El departamento de la Fiscalización de la Policía presenta recomendaciones sobre políticas del uso de la fuerza como parte de un gran esfuerza para reescribir las Órdenes Generales (General Orders) del departamento de la Policía de Austin. Esta revisión a las Ordenes Generales del Departamento de la Policía es parte de las resoluciones pasadas en junio del 2020 por el Concejo Municipal de Austin.
La primera etapa involucra analizando cómo las políticas actuales del Departamento de la Policía de Austin se comparan a las recomendaciones políticas hechas por 8 No Pueden Esperar (8 Can’t Waitopen_in_new), una iniciativa por la Campaña Cero (Campaign Zero) promueve las políticas que reducen el uso de fuerza letal policial.
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8 Can’t Wait
Policy Review and
Recommendations
Recommended policy changes to reduce deadly use of
force in policing
In June 2020, City Council passed a series of resolutions aimed at restricting the use of force by
law enforcement and reimagining public safety in Austin. These resolutions included:
• Resolution 20200611-50 (Resolution 50);
• Resolution 20200611-95 (Resolution 95); and
• Resolution 20200611-96 (Resolution 96).
These resolutions are at the center of Reimagining Public Safety (RPS), which is the City of
Austin’s multi-faceted approach for improving all facets of public safety in Austin. RPS addresses
issues like budget allocation, racial disparities in policing, use-of-force policies, and
mental health response.
As a part of the above resolutions, City Council directed the City Manager to direct the Office of
Police Oversight (OPO) to facilitate a rewrite of the Austin Police Department (APD) policy
manual, known as the General Orders. This rewrite will cover all policies, including those
surrounding issues like search and seizure, body-worn cameras, dash cameras, mental health
response, discipline, bias, language, and courtesy.
In addition, City Council also specifically directed OPO to issue recommendations on use-of-force
policies. Policies regarding use of force cover a wide range of topics, including de-escalation,
exhausting all alternatives before using deadly force, impact munitions, TASER devices,
chokeholds, and comprehensive reporting.
This report will first provide a brief policy overview highlighting OPO's main concerns with
existing policy language. The report also includes an introduction to each policy, policy review
findings from the analysis, current related policies, and recommended policy changes.
OPO’s Three-Phase Approach
OPO will be using a three-phase approach to conduct the rewrite of APD’s General Orders.
In Resolutions 95 and 96, City Council further instructed that OPO conduct this rewrite through
an open process, seeking feedback and input from the community.
Office of Police Oversight
Introduction
Phase II:
Community Input
Phase I: OPO
Preliminary
Analysis
Phase III:
Recommendations
sent to City
Management, APD &
Council
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Restrict shooting at moving vehicles;
Exhaust all alternatives before using deadly force;
De-escalation;
Duty to intervene in cases of improper or excessive use of force;
Comprehensive reporting of uses of force; and
Ban chokeholds and strangleholds.
In Phase I, OPO will conduct a preliminary analysis of APD’s current policy language on specific
topics. In Phase I, OPO will conduct a preliminary analysis of current policy language; all analysis
will be made available on atxpoliceoversight.org.
In Phase II, OPO will work with community partners and stakeholders to gather input from the
public about proposed changes to policies. This outreach effort will include events, surveys, and
other forms of community engagement.
In Phase III, OPO will submit policy recommendations and community feedback to APD. APD, in
consultation with the City Manager’s Office, will review the recommendations and modify as
appropriate prior to final incorporation. APD will subsequently bring the proposed modified
General Orders to Council for feedback in accordance with Resolution 95.
8 Can’t Wait Policy Review
OPO’s first step in facilitating the General Orders rewrite is an analysis of how current policies
compare to the policy recommendations at the center of a project called 8 Can’t Wait.
8 Can’t Wait is an initiative by Campaign Zero that advocates for more restrictive policies to
reduce the use of deadly force by police and save lives.
In Resolution 95, City Council outlined the City of Austin's position on six of the eight policy
issues at the center of 8 Can’t Wait, including the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
In addition, City Council directed the City Manager to ensure that policies align with the City of
Austin’s Reimagining Public Safety efforts on these matters. In Resolution 95, this was described
as a “non-exhaustive list,” and the two 8 Can’t Wait policy recommendations that were not
directly mentioned were:
7. Require a use-of-force continuum; and
8. Warn before shooting.
Office of Police Oversight
Introduction
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Policy Overview
Office of Police Oversight
Under current policy, shooting at moving vehicles is not sufficiently restricted.
Current policy is silent on the issue of shooting from a moving vehicle.
Under current deadly force policy, there is no requirement to exhaust all alternatives.
To comply with the directives from City Council, the Office of Police Oversight conducted
research related to six of the eight policy issues at the center of 8 Can’t Wait. As part of this
research, OPO conducted a comparative analysis of policies from police departments around the
country which, according to Campaign Zero, align with model policies that, if implemented, can
lead to a reduction in deadly use of force.
OPO’s research revealed that APD’s policies in these areas require substantive revision to be
effective and align with the City of Austin's position.
This policy overview highlights OPO’s main concerns with APD’s existing policy language.
1. Restrict shooting at moving vehicles
The City of Austin's position is that “[u]se of deadly force against individuals, including persons
fleeing (in vehicle or on foot), shall be limited to situations where necessary for self-defense or
defense of others against an imminent deadly threat or threat of serious bodily injury, and either
there were no reasonable alternatives to prevent serious injury, or death or all reasonable
alternatives have been exhausted.”
2. Exhaust all alternatives before using deadly force
The City of Austin's position is that “[u]se of deadly force against individuals, including persons
fleeing (in vehicle or on foot), shall be limited to situations where necessary for self-defense or
defense of others against an imminent deadly threat or threat of serious bodily injury, and either
there were no reasonable alternatives to prevent serious injury, or death or all reasonable
alternatives have been exhausted.”
3. De-escalation
The City of Austin's position is that “[u]se of force shall incorporate de-escalation tactics in all
circumstances, and the response shall be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the
threat of harm presented.”
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Policy Overview
Office of Police Oversight
Under current policy, definitions for “de-escalation” and “de-escalation techniques” provide
little detail and no examples.
The term “potential force encounters” is not defined.
Current policy does not adequately acknowledge or address factors outside of deliberate non-
compliance that may affect someone's ability to comply with officer commands.
Policy presents the potential for de-escalation efforts to fail but does not explain the reasons
that may happen.
The current policy makes treating people with dignity optional.
Under current policy, terms used are vague or undefined.
The policy does not specify the means for intervening.
The policy’s scope is too narrow.
Department hierarchical issues are not addressed.
Reporting requirements are not defined.
As a part of Resolution 20191205-066 (Resolution 66), the City of Austin has hired a
consulting firm, Kroll & Associates, to conduct a comprehensive assessment of APD’s use-of-
force practices. After this assessment is completed, OPO will use its findings, along with
community feedback, to inform recommendations on the topic of comprehensive reporting.
4. Duty to intervene in cases of improper or excessive use of force
The City of Austin's position is that APD policy “requiring officers to intervene to stop improper or
excessive uses of force by their fellow officers should be appropriately enforced.”
5. Comprehensive reporting of use of force
The City of Austin's position is that APD policy should require “comprehensive reporting of uses of
force and use of force threats.”
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Policy Overview
Office of Police Oversight
As a part of Resolution 66, the City of Austin has hired a consulting firm, Kroll & Associates, to
conduct a comprehensive assessment of APD’s use-of-force practices. After this assessment is
completed, OPO will use its findings, along with community feedback, to inform
recommendations on the topic of use-of-force continuums.
7. Require a use-of-force continuum
In Resolution 95, Council directed that use-of-force responses “shall be proportionate to the
seriousness of the offense and the threat of harm presented.” This language summarizes the goals
of utilizing a use-of-force continuum. Additionally, in Resolutions 50, 95, and 96, Council directed
OPO to make policy recommendations based on national best practices and campaigns such as 8
Can’t Wait and Campaign Zero. One of the policies recommended by 8 Can’t Wait is that police
departments utilize a force continuum “that restricts the most severe types of force to the most
extreme situations and creates clear policy restrictions on the use of each police weapon and
tactic.”
Without further detail in policy, feasibility language is ambiguous.
Policy is more robust for less-lethal force warnings.
Policy does not specify how a warning should be given.
8. Warn before shooting
In Resolution 95, Council directed that “[u]se of force shall incorporate de-escalation tactics in all
circumstances.” One common de-escalation tactic is to provide a warning before using force.
Additionally, in Resolutions 50, 95, and 96, Council directed OPO to make policy
recommendations based on national best practices and campaigns such as 8 Can’t Wait and
Campaign Zero. One of the policies recommended by 8 Can’t Wait is that police departments
“[r]equire officers to give a verbal warning in all situations before using deadly force.”
Chokeholds and strangleholds are not categorically banned.
Under current policy, the terms used are not defined.
The policy's scope is too narrow.
Directives are inconsistent.
6. Ban chokeholds and strangleholds
The City of Austin's position is that chokeholds and strangleholds are “strictly prohibited as a
policing tactic.”21
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Introduction
Campaign Zero’s 8 Can’t Wait initiative recommends that police departments restrict the
circumstances under which officers may shoot at moving vehicles. Shooting at a moving vehicle
is regarded as a particularly dangerous and ineffective tactic, with a high risk of injuring
bystanders. Increasing restrictions on shooting at moving vehicles has been shown to contribute
to a reduction in officer-involved shootings.
Policy review findings
Shooting at moving vehicles is not sufficiently restricted
Current policy permits shooting at a vehicle when the vehicle is being used as a weapon against
officers or others. Shooting at a moving vehicle is difficult and can lead to innocent or
uninvolved third parties being harmed. In addition, when shooting at a vehicle results in the
driver being wounded or killed, the threat presented by the vehicle is not necessarily eliminated.
APD's current policy fails to sufficiently restrict this practice in a way that effectively safeguards
both officers and the public against its inherent risks.
Office of Police Oversight
Restrict Shooting at Moving Vehicles
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Office of Police Oversight
Restrict Shooting at Moving Vehicles
202.1.1 Policy – Firearm Discharge Situations; and
202.1.3 Moving Vehicles.
Current APD policies related to
restricting shooting at moving
vehicles
The following APD General Orders chapters are relevant to the
restricting of shooting at moving vehicles:
To view the full excerpts of these chapters, please turn to
Appendix A.
Furthermore, current policy creates a significant loophole by permitting shooting at moving
vehicles in "extraordinary circumstances," while failing to define that term. Effective policies
require defined parameters in order to be enforced.
APD policy should generally prohibit shooting except as a last resort in circumstances when a
vehicle occupant is using deadly force other than the vehicle itself. The only other condition
under which shooting may be appropriate is when the vehicle itself is being used as a weapon
likely to cause a mass casualty incident.
APD policy is silent on the issue of shooting from a moving vehicle
Shooting from a moving vehicle presents some of the same risks (e.g. potential harm to innocent
bystanders) and difficulties (e.g. reduction in accuracy) as shooting at a moving vehicle. APD
policy should explicitly prohibit this practice due to the inherent risks to officers, involved
individuals, and uninvolved bystanders.
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Restrict Shooting at Moving Vehicles
Office of Police Oversight
Recommended policy changes
Add the following definition to General Order 200.1.2 Definitions:
Mass Casualty Incident – An incident in which the number of casualties exceeds the normally
available local resources.
Change APD General Order 202.1.3 Moving Vehicles to the following:
202.1.3 MOVING VEHICLES
(a) Officers shall only discharge their firearms at a moving vehicle if, based on the totality of
the circumstances, they have exhausted all possible alternatives and:
1. an occupant of the vehicle is using deadly force by means other than the vehicle
itself; or
2. if the vehicle itself is being used as a weapon that will more likely than not cause a
Mass Casualty Incident. An example of a situation that would constitute a Mass
Casualty Incident would be a vehicle being driven into a crowd of people.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a)(2) above, officers shall not discharge a firearm at a
moving vehicle in any situation when the totality of the circumstances indicates that it is
more likely than not that an innocent passenger or bystander could be injured.
(c) Officers shall exercise good judgment and shall not place themselves in the path of a
moving vehicle.
(d) Officers shall move out of the path of any approaching vehicle unless it is impossible to
do so.
(e) In situations when this policy applies, officers may leave a position of cover only:
1. to utilize an avenue of escape;
2. to move to a position of better cover; or
3. if the risk associated with not apprehending the suspect or stopping the threat
outweighs the danger posed to the officer or any other person by leaving a position
of cover.
(f) Officers shall not discharge their firearms from a moving vehicle.
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Introduction
Campaign Zero's 8 Can't Wait initiative recommends that police departments "[r]equire officers to
exhaust all other alternatives, including non-force and less-lethal force options, prior to resorting
to deadly force." In other words, under this recommendation, officers should only use deadly
force as a last resort. Some alternatives to deadly force include: conflict avoidance, empty-hand
techniques, and less-lethal force options (e.g. TASER devices).
This policy recommendation is intended to eliminate the unnecessary use of deadly force.
Currently, APD's deadly force policy does not require that officers exhaust all alternatives prior to
using deadly force.
Exhaust All Alternatives Before Using Deadly Force
Office of Police Oversight
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Policy review findings
Under APD’s current deadly force policy, there is no
requirement to exhaust all alternatives
APD's General Orders consists of both introductory sections and
conduct-specific sections. The introductory sections discuss ethics
and APD's philosophy. Following the introductory sections are the
chapters and sections with specific directives.
Currently, the only explicit language in the General Orders
pertaining to the use of deadly force as a last resort is the section
detailing APD’s philosophy. While articulating a police
department’s general philosophy is a valuable exercise, the policy
sections with specific directives are what provide officers with
substantive information about what is required of them.
While the rest of the relevant policies listed below may tangentially
relate to the exhaustion of all alternatives, nowhere do any of them
explicitly direct officers to use deadly force only as a last resort and
only after all available alternatives have been employed.
The Philosophy of the Austin Police Department, which is located in the introductory
paragraphs to the General Orders:
200.1.1 Philosophy – Response to Resistance;
200.3 Response to Resistance;
200.4 Deadly Force Applications; and
202.1.1 Policy – Firearm Discharge Situations.
Current APD policies related to exhaustion of all
alternatives
The following APD policies are relevant to the exhaustion of all alternatives:
To view the full excerpts of these policies, please turn to Appendix B.
Exhaust All Alternatives Before Using Deadly Force
Office of Police Oversight
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Recommended policy changes
Add the following definitions to General Order 200.1.2 Definitions:
Unreasonable – Conduct which, given the totality of the circumstances, is irrational, not
warranted, or not in accordance with practical realities.
Add the following section to APD General Order 200.4 Deadly Force Applications
and 202.1.1 Policy-Firearm Discharge Situations:
(b) Deadly force shall only be used as a last resort after all alternatives have been exhausted
or when, after analyzing the situation, alternatives have been rendered impossible by the
totality of the circumstances.
1. Officers shall utilize appropriate tactical communication and decision-making as
outlined in General Order 200.2 to ensure that they have the time, distance, and
resources to properly respond to situations they encounter.
2. Officers shall not take unreasonable or unnecessary actions that escalate any
situation to one that would require a deadly force response. Examples include, but
are not limited to, the following:
(a) Standing in front of a moving vehicle;
(b) Giving unclear commands;
(c) Giving an individual an insufficient amount of time to comply with commands;
(d) Drawing weapons before the officer has an objectively reasonable belief that
it will escalate to a deadly force situation; and
(e) Using profanity while giving commands.
3. Officers shall document in an incident report all deadly force alternatives used
during an encounter and what the involved individual's response was to each
technique. If deadly force was ultimately used, officers shall document in detail why
use of deadly force was necessary and objectively reasonable.
Exhaust All Alternatives Before Using Deadly Force
Office of Police Oversight
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Introduction
Campaign Zero’s 8 Can’t Wait initiative recommends that police departments "[r]equire officers to
de-escalate situations, where possible, by communicating with subjects, maintaining distance,
and otherwise eliminating the need to use force."
De-escalation employs techniques designed to safely stabilize a situation, reduce the immediacy
of a threat, and resolve an incident with the least amount of force necessary. The main goals of
de-escalation are to defuse tense situations or conflicts, obtain voluntary compliance, prevent
unnecessary use of force, and use the least amount of force if force is required.
The bedrock of de-escalation is communication. Common forms of de-escalation include
techniques like active listening, explaining one’s actions, reducing the intensity of a situation by
creating distance or maintaining cover, and engaging support from medical professionals or other
specially trained individuals.
Office of Police Oversight
De-escalation
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De-escalation
Office of Police Oversight
Policy review findings
The definitions for “de-escalation” and “de-escalation techniques” provide little
detail and no examples
While APD policy does define the terms “de-escalation” and “de-escalation techniques,” the
definitions lack detail and fail to provide examples to help clarify their meaning.
The term "potential force encounters" is not defined
APD's de-escalation policy uses the phrase "potential force encounters" but does not define it.
This term is ambiguous and unnecessary. First, it is possible that an officer may initially gauge
any encounter with a member of the public as one that could potentially result in a use of force.
Second, de-escalation techniques like maintaining a safe distance, active listening, and
explaining one’s actions are things that can be applied to all encounters. These strategies need
not be reserved only for potential use-of-force encounters.
The policy does not adequately acknowledge or address factors outside of
deliberate non-compliance that may affect someone’s ability to comply with officer
commands
Law enforcement interactions do not take place in a bubble, so it is important for policing
policies to address the real-life factors that may be at play during any given encounter that
officers have with the public. Variables like external noises, language barriers, mental health
indicators, physical size, age, vision and hearing capabilities, and medical conditions are all
factors that can play into an individual’s ability to both acknowledge and follow instructions from
officers. APD policy fails to address these issues.
The policy discusses the potential for de-escalation efforts to fail but does not
discuss the reasons that might happen
De-escalation efforts may indeed fail in some cases. APD’s de-escalation policy mentions this
possibility but neglects to acknowledge or address some of the reasons why that might be the
case. Successful de-escalation cannot be accomplished by one person’s actions alone, but one
person’s actions can be the reason that it fails. APD policy appears to put the onus of the success
or failure of de-escalation efforts solely on the individual with whom they are being used.
The policy never reminds officers that their own actions can also impact de-escalation efforts.
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De-escalation
Office of Police Oversight
The current policy makes treating people with dignity optional
In 200.2.1(b)(3), the policy states that “to the extent possible and reasonable under the totality of
the circumstances officers may use one or more of the following verbal techniques….” The
policy then goes on to list the techniques, the first of which being to “treat the subject with
dignity and respect." Placing this language after the word “may” has the effect of making it
optional rather than mandatory. While some techniques may only be appropriate for some
situations, officers should always be expected to treat community members with dignity and
respect, and APD’s policy should reflect that. Communication is the bedrock of effective de-
escalation, and that should be made more clear in APD's policy.
Policy language tends to discourage de-escalation rather than incentivize it
Officers may already fear that if they use de-escalation tactics, which often require pausing and
waiting, they may be accused of neglecting their duties because they did not spring immediately
into action. In order to encourage compliance, the policy should make it clear that officers will
not be penalized for engaging in appropriate de-escalation techniques.
200.1.2 Definitions;
200.2 De-escalation of Potential Force Encounters ; and
200.2.1 Assessment and De-escalation.
Current APD policies relevant to de-escalation
The following APD policies are relevant to de-escalation:
To view the full excerpts of these chapters, please turn to Appendix C.
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Recommended policy changes
Reformat the policies and add a new section to create a more linear and logical
progression:
(a) Keep section 200.1.2 Definitions;
(b) Keep section 200.2. De-escalation (reformat the policy and remove the part of the title
that reads “of Potential Force Encounters”);
(c) Keep section 200.2.1 Assessment (reformat the policy and remove the part of the title that
reads “and De-escalation); and
(d) Add a new section titled 200.2.2 Use of De-escalation Techniques
Replace the current policy language with the following:
200.1.2 DEFINITIONS
De-escalation – (1) The use of a range of techniques (e.g. communication, time, distance, cover,
concealment, etc.) designed to create conditions that safely stabilize a situation and reduce the
immediacy of a threat so that more time, options, and resources are available to resolve the
situation using the least amount of force necessary. (2) Reducing
or ending the use of force once a threat has diminished.
.
De-escalation
Office of Police Oversight
De-escalation Techniques – Tactics used by officers that are
designed to increase the likelihood of gaining voluntary
compliance and reduce the likelihood of using force during an
encounter. Tactics may include, but are not limited to, the
following: maintaining safe distance, active listening, clear
communication, explaining what actions need to be taken and
any alternatives, explaining the consequences of taking
particular actions, and securing additional resources.
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De-escalation
200.2 DE-ESCALATION
Officers shall safely incorporate appropriate de-escalation techniques in all circumstances, and
shall approach all encounters with the goal of preventing or minimizing uses of force and, in
situations where compliance is needed, gaining voluntary compliance.
(a) While de-escalation efforts may fail in some instances, officers are expected to recognize
their ability to impact the direction and outcome of many situations through their own
conduct and decision-making. Officers shall not engage in unnecessary conduct that could
be expected to escalate a situation. Examples include, but are not limited to, the following:
1. Becoming unnecessarily combative or aggressive;
2. Using insults, slurs, or rude gestures;
3. Unduly compromising one’s own safety or the safety of others by making
inappropriate or misguided tactical decisions; and
4. Unnecessarily rushing the pace of an encounter.
(b) Officers shall follow this order in accordance with other portions of the General Orders
and/or specific Department-approved training that addresses de-escalation.
(c) Officers who, in accordance with this policy, take actions to de-escalate an incident will
not be found to have neglected their duty as a result of those actions.
Office of Police Oversight
200.2.1 ASSESSMENT
(a) Gathering Information – As officers arrive on the scene, observe conditions, and interact
with the persons there, they should continue to gather additional information and facts to
develop an understanding of the totality of the circumstances relevant to the incident.
Pertinent information may include, but is not limited to, the following:
1. Factors that may impact an individual’s ability to interact with officers, understand
the nature of the situation, and/or voluntarily comply with instructions. Examples of
such factors include, but are not limited to, the following:
a. Medical conditions;
b. Mental health diagnoses, Intellectual or Developmental Disabilities (IDD), or
cognitive disorders;
c. Mental health crises;
d. Physical capabilities (taking into account factors like age, injury, or size);
e. Hearing or vision capabilities;
f. Language barriers;
g. Effects of drugs (street or prescribed) or alcohol; and
h. Conflicting noise or other distractions in the vicinity (e.g. multiple officers
giving commands at the same time, traffic noise, lights and sirens, etc.).
2. The number of individuals involved in an incident and the number of people still
at the scene; and
3. Events leading up to the call for service.
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(b) Assessing Risks and Benefits – After an officer has gathered sufficient information to form
an understanding of the totality of the circumstances, they shall identify appropriate de-
escalation techniques and determine how to safely employ them during the encounter.
Factors that officers shall consider include, but are not limited to, the following:
1. Whether a particular action is immediately necessary (e.g. search, detention,
arrest);
2. What risks and benefits may be associated with delaying immediate action;
3. Whether the situation requires, warrants, or could otherwise benefit from a
supervisor’s presence;
4. Whether other officers may be needed on the scene, including special units, such
as CIT or CINT; and
5. Whether other resources (e.g. less-lethal weaponry, special equipment, or other
emergency professionals, interpreters or other persons) are needed.
200.2.2 USE OF DE-ESCALATION TECHNIQUES
(a) Acknowledging that communication is crucial to de-escalation, officers shall at all times
treat individuals they encounter with dignity and respect, and in the way the officer would
wish to be treated if they stood in the individual’s shoes. Officers shall pay particular
attention to the manner in which they communicate (verbally and non-verbally) with
individuals and shall consider how the tone, volume, cadence, and gestures with which they
are communicating may be impacting an encounter.
(b) De-escalation also may involve actions such as securing additional resources, tactical
repositioning, and employing verbal persuasion.
1. Securing Additional Resources – When the circumstances of an incident make
doing so feasible and appropriate, officers should request and utilize additional
resources. Officers should request resources that they, through relevant training and
experience, believe would aid in resolving the situation without the use of force, or
would help to minimize the use of force. Absent an immediate need to do so, officers
shall avoid physically confronting an individual until such time as additional
resources have arrived to assist. Additional resources may include, but are not limited
to, the following:
(a) Officer swith special training, such as the Crisis Intervention Team or Critical
Incident Negotiation Team;
(b) Emergency medical professionals;
(c) Mental health care providers;
(d) Interpreters;
(e) Supportive family members related to individuals involved;
(f) Less-lethal weaponry; and
(g) Additional officers.
De-escalation
Office of Police Oversight
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2. Tactical Repositioning – When the circumstances of an incident make doing so
feasible and appropriate, officers should employ any one or more of the following
tactical repositioning measures to try to minimize or avoid physical confrontation:
(a) Maintain safe physical distance;
(b) Maintain cover behind existing or assembled physical barriers; or
(c) Communicate from a location that is concealed from the individual.
3. Verbal Persuasion – When the circumstances of an incident make doing so feasible
and appropriate, officers should use one or more of the following verbal techniques
to try to defuse tension and build rapport with individuals they encounter:
(a) Listen to the individual’s side of the story and permit them to express
frustration;
(b) Explain what the officer is doing, what other individuals can do, and what
needs to happen;
(c) Explain why the officer is taking a specific action, again permitting the
individual to respond and acknowledging their perspective;
(d) Provide the individual with alternatives, even if those alternatives may be
limited;
(e) Advise the individual of the consequences for noncompliance;
(f) Offer reasonable, professional advice if it is expected to help; or
(g) Provide the individual with adequate time within which to respond to
directives. In determining how much time is adequate, officers should consider
factors such as those listed in General Order 200.2.1.
De-escalation
Office of Police Oversight
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Introduction
Campaign Zero’s 8 Can’t Wait initiative recommends that police departments"[r]equire officers to
intervene and stop excessive force used by other officers and report these incidents immediately
to a supervisor." A duty-to-intervene policy creates an affirmative obligation on the part of
police officers to stop other officers from engaging in certain conduct prohibited by law or
department policy.
Recently, this issue was brought to the forefront of public discourse as a result of the killing of
George Floyd by an officer in the Minneapolis Police Department who knelt on his neck for nearly
nine minutes while other officers on scene did not intervene. This incident reinforced the dire
need for police departments to require that officers hold each other accountable and stop the use
of excessive force when they see it.
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Policy review findings
Terms used are vague or not defined
Some terms within the General Orders have specific meanings that may not be commonly
understood. As a result, it is crucial to define these terms so that both officers and the public
can clearly understand what APD requires of its officers.
“Intercede”
APD’s current policy creates a duty to intercede rather than intervene. OPO recommends
replacing the term “intercede” with the term “intervene.” While these words may appear to be
interchangeable, they are not the same. The common meaning of the word “intervene” more
precisely communicates an expectation that officers verbally or physically intervene when
necessary to stop another officer from engaging in prohibited conduct. Once adopted as the
appropriate term, “intervene” should be defined within the General Orders to ensure that readers
understand how it is applied to APD officer conduct.
“Promptly”
APD policy should define the term “promptly” as it relates to the reporting requirements of the
duty to intervene. In the alternative, APD should replace “promptly” with language that precisely
outlines the time frame within which officers must report their observations. As it stands, the
term “promptly” is vague and does not provide officers with any actual guidance about what is
required of them.
“Objectively Reasonable”
The definition of “objectively reasonable” should be improved for clarity and conciseness. APD’s
current definition of “objectively reasonable” paraphrases the description of “reasonableness”
from the United States Supreme Court case Graham v. Connor, but it does not actually define the
meaning of the phrase “objectively reasonable.”
First, the definition should explicitly state that it is a legal standard. Second, the definition of
"objectively reasonable" should not contain the word "objective." In other words, the word being
defined should not be used in the definition. Third, the addition of the language “without the
benefit of 20/20 hindsight” is redundant because the legal standard (and APD’s definition) already
makes clear that one must consider the totality of the circumstances presented at the time of the
incident
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The means of intervention is not specified
APD’s current policy lacks clarity because it does not specify how officers are required to
intervene (e.g. verbally, physically, or both). Clear policies allow officers to know exactly what is
required of them. Additionally, clear policies help to ensure appropriate enforcement by
allowing decisionmakers to hold officers accountable in a consistent and predictable manner.
APD’s current policy requires additional clarification about how officers should intervene when
they observe conduct that would create a duty for them to do so.
The policy's scope is too narrow
APD’s current policy only creates a duty in use-of-force situations and when “the officer knows
that the force being used is not objectively reasonable” and “has a reasonable opportunity to
prevent the harm." APD’s policy would be improved by broadening the parameters to create a
duty in situations beyond those involving use of force. In particular, the General Orders should
contain a centralized policy that sets forth a requirement for officers to intervene when they
witness any conduct by another officer that would constitute a violation of state law, federal law,
or APD policy.
Broadening APD’s duty to intervene policy in this way would still create a duty to intervene in
use-of-force situations, but it would also create a duty to intervene in cases involving dishonesty,
bias-based profiling, harassment, and use of racial slurs or epithets, just to name a few. Ensuring
that APD officers follow use-of-force policies is extremely important, and it is equally important
for officers to follow all other APD policies as well. Adopting a policy that encourages officers to
hold each other accountable in this way would benefit both APD and the community.
The scope of duty is unclear
While APD’s current policy says officers “shall intercede to prevent further harm,” it does not
clearly outline when that duty ends. In particular, APD’s policy should clearly articulate that,
regardless of their original role on a call, every on-scene officer who witnesses a violation of
state law, federal law, or APD policy has a duty to intervene unless and until the conduct in
question has been stopped.
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Department hierarchical issues are not addressed
APD’s current policy does not address potential issues that could arise if an officer witnessed
someone of higher rank (e.g. a corporal, sergeant, lieutenant, etc.) engaging in conduct that
created a duty to intervene. The policy should clearly articulate that the duty to intervene
creates an affirmative duty on the part of all officers of all ranks, and that the duty is created
despite APD’s policies related to insubordination (General Orders 110.4.3 and 110.4.4)." This is
necessary to relieve the fear officers may have about contradicting their superiors.
Reporting requirements are not defined
APD’s current policy provides scant details about what is
required of officers in terms of reporting when they witness
conduct creating a duty to intervene. Through Resolution 95,
City Council clearly articulated a desire for data gathered from
comprehensive reporting of incidents involving use of force
and the duty to intervene. APD's policy should be revised to
provide detailed reporting requirements that increase
accountability and transparency, and that memorialize
important data related to the incident (e.g. who was present,
the extent to which those present were involved, what
occurred, when it occurred, and how it occurred).
200.1.2 Definitions; and
200.1.3 Duty to Intercede.
Current APD policies relevant to duty to intervene
The following APD policies are relevant to the duty to intervene:
To view the full excerpts of these chapters, please turn to Appendix D.
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Recommended policy changes
Move the policy out of the Response to Resistance chapter (General Order 200) and
into the General Conduct and Responsibilities Chapter (General Order 900):
This move is necessary to support the creation of a duty to intervene in situations beyond use of
force.
Create a definitions section within General Order 900 that includes the following
definition:
Intervene – To verbally or physically interact with another officer in order to prevent, stop, or
modify a result or sequence of events.
Change the following definition in General Order 200.1.2 Definitions:
Objectively Reasonable – A legal standard applied to use-of-force situations that judges whether
force was justified from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene and considering the
totality of the circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the incident.
Replace the current policy language with the following:
200.1.3 DUTY TO INTERVENE
Any officer who observes another officer use or prepare to use force that is not objectively
reasonable or engage in any conduct that would constitute a violation of state law, federal law,
or APD policy shall make every effort to safely intervene and stop the other officer. Any officer
who fails to intervene in accordance with this policy shall be subject to discipline of the same
severity as if they themselves engaged in the conduct in question.
(a) This policy creates a duty in instances when, after an initial use of force, a continued
application of force is no longer required.
(b) Intervening officers shall make every effort to safely intervene by verbal and physical
means as the situation requires; if verbal intervention is not enough to stop the act(s),
intervening officers shall make every effort to safely intervene through physical means.
Examples of physical intervention methods include, but are not limited to, the following:
1. Physically positioning oneself in between the officer(s) whose conduct is in
question and the other involved individual(s);
2. Using physical force to remove an officer from a particular area; or
3. Using physical force to stop an officer’s physical contact with an involved
individual.
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(c) Upon witnessing an incident creating a duty to intervene, officers shall immediately
activate their body-worn camera systems if they are not already activated, and shall radio to
dispatch that they have observed an incident requiring them to intervene to stop the actions
of another officer.
(d) Once intervention is no longer required, officers who witnessed or intervened in the
incident must also immediately report their observations and involvement to a supervisor.
(e) In situations when an incident report would already be required, officers who witnessed or
intervened in the incident must include a detailed description of their involvement and the
events surrounding the incident. In situations that would not otherwise require an incident
report, this section creates a requirement. A detailed description includes, but is not limited
to, the following information:
1. Who was present (officers and civilians);
2. The extent to which those present were involved;
3. What occurred, when it occurred, and how it occurred.
(a) Detailed description includes, but is not limited to, the following
information:
(f) Notwithstanding General Orders 110.4.3 and 110.4.4, this policy creates an affirmative
duty to intervene regardless of rank or whether the intervening officer is of higher or lower
rank than the officer(s) whose conduct is in question.
(g) Regardless of their role during a call or original purpose for being in the vicinity, it is the
duty of every on-scene witness officer to intervene unless and until the conduct in question
has been stopped.
(h) Examples of scenarios creating a duty to intervene include, but are not limited to, the
following:
1. Use of physical force that is not objectively reasonable;
2. Escalating an encounter without a lawful, necessary purpose;
3. Stops, searches, and arrests that are unconstitutional or violate APD policy;
4. Theft or fraud;
5. Use of racial slurs or epithets;
6. Racial or bias-based profiling;
7. Sexual assault;
8. Harassment or sexual harassment;
9. Misrepresentation or dishonesty; and
10. Document falsification.
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Introduction
Campaign Zero’s 8 Can't Wait initiative recommends that police departments restrict officers from
using chokeholds or strangleholds on individuals, as use of these techniques may lead to
"unnecessary death or serious injury."
Neck restraints generally fall into two categories: vascular and respiratory. Vascular neck
restraints affect blood flow and are colloquially referred to as “strangleholds,” while respiratory
neck restraints affect air intake and are referred to as "chokeholds." According to APD,
chokeholds and strangleholds are not part of APD training curriculum and are not approved
tactics for restraining or arresting an individual.
In a memo to the Mayor of Austin and City Council on July 8, 2020, APD's Chief of Police stated
that, as of June 11, 2020, APD’s General Orders were updated to “explicitly ban the use of such
techniques." The revisions that APD's Chief of Police was referring to went into effect on July 3,
2020. Furthermore, APD’s policy does not explicitly ban these techniques. Rather, using
equivocal language, it limits the use of chokeholds and strangleholds to situations in which
deadly force would be authorized.
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Policy review findings
Terms are not defined
There are terms and maneuvers referenced in the current policy that are not defined. The purpose of
the General Orders is to make officers aware of their responsibilities, and to make the public aware of
APD officers’ responsibilities. As a result, it is important to define key terms that are not commonly
known or that have specific meaning within this context.
Here, there are six terms left undefined: vascular neck restraint, carotid neck restraint, stranglehold,
chokehold, pressure, and reasonably likely. While officers and the public may be familiar with these
terms, their technical meanings may not be commonly understood, and each term has a specific
meaning in this context.
To improve clarity, the term "reasonably likely" should be removed, and the remaining five terms
should be defined. In addition, the General Orders should explicitly list and define "respiratory neck
restraints" to clearly demonstrate that the policy applies to both the respiratory and vascular categories
of neck restraints.
The policy's scope is too narrow
Another issue with APD’s current policy is that it is too narrow in scope. On the topic of respiratory
restraints, APD’s policy only restricts actions that “apply direct or indirect pressure to an individual’s
throat, windpipe or airway in a manner that is reasonably likely to prevent, reduce, or hinder the intake
of air…” This wording excludes a wide range of conduct, including those actions that, even if not
actually executed in a manner that is “reasonably likely” to impact air intake, are intended to do so.
In addition, including language like “reasonably likely” invites an inquiry into the technicalities of how
a maneuver was performed and the amount of pressure used. Based on Council’s goals and the policy
of the City of Austin as outlined in Resolution 95, these kinds of inquiries do not matter. The purpose of
Resolution 95 is to unequivocally ban APD's use of chokeholds as a policing tactic, and it broadly
defines them to include not only all maneuvers that involve choking or cutting off blood flow, but also
all maneuvers that involve holding the neck in general. In light of Resolution 95, the fact that the
determination of whether APD's chokehold policy was violated is solely based on whether the
maneuver was performed in a manner making it reasonably likely that air intake or blood flow would
be affected contradicts both the intent and letter of the Resolution.
APD has said that it does not train officers on the use of neck restraints. As a result, it is possible that
subject officers being investigated for using a neck restraint will not have received relevant training. It
is similarly possible that the Internal Affairs investigators reviewing the incident will not have received
training on the use of neck restraints. It does not make sense to maintain a policy standard that invites
an inquiry into the technicalities of how a neck restraint was performed when APD does not train on
these maneuvers.
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Image 1: Visual Depiction of Carotid Neck Restraint (left) and Chokehold (right).
The question of whether pressure was applied in a manner “reasonably likely” to impair air intake or
blood flow also requires some threshold determination about how much pressure is needed before
such a risk is realistic. As it applies to respiratory restraints, “[t]here is no way to determine the amount
of pressure needed not to cause airway injury. The potential for injury exists whenever pressure is
applied." Furthermore, even if there were a threshold amount of pressure, an investigator would not
be able to determine the level of pressure used in a given incident. As a result, it would be best for
policy language to involve a simpler inquiry with clearer, more objective standards.
The current policy language also fails to consider whether the effects of a vascular or respiratory neck
restraint can be achieved without the application of “pressure.” While APD policy does not define
“pressure,” the common meaning of the word relates to the use of physical force by one thing against
another. While vascular and respiratory functions can certainly be impacted by the use of physical
force, the policy should also account for other scenarios where force may not be used but where these
types of functions are also impaired (e.g. blocking someone’s nose or mouth).
Directives are inconsistent
APD’s current policy only addresses intent in the subsection related to vascular neck restraints.
The subsection on respiratory neck restraints does not address the subject of intent. It is unclear why
intent would only be a factor for one type of neck restraint and not the other. Intent should be
considered for both respiratory and vascular neck restraints.
Chokeholds and strangleholds are not categorically banned
While APD has stated otherwise, APD’s current policy does not explicitly ban the use of neck restraints.
Rather, the policy prohibits the use of vascular neck restraints, carotid neck restraints, and
strangleholds except where deadly force would be authorized. In other words, APD policy allows for
the use of these maneuvers in some situations. APD’s position that neck restraints are an acceptable
tactic in certain circumstances is further demonstrated by the language of General Order
200.3(d), which allows officers to improvise when they “…reasonably believe that it would be
impracticable or ineffective to use a standard tool, weapon, or method provided by the APD."
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200.1.2 Definitions; and
200.3 Response to Resistance.
The use of neck restraints as a policing tactic is inherently dangerous to both officers and the
individuals being restrained. Importantly, using chokeholds and strangleholds requires officers to
engage in close-quarter hand-to-hand combat, which can put officers in danger.
During a chokehold, pressure applied with the forearm causes the individual’s airway to collapse and,
as a result, can cause fractures to important structures like the laryngeal cartilage or hyoid bone.
Moreover, “[a]s with a drowning swimmer, the procedure sometimes precipitates resistance as the
person fights for air.”
During a stranglehold, pressure applied to the individual’s neck can cause them to lose consciousness
and go limp within seconds. Serious medical consequences can occur both at the onset and period
following loss of consciousness. Indeed, even in controlled training situations, police officers have
developed stroke symptoms after being restrained with a stranglehold. Unlike in roleplay scenarios
that are used during training, when officers use a chokehold or stranglehold in real life, the
environment is not controlled. As Image 1 demonstrates, there is very little difference in how one’s
arms are positioned in a stranglehold (carotid neck restraint) versus a chokehold. As a result, “[w]hen
there is a restraint happening, what could start as a carotid take-down could end up with a bar-arm
chokehold, or vice versa, because it’s a dynamic process where the suspect is trying to escape the
restraint and the police officer is supplying the restraint, and there are other factors, which could play a
role in the suspect’s actions.” In other words, “[t]he dynamic fact that the person is struggling could
result in pressure being applied in different parts of the neck even if it’s not intended to by the officer.”
The dangers of using these maneuvers are increased when officers do not receive frequent training on
how to perform them properly. In order to align with Resolution 95 and the City’s policy that
chokeholds and strangleholds be strictly prohibited as a policing tactic, APD policy should be revised to
categorically ban their use in all situations.
Current APD policies relevant to chokeholds and
strangleholds
The following APD General Orders chapters are relevant to neck restraints:
To view the full excerpts of these chapters, please turn to Appendix E.
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Recommended policy changes
Replace the current policy language with the following:
200.1.2 DEFINITIONS
Vascular Neck Restraint – A neck restraint that restricts, or may restrict, blood flow in the person being
restrained by compressing the carotid arteries (blood vessels on the sides of the neck that deliver blood
to the brain and head). This maneuver may also be referred to as a sleeper hold, carotid restraint, or
stranglehold.
Respiratory Neck Restraint – A neck restraint that restricts, or may restrict, air supply to the person being
restrained when pressure is applied to the front portion of the neck and throat. A respiratory neck
restraint may also be referred to as a chokehold, bar arm hold, guillotine choke, or bar hold. This
maneuver may also be performed with an inanimate object such as a baton or stick. When performed
with a baton or stick, the maneuver may be referred to as a mechanical hold.
Pressure – The physical application of force against a thing by something else in contact with
it.
Replace the current chokehold and stranglehold policy in General Order 200.3(c)
Response to Resistance with the following:
(c) Negative Impact to Air Intake or Blood Flow—Performing any action that could, or is
intended to, prevent, reduce, hinder or otherwise negatively impact an individual’s blood
flow to the brain or intake of air is considered a use of deadly force and is categorically
prohibited.
1. Examples of specific actions that are prohibited include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(a) Applying direct or indirect pressure by any means to an individual’s chest, back,
torso, head, face, neck, throat, windpipe or airway;
(b) Performing a Vascular Neck Restraint, carotid neck restraint, or any other variation
thereof;
(c) Performing a Respiratory Neck Restraint, chokehold, or any variation thereof;
(d) Kneeling, standing, sitting, or placing any body part on any area referenced in
200.3(c)(1)(a) (e.g. kneeling on a person’s back while they are in the prone position);
(e) Using an inanimate object to apply pressure to any area referenced in 200.3(c)(1)(a);
and
(f) Causing an individual’s nose or mouth to be blocked regardless of whether pressure
was used. The Department shall ensure that any device utilized by officers in the course
of their duties meets established safety requirements and does not restrict breathing
(e.g. ensuring that spit hoods are made of porous, breathable materials).
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2. This section is not applicable to situations in which an employee is applying pressure
to a wounded area to provide first aid or lifesaving measures.
3. Notwithstanding any other section of the General Orders and regardless of a
subsequent determination that use of such techniques was objectively reasonable under
the circumstances, it is a violation of Department policy to use any form of neck restraint
or to otherwise engage in any action that could, or is intended to, impede an individual’s
normal breathing or blood flow by applying pressure to the individual’s throat, neck,
head, back, chest or torso, or by blocking the individual’s nose or mouth.
Remove General Order 200.3(d) Response to Resistance, which currently includes
the following language:
Improvising Permitted - Circumstances may arise in which officers reasonably believe that it would
be impracticable or ineffective to use a standard tool, weapon, or method provided by the
Department. Officers may find it more effective or practicable to improvise their response to
rapidly unfolding conditions they are confronting. In such circumstances, the use of any
improvised device or method must still be objectively reasonable and used only to the extent
which reasonably appears necessary to accomplish a legitimate law enforcement purpose.
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Introduction
Campaign Zero’s 8 Can’t Wait initiative recommends that police departments adopt policies that
require officers provide a verbal warning before employing use of deadly force when feasible.
Additionally, before using deadly force, officers should provide individuals an adequate amount
of time to comply with any commands the officers have given.
APD policy requires that officers issue a warning prior to the use of deadly force when “feasible."
While this is in alignment with 8 Can’t Wait’s model policy, it lacks sufficient specificity and detail
to provide officers with a clear understanding of what is expected of them.
Adding clear directives about when and how warnings should be given will help officers to
consistently give appropriate warnings before using of deadly force, potentially eliminating the
need for officers to resort to the use of deadly force. Policies that provide concrete guidance to
officers will increase consistency (in behavior and accountability) and help ensure that officers’
behavior reflects both community and APD goals.
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Policy review findings
Without further detail in policy, feasibility language is
ambiguous
The requirement for police officers to provide a warning prior to
the use of deadly force if “feasible” was established by the United
States Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner. In alignment with
this case, the majority of the police department policies that
meet 8 Can’t Wait standards require warnings when “feasible.”
Other policies that meet the 8 Can’t Wait standard may use the
terms “practical” or “possible."
APD’s current policy states that a warning should be given “if
feasible” but provides no other direction. By allowing so much
discretion, the policy fails to provide officers with guidance in
life-or-death situations. In some of the most critical and
consequential moments that officers may face, the policy leaves
them without knowing exactly what is expected of them and
what factors will be considered in the event of an administrative
investigation into the incident.
APD policy is more robust for less-lethal force warnings
APD policy is virtually silent regarding warning requirements for deadly force, particularly in
comparison with the warning requirements for less-lethal force options. The sections for both
TASER and kinetic energy projectiles include the purpose of a warning, verbiage for the warning,
and reporting requirements. These specifics are missing from APD’s policy regarding warnings
for deadly-force situations. APD’s policy should provide the same, if not more, specificity and
guidance as its policies governing less-lethal force options.
APD policy does not specify how a warning should be given
Other police departments instruct officers to, as part of their warning, identify themselves and
give a command. APD doesn’t require a warning or provide any specifications about how
warnings should be given. Requiring officers to identify themselves prior to using deadly force
would potentially decrease confusion thereby helping officers to gain or maintain control of the
scene. Additionally, requiring that officers give individuals a clear command and an adequate
amount of time to comply would increase the likelihood of gaining voluntary compliance, which
could eliminate any, real or perceived, need to use deadly force.
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Recommended policy changes
Remove the last paragraph of 202.1.1 Policy, which currently includes the following
language
Where feasible, a warning should be given before an officer resorts to deadly force as outlined
(a), (b) or (c) above. A specific warning that deadly force will be used is not required by this order;
only that a warning be given if feasible.
Create a new policy section in General Order 202 adding the following language
VERBAL WARNINGS
Purpose: The purpose of a warning is to provide the individual being targeted with a reasonable
opportunity to voluntarily comply with officer commands and to advise other officers and
bystanders with a warning that deadly force will be deployed.
(a) A verbal warning must be given prior to the deployment of a firearm in all circumstances
unless:
1. Use of deadly force is immediately necessary to prevent imminent death or serious
bodily injury to officers or bystanders on scene; and
2. Giving a warning will place the officer or bystanders in additional danger.
(b) A warning must be given prior to each deployment of a firearm in all circumstances that
don’t meet the requirements identified in subsection (a). If an initial deployment of a firearm
meets the requirements in subsection (a), a warning must be given prior to any subsequent
discharges of a firearm.
(c) Any warning must identify officers as police officers and include a clear, specific command
(e.g. "Austin Police! Drop the weapon or I’ll shoot!").
1. The warning must be communicated in a manner that enables the targeted
individual to perceive, understand, and comply with any issued commands. Officers
shall take into account factors such as, but not limited to, the following: distance,
environmental conditions, physical/mental condition of the targeted individual,
language barriers, and whether the individual has any disabilities that would inhibit
their ability to perceive, understand, or comply with any commands.
Office of Police Oversight
202.1.1 Firearm Discharge Situations; and
200.4 Deadly Force Applications.
Current APD policies relevant to warning before
shooting
The following APD policies chapters are relevant to warning before shooting:
To view the full excerpts of these chapters, please turn to Appendix F.
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(d) Warnings shall not include disrespectful, profane, discourteous, harsh, or offensive
language.
(e) The fact that a verbal warning was given, or the reasons it was not given, shall be
documented in any related reports. Officers shall also document any responses by the
targeted individual.
2. Based on factors like the ones listed in subsection (c)(1) above, officers shall have a
reasonable basis for believing that the warning was understood by the individual to
whom it was directed.
3. Officers must give targeted individuals an adequate of time to comply with any
request or command given as a part of the warning.
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202.1.1 Policy - Firearm Discharge Situations (Excerpt)
It is the policy of this department to resort to the use of a firearm when it reasonably appears to
be necessary under the circumstances.
(a) An officer has no duty to retreat and is only justified in using deadly force against another
when and to the extent the officer reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately
necessary to (Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(c) and (e)):
1. Protect himself or others from what he reasonably believes would be an imminent
threat of death or serious bodily injury.
2. Make an arrest or to prevent escape after arrest when the officer has probable
cause to believe that:
(a) The subject has committed or intends to commit an offense involving the
infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily injury or death; or
(b) The officer reasonably believes that there is an imminent or potential risk of
serious bodily injury or death to any other person if the subject is not
immediately apprehended.
202.1.3 Moving Vehicles
This order is not intended to restrict an officer's right to use deadly force directed at the operator
of a vehicle when it is reasonably perceived that the vehicle is being used as a weapon against
the officer or others. Officers who utilize a firearm against a vehicle or operator of a vehicle must
meet the same standards established in 202.1.1(a) above.
(a) Officers shall exercise good judgment and will not place themselves in the path of a
moving vehicle since doing so may increase the likelihood of having to resort to the use of
deadly force.
(b) Unless it reasonably appears that it would endanger officers or the public, officers will
move out of the path of any approaching vehicle.
(c) When encountering a vehicle being operated in a threatening manner, officers may leave a
position of cover only:
1. to utilize an avenue of escape
2. move to a position of better cover, or
3. if the need to apprehend the suspect or stop the threat outweighs the danger
imposed to the officer or any other person.
(d) Disabling a vehicle by use of a firearm will only be attempted under extraordinary
circumstances. Officers who utilize a firearm against a vehicle or operator of a vehicle must
meet the same standards established in 202.1.1(a) above.
Appendix A: Current APD policies relevant to shooting
at moving vehicles
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Philosophy of the Austin Police Department (Excerpt)
The protection of life is the primary core value and guiding principle of the Austin Police
Department. As such, all employees will strive to preserve human life while recognizing that duty
may require the use of deadly force, as a last resort, after other reasonable alternatives have failed
or been determined impractical.
200.1.1 Philosophy - Response to Resistance (Excerpt)
The Department recognizes and respects the value of all human life and dignity without prejudice
to anyone. It is also understood that vesting officers with the authority to use lawful and
objectively reasonable force and to protect the public welfare requires a careful balancing of all
human interests. Officers should recognize that their conduct prior to the use of force may be a
factor which can influence the level of force necessary in a situation. Officers should recognize
that their conduct prior to the use of force may be a factor which can influence the level of force
necessary in a situation.
200.3 Response to Resistance (Excerpt)
While the type and extent of force may vary, it is the policy of this department that officers use
only that amount of objectively reasonable force which appears necessary under the
circumstances to successfully accomplish the legitimate law enforcement purpose in accordance
with this order.
200.4 Deadly Force Applications
An officer has no duty to retreat and is only justified in using deadly force against another when
and to the extent the officer reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to
(Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(c) and (e)):
(a) Protect himself or others from what he reasonably believes would be an imminent threat of
death or serious bodily injury.
(b) Make an arrest or to prevent escape after arrest when the officer has probable cause to
believe that:
1. The subject has committed or intends to commit an offense involving the infliction
or threatened infliction of serious bodily injury or death; or
2. The officer reasonably believes that there is an imminent or potential risk of serious
bodily injury or death to any other person if the subject is not immediately
apprehended.
Appendix B: Current APD policies relevant to
exhausting all alternatives
Office of Police Oversight
36
202.1.1 Policy - Firearm Discharge Situations (Excerpt)
It is the policy of this department to resort to the use of a firearm when it reasonably appears to
be necessary under the circumstances.
(a) An officer has no duty to retreat and is only justified in using deadly force against
another when and to the extent the officer reasonably believes the deadly force is
immediately necessary to (Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(c) and (e)):
1. Protect himself or others from what he reasonably believes would be an
imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.
2. Make an arrest or to prevent escape after arrest when the officer has probable
cause to believe that:
(a) The subject has committed or intends to commit an offense involving the
infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily injury or death; or
(b) The officer reasonably believes that there is an imminent or potential risk
of serious bodily injury or death to any other person if the subject is not
immediately apprehended.
Appendix B: Current APD policies relevant to
exhausting all alternatives
Office of Police Oversight
37
200.1.2 Definitions (Excerpt)
De-escalation - Using techniques to stabilize the situation and reduce the immediacy of the threat,
so that more options and resources are available to bring about a successful resolution to an
encounter with a non-compliant subject. The goal of de-escalation is to gain the voluntary
compliance of subjects, when feasible, thereby eliminating the need to use force in response to
resistance.
De-escalation Techniques - Communicative or other actions used by officers, when safe, and without
compromising law-enforcement priorities, that are designed to increase the likelihood of gaining
voluntary compliance from a non-compliant subject, and reduce the likelihood of using force in
response to resistance.
Force - Any physical contact with a subject by an officer using the body or any object, device, or
weapon, not including unresisted escorting or handcuffing a subject.
200.2 De-escalation of Potential Force Encounters
When safe and reasonable under the totality of circumstances, officers shall use de-escalation
techniques to reduce the likelihood for force and increase the likelihood of voluntary compliance.
Nothing in this de-escalation policy requires an officer to place themselves in harm’s way to
attempt to de-escalate a situation. Recognizing that circumstances may rapidly change, officers
may need to abandon de-escalation efforts after they have commenced. Understanding that no
policy can realistically predict every situation an officer might encounter, the Department
recognizes that each officer must be entrusted with well-reasoned discretion in determining the
reasonable de-escalation techniques to use in a situation. This de-escalation policy is intended to
complement, not replace or supersede, other portions of the APD Policy Manual or specific officer
training that addresses de-escalation.
Appendix C: Current APD policies relevant to de-
escalation
Office of Police Oversight
38
200.2.1 Assessment and De-Escalation
As officers arrive on the scene, observe conditions, and interact with the persons there, they
should continue to gather additional relevant information and facts. These assessments, along
with reasonable inferences help to develop an understanding of the totality of the circumstances
of the incident.
(a) Assessing Risks and Benefits – After an officer has gathered sufficient information to
ascertain anticipated threats at the scene, they shall consider whether de-escalation is
appropriate. Factors that should be considered are:
1. whether the officer believes the search, arrest or transportation must be
undertaken immediately;
2. what risks and benefits may be associated with delaying immediate action;
3. what contingencies may arise;
4. whether the situation requires a supervisor’s response;
5. whether other officers may be needed on the scene, including special units, such as
CIT or CINT;
6. whether other resources (e.g. less-lethal weaponry, special equipment, or other
emergency professionals, interpreters or other persons) are needed; and
7. other factor(s) relevant to assessing risks, benefits and contingencies
Having completed the above outlined assessment the officers shall, if reasonable, identify and
employ appropriate de-escalation techniques.
(b) Use of De-escalation Techniques – Employing de-escalation techniques may involve
securing additional resources, tactical repositioning, and employing verbal persuasion.
1. Securing Additional Resources -- Officers may utilize additional resources which are
reasonably calculated to lessen or possibly eliminate the need to respond to
resistance in a situation. To the extent possible and reasonable, in light of the totality
of the circumstances, officers should avoid physical confrontation until such time as
additional resources have arrived to assist. Additional resources may include:
(a) less lethal weaponry;
(b) additional officers;
(c) officers with special training, such as CIT or CINT; or
(d) any other persons whose presence may help de-escalate the situation (e.g.,
emergency medical professionals, interpreters, or supportive family members).
Appendix C: Current APD policies relevant to de-
escalation
Office of Police Oversight
39
2. Tactical Repositioning -- To delay or avoid physical confrontation, officers may
wish to employ any one or more of the following tactical repositioning measures, to
the extent possible and reasonable in light of the totality of circumstances:
(a) maintain safe physical distance from the subject;
(b) maintain cover behind existing or assembled physical barriers; or
(c) communicate from a location that is concealed from the subject.
3. Verbal Persuasion -- To the extent possible and reasonable under the totality of
the circumstances officers may use one or more of the following verbal techniques
to try to calm an agitated subject and promote rational decisions.
(a) Treat the subject with dignity and respect, the way the officer would wish to
be treated if they stood in the subject’s shoes;
(b) Listen to the subject’s side of the story and permit them to express
frustration;
(c) Explain what the officer is doing, what the subject can do, and what needs to
happen;
(d) Explain why the officer is taking a specific action, again permitting the
subject to respond and acknowledging their perspective;
(e) If possible, provide the subject with alternatives, even though those
alternatives may be limited;
(f) Advise the subject of the consequences for noncompliance;
(g) Offer reasonable, professional advice if it is expected to help; or
(h) Provide the subject with reasonably sufficient time within which to respond
to directives.
Appendix C: Current APD policies relevant to de-
escalation
Office of Police Oversight
40
Office of Police Oversight
200.1.2 Definitions (Excerpt)
Objectively Reasonable - An objective standard viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer
on the scene, without the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, and within the limitations of the totality of
the circumstances presented at the time of the incident.
200.1.3 Duty to Intercede
Any officer who observes another officer using force shall intercede to prevent further harm if the
officer knows that the force being used is not objectively reasonable and the officer has a
reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm. Such officers must also promptly report these
observations to a supervisor.
Appendix D: Current APD policies relevant to the duty
to intervene
41
Office of Police Oversight
200.1.2 Definitions (Excerpt)
Bodily Injury - Physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition (Tex. Penal Code §
1.07(a)(8)).
Serious Bodily Injury - Bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death,
serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ (Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(46)).
De-escalation - Using techniques to stabilize the situation and reduce the immediacy of the threat,
so that more options and resources are available to bring about a successful resolution to an
encounter with a non-compliant subject. The goal of de-escalation is to gain the voluntary
compliance of subjects, when feasible, thereby eliminating the need to use force in response to
resistance.
De-escalation Techniques - Communicative or other actions used by officers, when safe, and without
compromising law-enforcement priorities, that are designed to increase the likelihood of gaining
voluntary compliance from a non-compliant subject and reduce the likelihood of using force in
response to resistance.
Deadly Force - Force that is intended or known by the officer to cause, or in the manner of its use or
intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury (Tex. Penal Code § 9.01(3)). Force
- Any physical contact with a subject by an officer using the body or any object, device, or weapon,
not including unresisted escorting or handcuffing a subject.
Non-Deadly Force - Any application of force other than deadly force.
Objectively Reasonable - An objective standard viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer
on the scene, without the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, and within the limitations of the totality of
the circumstances presented at the time of the incident.
Appendix E: Current APD policies relevant to
chokeholds and strangleholds
42
Office of Police Oversight
200.3 Response to Resistance (Excerpt)
(c) Vascular Neck Restraints, Carotid Neck Restraints, and strangleholds are prohibited in all
cases except where deadly force would be authorized. Unless engaged in a lethal force
encounter, officers will not:
1. Apply direct or indirect pressure by any means to an individual’s throat, windpipe, or
airway in a manner that is reasonably likely to prevent, reduce, or hinder the intake of air
(e.g., apply a chokehold); or
2. Apply direct or indirect pressure to an individual’s neck in a manner that is reasonably
likely or intended to prevent, reduce, or hinder the blood flow within the carotid arteries.
(d) Improvising Permitted - Circumstances may arise in which officers reasonably believe that
it would be impracticable or ineffective to use a standard tool, weapon, or method provided
by the Department. Officers may find it more effective or practicable to improvise their
response to rapidly unfolding conditions they are confronting. In such circumstances, the use
of any improvised device or method must still be objectively reasonable and used only to the
extent which reasonably appears necessary to accomplish a legitimate law enforcement
purpose
Appendix E: Current APD policies relevant to
chokeholds and strangleholds
43
Office of Police Oversight
202.1.1 Firearm Discharge Situations
It is the policy of this department to resort to the use of a firearm when it reasonably appears to
be necessary under the circumstances.
(a) An officer has no duty to retreat and is only justified in using deadly force against another
when and to the extent the officer reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately
necessary to (Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(c) and (e)):
1. Protect himself or others from what he reasonably believes would be an imminent
threat of death or serious bodily injury.
2. Make an arrest or to prevent escape after arrest when the officer has probable cause
to believe that:
(a) The subject has committed or intends to commit an offense involving the
infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily injury or death; or
(b) The officer reasonably believes that there is an imminent or potential risk of
serious bodily injury or death to any other person if the subject is not immediately
apprehended.
(b) To stop a dangerous and aggressive animal:
1. In circumstances where officers encounter any animal which reasonably appears to
pose an imminent threat of bodily injury to officers or others, officers are authorized
to use objectively reasonable force up to and including deadly force (when lesser
means would be impractical) to neutralize the threat. If time and distance permit, an
officer may consider using the following less-lethal options:
(a) Fire Extinguisher
(b) Oleoresin Capsicum spray
(c) TASER Device
(d) Assistance of Animal Control
2. In circumstances in which officers have sufficient advanced notice that a potentially
dangerous domestic animal (e.g., dog) may be encountered, such as in the serving of a
search warrant, officers should develop reasonable contingency plans for dealing with
the animal without the use of deadly force (e.g., fire extinguisher, TASER Device,
oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray, assistance of animal control). Nothing in this order
shall prohibit any officer from resorting to deadly force to control a dangerous animal
if circumstances reasonably dictate that a contingency plan has failed or becomes
impracticable.
Appendix F: Current APD policies relevant to warning
before shooting
44
Office of Police Oversight
3. In the event force is used against an animal by an officer and the animal is injured
or there is a reasonable belief the animal was injured, regardless of whether visible
injury exists, officers shall make a reasonable attempt to ensure the animal receives
care for its' injuries. This may include but is not limited to:
(a) Contacting the owner to arrange private treatment in an appropriate time
frame.
(b) Contacting Animal Control to have the animal collected and treated
(c) Arranging transport of the animal to a veterinary facility
(d) Transporting the animal to a veterinary facility
(c) With the approval of a supervisor, an officer may euthanize an animal that is so
badly injured that human compassion requires its removal from further suffering
and where other dispositions are impracticable.
(d) Omitted; Irrelevant
Where feasible, a warning should be given before an officer resorts to deadly force as outlined
(a), (b) or (c) above. A specific warning that deadly force will be used is not required by this
order; only that a warning be given if feasible.
200.4 Deadly Force Applications
An officer has no duty to retreat and is only justified in using deadly force against another
when and to the extent the officer reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately
necessary to (Tex. Penal Code § 9.51(c) and (e)):
(a) Protect himself or others from what he reasonably believes would be an
imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.
(b) Make an arrest or to prevent escape after arrest when the officer has probable cause
to believe that:
1. The subject has committed or intends to commit an offense involving the infliction
or threatened infliction of serious bodily injury or death; or
2. The officer reasonably believes that there is an imminent or potential risk of serious
bodily injury or death to any other person if the subject is not immediately
apprehended.
Appendix F: Current APD policies relevant to warning
before shooting
45
Endnotes
Office of Police Oversight
1 Resolution 20200611-050, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020); Resolution 20200611-095,
Austin City Council (June 11, 2020); Resolution 20200611-096, Austin City Council (June 11,
2020).
Reimagining Public Safety, City of Austin, 2020, austintexas.gov/publicsafety. Accessed 23 Jan.
2021.
Reimagining Public Safety, City of Austin, 2020, austintexas.gov/publicsafety. Accessed 23 Jan.
2021
Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020); Resolution, Austin City Council
20200611-096 (June 11, 2020).
Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020); Resolution 20200611-096,
Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020); Resolution 20200611-096,
Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
See Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
8 Can’t Wait, Campaign Zero, 2020, 8cantwait.org. Accessed 23 Jan. 2021.
Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
See Resolution 20200611-095 (June 11, 2020); 8 Can’t Wait, Campaign Zero, 2020,
8cantwait.org. Accessed 23 Jan. 2021.
See Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
See 8 Can’t Wait, Campaign Zero, 2020, 8cantwait.org/compare/. Accessed 23 Jan. 2021.
Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council, (June 11, 2020).
Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
46
Office of Police Oversight
18 Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
See “The Use-of-Force Continuum.” National Institute of Justice, 3 Aug. 2009,
nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/use-force-continuum. Accessed 23 Jan 2021.
Campaign Zero. “Require Use of Force Continuum.” 8 Can’t Wait, 2020, 8cantwait.org. Accessed
23 Jan. 2021.
Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
This tactic is mentioned in numerous police departments’ policies. Some of the cities whose
departments reference this tactic include: Baltimore, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Denver,
Las Vegas, New Orleans, Portland, San Antonio, and Tucson.
Resolution 20200611-050, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020); Resolution 20200611-095,
Austin City Council (June 11, 2020); Resolution 20200611-096, Austin City Council (June 11,
2020).
Campaign Zero. “Require Warning Before Shooting.” 8 Can’t Wait, 2020, 8cantwait.org. Accessed
23 Jan. 2021.
See 8 Can’t Wait, Campaign Zero, 2020, 8cantwait.org. Accessed 23 Jan. 2021.
Stoughton, Seth W., et al. Evaluating Police Uses of Force. New York, New York University Press,
2020.
See Police Executive Research Forum. “Guiding Principles on Use of Force.” 2016.
www.policeforum.org/assets/guidingprinciples1.pdf.
Austin Police Department. “202.1.3 Moving Vehicles.” Austin Police Department General Orders.
12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
20
19
29
30
31
32
Endnotes
47
Office of Police Oversight
33 See Walker, Samuel E., and Carol A. Archbold. The New World of Police Accountability. SAGE
Publications, 2020.
See Stoughton, Seth W., et al. Evaluating Police Uses of Force. New York, New York University
Press, 2020.
See Austin Police Department. “202.1.3 Moving Vehicles.” Austin Police Department General
Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. “202.1.3 Moving Vehicles.” Austin Police Department General
Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Stephens, Darrel W. “Police Discipline: A Case for Change.” New Perspectives in Policing.
2011. www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/234052.pdf.
International Association of Chiefs of Police, et al. "National Consensus Policy and Discussion
Paper on Use of Force." 2020. www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2020-
07/National_Consensus_Policy_On_Use_Of_Force%2007102020%20v3.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. Austin Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020.
austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
Campaign Zero. “Requires Exhaust All Alternatives Before Shooting.” 8 Can’t Wait, 2020,
8cantwait.org. Accessed 23 Jan. 2021.
See Stoughton, Seth W., et al. Evaluating Police Uses of Force. New York, New York University
Press, 2020.
See Austin Police Department. “200.4 Deadly Force Applications.” Austin Police Department
General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf;
Austin Police Department. “202.1.1 Policy” Austin Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov.
2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. “Law Enforcement Code of Ethics.” Austin Police Department
General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf;
Austin Police Department. “Canons of Police Ethics.” Austin Police Department General Orders.
12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf; Austin Police
Department. “Philosophy, Values, Vision and Mission.” Austin Police Department General
Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
Endnotes
48
See Austin Police Department. Austin Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020.
austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. “Philosophy, Values, Vision and Mission.” Austin Police
Department General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020.
austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. “200.1.1 Philosophy.” Austin Police Department General Orders.
12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf; Austin Police
Department. “200.3 Response to Resistance.” Austin Police Department General Orders. 12
Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf; Austin Police
Department. “200.4 Deadly Force Applications.” Austin Police Department General Orders. 12
Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf; Austin Police
Department. “202.1.1 Policy.” Austin Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020.
austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. Austin Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020.
austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
Campaign Zero. “Require De-escalation.” 8 Can’t Wait, 2020, 8cantwait.org. Accessed 23 Jan.
2021.
Stoughton, Seth W., et al. Evaluating Police Uses of Force. New York, New York University Press,
2020. See Walker, Samuel E., and Carol A. Archbold. The New World of Police Accountability.
SAGE Publications, 2020.
Police Executive Research Forum. "An Integrated Approach to De-Escalation and Minimizing
Use of Force." Critical Issues in Policing Series, August 2012.
www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/an%20integrated%20approach%20to
%20de-escalation%20and%20minimizing%20use%20of%20force%202012.pdf; Stoughton,
Seth W., et al. Evaluating Police Uses of Force. New York, New York University Press, 2020;
Walker, Samuel E., and Carol A. Archbold. The New World of Police Accountability. SAGE
Publications, 2020.
See Police Executive Research Forum. “Refining the Role of Less-Lethal Technologies: Critical
Thinking, Communications, and Tactics Are Essential in Defusing Critical Incidents.” February
2020. www.policeforum.org/assets/LessLethal.pdf; Stoughton, Seth W., et al. Evaluating Police
Uses of Force. New York, New York University Press, 2020.
Office of Police Oversight
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
Endnotes
49
Police Executive Research Forum. “Refining the Role of Less-Lethal Technologies: Critical
Thinking, Communications, and Tactics Are Essential in Defusing Critical Incidents.” February
2020. www.policeforum.org/assets/LessLethal.pdf; Stoughton, Seth W., et al. Evaluating Police
Uses of Force. New York, New York University Press, 2020; Walker, Samuel E., and Carol A.
Archbold. The New World of Police Accountability. SAGE Publications, 2020.
See Austin Police Department. “202.1.2 Definitions.” Austin Police Department General Orders. 12
Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. “200.2 De-escalation of Potential Force Encounters.” Austin
Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020.
austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Walker, Samuel E., and Carol A. Archbold. The New World of Police Accountability. SAGE
Publications, 2020.
See Austin Police Department. “200.2 De-escalation of Potential Force Encounters.” Austin
Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020.
austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf; Austin Police Department.
“200.2.1 Assessment and De-escalation.” Austin Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov.
2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. “200.2 De-escalation of Potential Force Encounters.” Austin
Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020.
austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf; Austin Police Department.
“200.2.1 Assessment and De-escalation.” Austin Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov.
2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. “200.2 De-escalation of Potential Force Encounters.” Austin
Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020.
austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf; Austin Police Department.
“200.2.1 Assessment and De-escalation.” Austin Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov.
2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. “200.2 De-escalation of Potential Force Encounters.” Austin
Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020.
austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf; Austin Police Department.
“200.2.1 Assessment and De-escalation.” Austin Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov.
2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
Office of Police Oversight
52
53
54
55
Endnotes
56
57
58
59
50
Austin Police Department. “200.2.1 Assessment and De-escalation.” Austin Police Department
General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
Austin Police Department. “200.2.1 Assessment and De-escalation.” Austin Police Department
General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. “106.2.3 Grammatical Construction of Manuals.” Austin Police
Department General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020.
austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. Austin Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020.
austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
Campaign Zero. “Duty to Intervene.” 8 Can’t Wait, 2020, 8cantwait.org. Accessed 23 Jan. 2021.
Walker, Samuel E., and Carol A. Archbold. The New World of Police Accountability. SAGE
Publications, 2020.
See Cronk, Spencer. “Reimagining Public Safety for the City of Austin.” Received by Mayor,
Mayor Pro Tem and Council Members, Official Distribution Memoranda Search, City of Austin
Communications and Public Information Office, 17 June 2020,
www.austintexas.gov/edims/pio/document.cfm?id=342175; Devlin, Kat, et al. “Outside U.S.,
Floyd's Killing and Protests Sparked Discussion on Legislators' Twitter Accounts.” Pew Research
Center, Pew Research Center, 26 Aug. 2020, www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2020/08/04/outside-u-s-floyds-killing-and-protests-sparked-discussion-on-legislators-
twitter-accounts/.
See Austin Police Department. “200.1.3 Duty to Intercede.” Austin Police Department General
Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See e.g. “Intervene.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/intervene. Accessed 23 Jan. 2021; “Intervene.” Lexico.com Dictionary,
Oxford University Press, www.lexico.com/en/definition/intervene. Accessed 23 Jan. 2021; See
also “Intercede.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/intercede. Accessed 23 Jan. 2021; “Intercede.” Lexico.com Dictionary,
Oxford University Press, www.lexico.com/en/definition/intercede. Accessed 23 Jan. 2021.
See Austin Police Department. “200.1.3 Duty to Intercede.” Austin Police Department General
Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
Office of Police Oversight
Endnotes
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
51
Office of Police Oversight
See Austin Police Department. “200.1.2 Definitions.” Austin Police Department General Orders. 12
Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf; Graham v. Conner,
490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
See Austin Police Department. “200.1.3 Duty to Intercede.” Austin Police Department General
Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
Walker, Samuel E., and Carol A. Archbold. The New World of Police Accountability. SAGE
Publications, 2020.
Walker, Samuel E., and Carol A. Archbold. The New World of Police Accountability. SAGE
Publications, 2020.
Austin Police Department. “200.1.3 Duty to Intercede.” Austin Police Department General Orders.
12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Walker, Samuel E., and Carol A. Archbold. The New World of Police Accountability. SAGE
Publications, 2020.
See Austin Police Department. “200.1.3 Duty to Intercede.” Austin Police Department General
Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. “200.1.3 Duty to Intercede.” Austin Police Department General
Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. “200.1.3 Duty to Intercede.” Austin Police Department General
Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
See Austin Police Department. Austin Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020.
austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
Campaign Zero. “Ban Chokeholds & Strangleholds.” 8 Can’t Wait, 2020, 8cantwait.org. Accessed
23 Jan. 2021.
See Gennaco, Michael et al., panelists. Panel discussion. “An Examination of Police Initiated
Neck Restraints.” The Twenty-Sixth Annual Conference of the National Association for Civilian
Oversight of Law Enforcement, 9 Sept. 2020. Webinar.
Endnotes
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
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See Gennaco, Michael et al., panelists. Panel discussion. “An Examination of Police Initiated
Neck Restraints.” The Twenty-Sixth Annual Conference of the National Association for Civilian
Oversight of Law Enforcement, 9 Sept. 2020. Webinar; “Leading Law Enforcement Organizations
Release Update to National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on The Use of Force.”
International Association of Chiefs of Police, 10 July 2020,
www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2020%20Use%20of%20Force%20Consensus%20Policy%20
Statement_0.pdf?MvBriefArticleId=36500.
Manley, Brian. “Use of Force and De-Escalation Policies.” Received by Mayor and Council
Members, Official Distribution Memoranda Search, City of Austin Communications and Public
Information Office, 8 July 2020, www.austintexas.gov/edims/pio/document.cfm?id=342897.
Manley, Brian. “Use of Force and De-Escalation Policies.” Received by Mayor and Council
Members, Official Distribution Memoranda Search, City of Austin Communications and Public
Information Office, 8 July 2020, www.austintexas.gov/edims/pio/document.cfm?id=342897.
See Austin Police Department General Orders, 12 Nov. 2020, austintexas.gov/page/apd-general-
orders. Accessed 23 Jan. 2021.
See Austin Police Department. “200.3 Response to Resistance.” Austin Police Department General
Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. “200.3 Response to Resistance.” Austin Police Department General
Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. “200.1.2 Definitions.” Austin Police Department General Orders. 12
Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf; Austin Police
Department. “200.3 Response to Resistance.” Austin Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov.
2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
Austin Police Department. “200.3 Response to Resistance.” Austin Police Department General
Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
See Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
Manley, Brian. “Use of Force and De-Escalation Policies.” Received by Mayor and Council
Members, Official Distribution Memoranda Search, City of Austin Communications and Public
Information Office, 8 July 2020, www.austintexas.gov/edims/pio/document.cfm?id=342897.
Endnotes
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
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Endnotes
Guerrero, Michelle. Carotid restraint or chokehold. 20 May 2019. San Diego Union-Tribune,
www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/public-safety/story/2019-05-19/san-diego-police-
leaders-defend-use-controversial-neck-restraint-despite-calls-for-ban. (Surrounding text
removed.)
New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board. “A Mutated Rule: Lack of Enforcement in
the Face of Persistent Chokehold Complaints in New York City.” An Evaluation of Chokehold
Allegations Against Members of the NYPD from January 2009 through June 2014. 2014.
www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/Chokehold%20Study_20141007.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. “200.1.2 Definitions.” Austin Police Department General Orders.
12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf;“Pressure.”
Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/pressure. Accessed 19 Jan. 2021.
See Austin Police Department. “200.3 Response to Resistance.” Austin Police Department
General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020.
austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. “200.3 Response to Resistance.” Austin Police Department
General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020.
austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Manley, Brian. “Use of Force and De-Escalation Policies.” Received by Mayor and
Council Members, Official Distribution Memoranda Search, City of Austin Communications
and Public Information Office, 8 July 2020, www.austintexas.gov/edims/pio/document.cfm?
id=342897. But see Austin Police Department. “200.3 Response to Resistance.” Austin Police
Department General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020.
austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
Austin Police Department. “200.3 Response to Resistance.” Austin Police Department General
Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
Austin Police Department. “200.3 Response to Resistance.” Austin Police Department General
Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
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Office of Police Oversight
See Gennaco, Michael et al., panelists. Panel discussion. “An Examination of Police Initiated
Neck Restraints.” The Twenty-Sixth Annual Conference of the National Association for
Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, 9 Sept. 2020. Webinar; “Leading Law Enforcement
Organizations Release Update to National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on The
Use of Force.” International Association of Chiefs of Police, 10 July 2020,
www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2020%20Use%20of%20Force%20Consensus%20Policy%
20Statement_0.pdf?MvBriefArticleId=3650; Smock, Bill, MD. “Dr. Smock’s Top 25 Medical
Consequences Resulting from Strangulation and Lateral Vascular Neck Restraint.” Indiana
State Medical Association. www.ismanet.org//pdf/resources/Top25CompsDV.pdf.
See Gennaco, Michael et al., panelists. Panel discussion. “An Examination of Police Initiated
Neck Restraints.” The Twenty-Sixth Annual Conference of the National Association for Civilian
Oversight of Law Enforcement, 9 Sept. 2020. Webinar.
Americans For Ethical Law Enforcement. “Civil Liability for the Use of Neck Restraints” AELE
Monthly Law Journal, Civil Liability Law Section, Jan. 2014.
www.aele.org/law/2014all01/2014-01MLJ101.pdf.
See Gennaco, Michael et al., panelists. Panel discussion. “An Examination of Police Initiated
Neck Restraints.” The Twenty-Sixth Annual Conference of the National Association for Civilian
Oversight of Law Enforcement, 9 Sept. 2020. Webinar.
See Smock, Bill, MD. “Dr. Smock’s Top 25 Medical Consequences Resulting from
Strangulation and Lateral Vascular Neck Restraint.” Indiana State Medical Association.
www.ismanet.org//pdf/resources/Top25CompsDV.pdf.
See Smock, Bill, MD. “Dr. Smock’s Top 25 Medical Consequences Resulting from
Strangulation and Lateral Vascular Neck Restraint.” Indiana State Medical Association.
www.ismanet.org//pdf/resources/Top25CompsDV.pdf.
Gennaco, Michael et al., panelists. Panel discussion. “An Examination of Police Initiated
Neck Restraints.” The Twenty-Sixth Annual Conference of the National Association for Civilian
Oversight of Law Enforcement, 9 Sept. 2020. Webinar.
Gennaco, Michael et al., panelists. Panel discussion. “An Examination of Police Initiated
Neck Restraints.” The Twenty-Sixth Annual Conference of the National Association for Civilian
Oversight of Law Enforcement, 9 Sept. 2020. Webinar.
Endnotes
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
55
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See Gennaco, Michael et al., panelists. Panel discussion. “An Examination of Police Initiated
Neck Restraints.” The Twenty-Sixth Annual Conference of the National Association for Civilian
Oversight of Law Enforcement, 9 Sept. 2020. Webinar; Americans For Ethical Law
Enforcement. “Civil Liability for the Use of Neck Restraints” AELE Monthly Law Journal, Civil
Liability Law Section, Dec. 2013. www.aele.org/law/2013all12/2013-12MLJ101.pdf; Americans
For Ethical Law Enforcement. “Civil Liability for the Use of Neck Restraints” AELE Monthly Law
Journal, Civil Liability Law Section, Jan. 2014. www.aele.org/law/2014all01/2014-
01MLJ101.pdf.
Resolution 20200611-095, Austin City Council (June 11, 2020).
See Austin Police Department. Austin Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020.
austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See 8 Can’t Wait, Campaign Zero, 2020, 8cantwait.org. Accessed 23 Jan. 2021.
See Stoughton, Seth W., et al. Evaluating Police Uses of Force. New York, New York University
Press, 2020.
Austin Police Department. “202.1.1 Policy.” Austin Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov.
2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Stoughton, Seth W., et al. Evaluating Police Uses of Force. New York, New York University
Press, 2020; Stephens, Darrel W. “Police Discipline: A Case for Change.” New Perspectives in
Policing. 2011. www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/234052.pdf.
See Stephens, Darrel W. “Police Discipline: A Case for Change.” New Perspectives in Policing.
2011. www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/234052.pdf.
See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985).
See 8 Can’t Wait, Campaign Zero, 2020, 8cantwait.org/compare/. Accessed 23 Jan. 2021.
See 8 Can’t Wait, Campaign Zero, 2020, 8cantwait.org/compare/. Accessed 23 Jan. 2021.
See Austin Police Department. “202.1.1 Policy.” Austin Police Department General Orders. 12
Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Austin Police Department. “206.5.2 Verbal Warnings.” Austin Police Department General
Orders. 12 Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf; Austin
Police Department. “208.3 Verbal Warnings.” Austin Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov.
2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
Endnotes
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
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See Austin Police Department. “202.1.1 Policy.” Austin Police Department General Orders. 12
Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See 8 Can’t Wait, Campaign Zero, 2020, 8cantwait.org/compare/. Accessed 23 Jan. 2021.
See Austin Police Department. “202.1.1 Policy.” Austin Police Department General Orders. 12
Nov. 2020. austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
See Stoughton, Seth W., et al. Evaluating Police Uses of Force. New York, New York University
Press, 2020.
Austin Police Department. Austin Police Department General Orders. 12 Nov. 2020.
austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/General%20Orders.pdf.
Endnotes
123
124
125
126
127
57