forum.
58. See Resolution 20200611-095.
59. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International Association
of Chiefs of Police, et al.
60. Stoughton, Seth W., et al., Evaluating Police Uses of Force, New York: New York University Press,
2020; See Walker, Samuel E., and Carol A. Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability, SAGE
Publications, 2020.
61. Police Executive Research Forum, "An Integrated Approach to De-Escalation and Minimizing Use
of Force," Critical Issues in Policing Series (August 2012)
https://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/an%20integrated%20approach%20t
o%20de-escalation%20and%20minimizing%20use%20of%20force%202012.pdf; Stoughton, Seth W.,
et al., Evaluating Police Uses of Force; Walker, Samuel E., and Carol A. Archbold, The New World of
Police Accountability.
62. “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,” Campaign Zero.
63. “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,” Campaign Zero.
64. Resolution 20200611-095.
65. See “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum; Police Executive
Research Forum, “ICAT Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics: A Training Guide for
Defusing Critical Incidents,” Critical Issues in Policing Series (October 2016)
https://www.policeforum.org/assets/icattrainingguide.pdf.
66. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International Association
of Chiefs of Police, et al.; “Model Policy Interactions with Individuals with Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities,” International Association of Chiefs of Police, August 2017, accessed
Oct. 1, 2021, https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2018-
08/IntellectualDevelopmentalDisabilityPolicy.pdf.
67. See “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,” Campaign Zero.
68. See Resolution 20200611-095.
69. See “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum; Police Executive
Research Forum, “ICAT Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics: A Training Guide for
Defusing Critical Incidents.”
70. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International Association
of Chiefs of Police, et al.; “Model Policy Interactions with Individuals with Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities,” International Association of Chiefs of Police.
71. See “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,” Campaign Zero.
72. See Resolution 20200611-095.
90
Endnotes
Office of Police Oversight
73. See Austin Police Department, “200.2 De-escalation of Potential Force Encounters.”
74. “Getting Officers to ‘Step Up and Step In’,” Police Executive Research Forum, April 3, 2021,
accessed Oct. 1, 2021, https://www.policeforum.org/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=941:trending3apr21&catid=20:site-content.
75. “Getting Officers to ‘Step Up and Step In’,” Police Executive Research Forum.
76. “Examining the Impact of Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics (ICAT) De-
escalation Training for the Louisville Metro Police Department: Initial Findings,” International
Association of Chiefs of Police and the University of Cincinnati Center for Police Research and
Policy, Oct. 30, 2020, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/Research%20Center/LMPD_ICAT%20Evaluation%20Initia
l%20Findings%20Report_FINAL%2009212020.pdf.
77. Examining the Impact of Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics (ICAT) De-
escalation Training for the Louisville Metro Police Department: Initial Findings,” International
Association of Chiefs of Police and the University of Cincinnati Center for Police Research and
Policy.
78. See Resolution 20200611-095.
79. See Model Policy Interactions with Individuals with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities,”
International Association of Chiefs of Police; Police Executive Research Forum, “ICAT Integrating
Communications, Assessment, and Tactics: A Training Guide for Defusing Critical Incidents.”
80. See “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum; Police Executive
Research Forum, “ICAT Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics: A Training Guide for
Defusing Critical Incidents;” "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force,"
International Association of Chiefs of Police, et al.”
81. See “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum; Police Executive
Research Forum, “ICAT Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics: A Training Guide for
Defusing Critical Incidents;” "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force,"
International Association of Chiefs of Police, et al.”
82. Walker, Samuel E., and Carol A. Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability.
83. See “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,” Campaign Zero.
84. Resolution 20200611-095.
85. See “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum.
86. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International Association
of Chiefs of Police, et al.;” “Peer Bystander Intervention in Law Enforcement Agencies,” International
Association of Chiefs of Police, Aug. 2021, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/243806_IACP_CPE_Bystander_Intervention_p2.pdf.
87. See “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,” Campaign Zero.
88. See Resolution 20200611-095.
89. See “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum.
91
Endnotes
Office of Police Oversight
90. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International Association
of Chiefs of Police, et al.;” “Peer Bystander Intervention in Law Enforcement Agencies,” International
Association of Chiefs of Police.
91. See “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,” Campaign Zero.
92. See Resolution 20200611-095.
93. See Austin Police Department, “200.1.3 Duty to Intercede.”
94. “Ethical Policing is Courageous,” New Orleans Police Department, accessed Oct. 1 2021,
http://epic.nola.gov/home/; “Active Bystandership in Law Enforcement (ABLE) Project,” Georgetown
University Law Center, accessed Oct. 1, 2021, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/innovative-policing-
program/active-bystandership-for-law-enforcement/.
95. See Resolution 20200611-095.
96. “Getting Officers to ‘Step Up and Step In’,” Police Executive Research Forum; Ethical Policing is
Courageous,” New Orleans Police Department; “Active Bystandership in Law Enforcement (ABLE)
Project,” Georgetown University Law Center; “Peer Bystander Intervention in Law Enforcement
Agencies,” International Association of Chiefs of Police.
97. See “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum.
98. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International Association
of Chiefs of Police, et al.; “Peer Bystander Intervention in Law Enforcement Agencies,” International
Association of Chiefs of Police.
99. See “Peer Bystander Intervention in Law Enforcement Agencies,” International Association of
Chiefs of Police.
100. See “Peer Bystander Intervention in Law Enforcement Agencies,” International Association of
Chiefs of Police.
101. See “Why Did Minneapolis Officers Not Adhere to the City’s ‘Duty to Intervene’ Policy?,” Police
Executive Research Forum, June 9, 2020, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.policeforum.org/criticalissuesjune9.
102. See Gennaco, Michael et al., panelists. Panel discussion. “An Examination of Police Initiated
Neck Restraints.” The Twenty-Sixth Annual Conference of the National Association for Civilian
Oversight of Law Enforcement, 9 Sept. 2020. Webinar; “Leading Law Enforcement Organizations
Release Update to National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on The Use of Force.”
International Association of Chiefs of Police, 10 July 2020,
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2020%20Use%20of%20Force%20Consensus%20Policy%
20Statement_0.pdf.
103. See Gennaco, Michael et al., panelists. Panel discussion. “An Examination of Police Initiated
Neck Restraints.” The Twenty-Sixth Annual Conference of the National Association for Civilian
Oversight of Law Enforcement, 9 Sept. 2020. Webinar; “Leading Law Enforcement Organizations
Release Update to National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on The Use of Force.”
International Association of Chiefs of Police.
92
Endnotes
Office of Police Oversight
104. See “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,” Campaign Zero.
105. Resolution 20200611-095.
106. See Austin Police Department, “200.3 Response to Resistance.”
107. See Police Executive Research Forum, "Re-engineering Training on Police Use of Force," Critical
Issues in Policing Series (August 2015)
https://www.policeforum.org/assets/reengineeringtraining1.pdf; "Review of the Vancouver, WA
Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research Forum; “Volusia County Sheriff’s Office
Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive Research Forum.
108. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International
Association of Chiefs of Police, et al.; “IACP Policy Framework for Improved Community-Police
Engagement,” International Association of Chiefs of Police, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/IACP%20Policy%20Framework%20for%20Improved%20C
ommunity-Police%20Engagement.pdf.
109. See “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,” Campaign Zero.
110. See Resolution 20200611-095.
111. See Police Executive Research Forum, "Re-engineering Training on Police Use of Force”;
"Review of the Vancouver, WA Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research Forum;
“Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive Research
Forum.
112. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International
Association of Chiefs of Police, et al.; “IACP Policy Framework for Improved Community-Police
Engagement,” International Association of Chiefs of Police.
113. See “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,” Campaign Zero.
114. See Resolution 20200611-095.
115. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International
Association of Chiefs of Police, et al.
116. See “Chokeholds & Carotid Restraints; Knock & Announce Requirement,” U.S. Department of
Justice Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Sept. 13, 2021, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.justice.gov/dag/page/file/1432531/download.
117. See Police Executive Research Forum, "Re-engineering Training on Police Use of Force;”
"Review of the Vancouver, WA Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research Forum;
“Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive Research
Forum; "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International Association
of Chiefs of Police, et al.; “IACP Policy Framework for Improved Community-Police Engagement,”
International Association of Chiefs of Police.
118. See Police Executive Research Forum, "Re-engineering Training on Police Use of Force;”
"Review of the Vancouver, WA Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research Forum;
“Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive Research
Forum."
93
Endnotes
Office of Police Oversight
119. See Police Executive Research Forum, "Re-engineering Training on Police Use of Force;”
"Review of the Vancouver, WA Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research Forum;
“Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive Research
Forum; "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International Association
of Chiefs of Police, et al.; “IACP Policy Framework for Improved Community-Police Engagement,”
International Association of Chiefs of Police.
120. See Manley, Brian. “Use of Force and De-Escalation Policies.”
121. See Resolution 20200611-095.
122. See Resolution 20200611-095.
123. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International
Association of Chiefs of Police, et al.; "Review of the Vancouver, WA Police Department Final
Report," Police Executive Research Forum; “Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review
Final Report,” Police Executive Research Forum.
124. "Review of the Vancouver, WA Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research
Forum; “Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive
Research Forum; "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International
Association of Chiefs of Police, et al.; “IACP Policy Framework for Improved Community-Police
Engagement,” International Association of Chiefs of Police.
125. See “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,” Campaign Zero.
126. 8 Can’t Wait, Campaign Zero.
127. Resolution 20200611-095.
128. See Austin Police Department, “202.1.1 Firearm Discharge Situations;” Austin Police
Department “200.4 Deadly Force Applications;” see also Austin Police Department, “208 TASER
Device Guidelines.”
129. See “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum; see also “Volusia
County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive Research Forum.
130. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International
Association of Chiefs of Police, et al.
131. See “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,” Campaign Zero.
132. See Resolution 20200611-095.
133. See “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum; see also “Volusia
County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive Research Forum.
134. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International
Association of Chiefs of Police, et al.
135. See “Campaign Zero Model Use of Force Policy,” Campaign Zero.
136. See Resolution 20200611-095.
137. See “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum.
138. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International
Association of Chiefs of Police, et al.
94
Endnotes
Office of Police Oversight
139. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International
Association of Chiefs of Police, et al.
140. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International
Association of Chiefs of Police, et al.
141. See Manley, Brian. “Use of Force and De-Escalation Policies.”
142. Resolution 20200611-095.
143. See Resolution 20200611-095; Resolution 20200611-096.
144. See "Review of the Vancouver, WA Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research
Forum, June 2020, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.cityofvancouver.us/sites/default/files/fileattachments/police_vpd/page/42481/vancouv
er_pd_final_report_june_2020.pdf; “Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final
Report,” Police Executive Research Forum, Sept. 2018, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.volusiasheriff.org/_/documents/VSO-PERF-Use-of-Force-Review-Final.pdf; “How Can
We Get Cops to Stop Shooting at Vehicles?,” Police Executive Research Forum, June 5, 2021;
accessed Oct. 1, 2021, https://www.policeforum.org/trending5jun21; “Guiding Principles on Use of
Force,” Police Executive Research Forum, 2016, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.policeforum.org/assets/guidingprinciples1.pdf.
145. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International
Association of Chiefs of Police, et al., July 2020, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2020-
07/National_Consensus_Policy_On_Use_Of_Force%2007102020%20v3.pdf
146. See City of Austin Office of Police Oversight, 8 Can’t Wait Policy Review and Recommendations.
147. See "Review of the Vancouver, WA Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research
Forum; “Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive
Research Forum; “How Can We Get Cops to Stop Shooting at Vehicles?,” Police Executive Research
Forum; “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum.
148. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International
Association of Chiefs of Police.
149. See City of Austin Office of Police Oversight, 8 Can’t Wait Policy Review and Recommendations.
150. “Winslow, AZ Police Department Review and Assessment Final Report,” Police Executive
Research Forum, April 2017, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.winslowaz.gov/PERF%20Winslow%20Police%20Department_Final%20Report%20to%2
0WPD%204-3-17.pdf.
151. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International
Association of Chiefs of Police, et al., July 2020, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2020-
07/National_Consensus_Policy_On_Use_Of_Force%2007102020%20v3.pdf
152. See City of Austin Office of Police Oversight, 8 Can’t Wait Policy Review and Recommendations.
95
Endnotes
Office of Police Oversight
153. See Police Executive Research Forum, “ICAT Integrating Communications, Assessment, and
Tactics: A Training Guide for Defusing Critical Incidents,” Critical Issues in Policing Series (October
2016) https://www.policeforum.org/assets/icattrainingguide.pdf.
154. See “Model Policy Interactions with Individuals with Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities,” International Association of Chiefs of Police, August 2017, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/IntellectualDevelopmentalDisabilityPolicy.pdf.
155. See City of Austin Office of Police Oversight, 8 Can’t Wait Policy Review and Recommendations.
156. Police Executive Research Forum, “ICAT Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics:
A Training Guide for Defusing Critical Incidents.”
157. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International
Association of Chiefs of Police, et al., July 2020, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2020-
07/National_Consensus_Policy_On_Use_Of_Force%2007102020%20v3.pdf.
158. See City of Austin Office of Police Oversight, 8 Can’t Wait Policy Review and Recommendations.
159. “Guiding Principles on Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum, 2016, accessed Oct. 1,
2021, https://www.policeforum.org/assets/guidingprinciples1.pdf; “Why Did Minneapolis Officers
Not Adhere to the City’s ‘Duty to Intervene’ Policy?,” Police Executive Research Forum, June 9, 2020,
accessed Oct. 1, 2021, https://www.policeforum.org/criticalissuesjune9.
160. Peer Bystander Intervention in Law Enforcement Agencies,” International Association of Chiefs
of Police, Aug. 2021, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/243806_IACP_CPE_Bystander_Intervention_p2.pdf.
161. See City of Austin Office of Police Oversight, 8 Can’t Wait Policy Review and Recommendations.
162. “Getting Officers to ‘Step Up and Step In’,” Police Executive Research Forum, April 3, 2021,
accessed Oct. 1, 2021, https://www.policeforum.org/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=941:trending3apr21&catid=20:site-content.
163. Peer Bystander Intervention in Law Enforcement Agencies,” International Association of Chiefs
of Police.
164. See City of Austin Office of Police Oversight, 8 Can’t Wait Policy Review and Recommendations.
165. See Police Executive Research Forum, "Re-engineering Training on Police Use of Force," Critical
Issues in Policing Series (August 2015)
https://www.policeforum.org/assets/reengineeringtraining1.pdf; "Review of the Vancouver, WA
Police Department Final Report," Police Executive Research Forum, June 2020, accessed Oct. 1,
2021,
https://www.cityofvancouver.us/sites/default/files/fileattachments/police_vpd/page/42481/vancouv
er_pd_final_report_june_2020.pdf; “Volusia County Sheriff’s Office Use-of-Force Review Final
Report,” Police Executive Research Forum, Sept. 2018, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.volusiasheriff.org/_/documents/VSO-PERF-Use-of-Force-Review-Final.pdf.
96
Endnotes
Office of Police Oversight
166. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International
Association of Chiefs of Police, et al., July 2020, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2020-
07/National_Consensus_Policy_On_Use_Of_Force%2007102020%20v3.pdf; “IACP Policy Framework
for Improved Community-Police Engagement,” International Association of Chiefs of Police,
accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/IACP%20Policy%20Framework%20for%20Improved%20C
ommunity-Police%20Engagement.pdf.
167. See City of Austin Office of Police Oversight, 8 Can’t Wait Policy Review and Recommendations.
168. “ICAT Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics,” Police Executive Research Forum,
June 2021, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.policeforum.org/assets/ICAT/ICAT_Module1_Aug2021.pdf; Volusia County Sheriff’s
Office Use-of-Force Review Final Report,” Police Executive Research Forum, Sept. 2018, accessed
Oct. 1, 2021, https://www.volusiasheriff.org/_/documents/VSO-PERF-Use-of-Force-Review-Final.pdf.
169. See "National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force," International
Association of Chiefs of Police, et al., July 2020, accessed Oct. 1, 2021,
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2020-
07/National_Consensus_Policy_On_Use_Of_Force%2007102020%20v3.pdf.
170. See City of Austin Office of Police Oversight, 8 Can’t Wait Policy Review and Recommendations.
97